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This work herein was conducted by the Engineering Department
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Contract NAS3-22652 from September 1980 through October 1981.
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were Project Manager and Assistant Project Manager, respect-
ively. At Rocketdyne, Mr. F. M. Kirby as Program Manager,
and Mr. C. A. MacGregor as Project Engineer, were respons-
ible for technical direction of the program. Mr. M. Ionnitiu
performed Task I; Mr. S. Barkhoudarian, Mr. J. R. Mcl1anus,
Mr. J. Maram, and Mr. R. L. Phillips performed Task II; and
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SUMMARY
Rocketdyne has reviewed the 85,000 failure reports which have resulted
from
1. The development of eight different pump-fed liquid rocket engines
2. The delivery of about 2500 engines
3. The launch of over 1000 flight vehicles
over the last 30 years. These engine failure reports were reviewed,
screened, categorized and were reduced to 16 failure modes and failure prop-
agation diagrams, which were common to all engines .
A survey of the state of the art of sensors for in-flight and inspection
techniques for between-flight engine condition moinitoring was performed.
The in-flight sensors and the between-flight inspection techniques were
assessed, matched, then ranked relative to their suitability for prognosis
and diagnosis of the identified 16 failure modes. The highest ranked tech-
nology selections for both in-flight and between-flight were considered
upgradable and the effort required to develop these technologies has been
identified.
The eight technologies that are potentially applicable to rocket engines
are:
1. Optical pyrometer for turbine blade temperature
2. Fiberoptic deflectometer for bearing condition
3. Isotope wear detector for wear particles
4. Tunable di9de laser spectrometer for wear particles
5. Ultrasonic flowmeter for propellant flows
6. Ultrasonic thermometer for high temperatures
7. Holographic leak detector for fluid leaks
8. Scanning pyrometer for blocked fluid passages
INTRODUCTION
Future space transportation systems for low earth orbit must rely on reus-
able subsystems and routine ground 6perations to be cost effective. This
can be achieved by avoiding high costs associated with maintenance on a
basis other than for cause, and avoiding disassembly for routine inspection
and premature component replacement. The approach to achieving substantial
operations cost reductions by increasing rocket engine service life and
reducing maintenance and turn-around time between flights is to incorpo-
rate engine condition monitoring. Engine condition monitoring includes
both in-flight condition monitoring and between-flight inspection. This
study was conducted for the purpose of identifying technology advancements
in engine condition monitoring needed to minimize liquid rocket engine
maintenance.
There has been a long history of development activity directed toward air-
craft air breathing engine monitoring systems. Several Air Force aircraft/
engine systems as well as engine-alone systems have been implemented
recently through prototype and operational applications. These systems
have been directed toward reducing propulsion support costs and improving
aircraft operational availability. Similar activity has existed with com-
mercial airlines. However, prior to the advent of the Space Shuttle and
the Space Shuttl~ Main Engines, no large requirement for reusable liquid
rocket engines existed. The Space Shuttle is bringing about new
requirements.
This study was undertaken to identify needed technology advancements in
engine conditioning monitoring. The efforts (1) reviewed past rocket
engine failures modes, (2) identified state-of-the-art technology for
in-flight engine condition monitoring sensors and between-flight inspection
techniques to detect incipient component failures, and (3) identified areas
where advancement in monitoring and inspectipn technology is required.
The study was performed in four tasks:
Task I - Review and Characterization of Past and Present Rocket
Engine Failures
TaEik II - Identification and Evaluation of In..,.Flight Condition
Monitoring Sensors
Task III - Identification and Evaluation of Between-Flight Inspection
Techniques
Task IV - Eight Technologies Recommended for Additional Development
Effort
The study was performed during part of 1980 and 1981.
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DISCUSSION
CHARACTERIZATION OF ROCKET ENGINE FAILURES
The objectives of Task I of this study were to identify engine failures of
main propulsion booster and space engines. regardless of propellant combina-
tion, to categorize these failures, and to investigate and evaluate the
failure modes in order to conduct an assessment of state-of-the-art tech-
nology of the in-flight engine condition, monitoring equipment and inspection
techniques •
To perform this task it was necessary to draw upon the Rocketdyne Reliability
Data bank for applicable failures, to categorize the data in some meaningful
way, to reduce it to a manageable size, and to unravel the propagation of
the applicable failure modes to assist the investigation of the monitoring
techniques.
These data were to be submitted in an agreed-upon format that would simplify
the performance of the subsequent tasks of the study, and would record the
results.
FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
1. Definitions
Since Rocketdyne has had a relatively long and rich experience in rocket
engine development, testing and production (Fig. 1), it was decided to review
and evaluate the reports associated with engine failures that could provide
a basis for the study.
The failure data accumulated at Rocketdyne over the years was estimated to
be in the neighborhood of 100.000 pieces of information. It became apparent
that some ground rules and screening were required to handle the mass of data
in some consistent manner to obtain meaningful results to support the study.
The first decision was to select a definition for failure which would be
consistent with the approach. The definition is:
"Failure is the inability of equipment to satisfy performance
or design specifications once the equipment has experienced
successful operation or acceptance or has the expectation of
successful performance without adjustment or rework:"
This definition permits the reporting of failures, which have been noted
during operation, as well as the reporting of conditions which would result
in a failure if operation were permitted.
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Figure 1. Rocketdyne--30 Years of Delivering Engines
The definition would become a first screen of the data by eliminating the
trouble reports in the system which are generated as a result of rejection
of hardware due to improper paperwork~ cosmetic discrepancies (scratches on
paint~ lack of torque stripe. etc.). While the boundaries of the failure
were determined~ the criticality of the failure had also to be defined.
Since the format selected for presentation of the data required assigning
criticality factors~ these were defined as:
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
2. Raw Data Base
loss of life or vehicle
loss of mission (includes both post-launch
abort and launch delay sufficient to cause
mission scrub)
all others
Before examining the criteria for subsequent screens~ it is helpful to
describe the life cycle of an engine at Rocketdyne and in the field~ up
to the point where the engine is expended, and to establish at which point
failure reports, or Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCRs) originate.
4
Figure 2 shows the typical activity to which the hardware, which constitutes
an engine, is exposed. Separate pieces of hardware are received and tested
prior to assembly in subsystems or assemblies in Receiving Inspection opera-
tions by the Quality Assurance organization. Once a component or parts
thereof are deemed acceptable, they are ready for assembly into larger
components, subsystems, systems and finally into a complex system. The
engine UCRs are written only when the component, having once demonstrated
its ability to function according to specification requirements, fails to
meet these requirements.
Components are functionally checked during assembly and subsystems are
further tested. Turbopumps are calibrated and assembled, and subjected to
a so-called "green run" on the component test stand. The green run is the
initial hot fire test of the assembled turbopump, verifying its ability to
deliver the desired performance. The turbine receives its working fluid
from a slave gas generator: while the fuel pump delivers fuel, the LOX side
pumps water. After successfully passing the green run tests, the assembled
turbopump is returned to the shop to be mounted on the engine. The thrust
chamber and injector are also calibrated separately, in water tests, to
determine the Delta-P and are then ready for assembly. For many years the
gas generator, the component that delivers working gas to the turbine, was
tested separately to determine its performance.
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Figure 2. Gas Generator Cycle Rocket Engine Test Activity
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All these components, together with the thrust mounts, valves, controls,
lines and ducts, electrical components and harnesses are assembled into
an engine. UCRs are always written when a component does not meet any
requirements. Finally, the completed engine is subjected to a series of
electromechanical and leak checks, usually called the first E&M check.
After passing this series of tests, the engine is mounted on a test stand
and subjected to a minimum of two hot fire tests to verify engine perform-
ance and operation. Any nonconformance is written up as an UCR. After
completing the hot fire, or acceptance tests, the production engine is
returned to the shop for another series of leak and electromechanical tests,
the second E&M check. After successfully passing these tests, the engine is
delivered to the customer. At this point, the engine is transported to
another contractor, where it passes receiving inspection tests, is installed
in the vehicle and subjected to a new series of electrical, mechanical and
leak checks. During this time, any discrepancy is written up as an UCR.
Subsequently, the integrated vehicle is transported to the launch site, the
payload is installed and the engine goes through the final series of checks
prior to countdown sometimes including static firing. Further UCRs may be
generated during this time, until, in conventional rocket engines, the
engine is expended in launch.
As it can be seen, the Rocketdyne failure reporting system is designed to
record on UCRs nonconforming conditions at various stages of the engine
life. In addition, the UCR provides disposition for the discrepant hard-
ware; it outlines corrective action against future similar occurrences and
supplies trend data. Figure 3 shows two UCRs from the SSME data file,
indicating all the information that is recorded regarding the discrepancy.
At this point, the selection of the engine systems, from which the UCR data
were going to be evaluated, was also made. Based on the study requirements,
it was decided to use failure data from large liquid rocket engines; that
is, systems that utilize pumps for propellant feed, rather than being fed
from pressurized tanks. The engine systems selected are based on similarity
of engine operation and of component configuration with the hypothetical
reusable rocket engine.
The information retrived from the computerized Reliability Data Repository
was limited to current engine systems still in production as well as those
that had been designed for manned application in the Apollo program. Data
from discontinued pump-fed engines, such as the Navajo, Jupiter and Redstone,
were not used since they are too far removed from the current concept of
rocket engines. The selected engine systems are:
•
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
SSME used in the Orbiter Vehicle
J-2 used in the. Saturn Ib and V Vehicles
H-l used in the Saturn Ib Vehicle
F-l used in the Saturn V Vehicle
RS-27 used in the Delta Vehicle
Thor used in the Thor Vehicle
Atlas used in the Atlas, Atlas-Centaur Vehicles
These systems are described briefly in Appendix A.
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After excluding other data from programs that did not fit the initial
criteria, that is UCRs originating in programs related to the engine systems
listed above, the data base consisted of some 84,000 pieces of information.
3. Data Screening
Concentrating on the objective of the study, it was desirable to use only
UCRs which could provide the basis for investigation of rocket engine
sensors. Since the UCR search covered an extensive time period during the
development stages and the production of these engine systems, it was
desirable to concentrate on the failures originating during the operational
phase of the engine.
Screen No.1. The criteria to eliminate failure reports of components and
engines of experimental configuration were established. The most cost-
effective way was to retain the data originating from production and flight
configuration engines. This allowed an automatic sort of the data stored
on computer tapes. The criteria for sorting the failure data were by engine
serial number denoting production/flight engine systems as follows:
SSME - All 2xxx series plus flight configuration engines 0006,
0008, 0009 .
Atlas - All llxxxx and 22xxxx series engines
RS-27 - All OOxx series
F-l
J-2 All 4 digit series
H-l
Thor - All 6 digit series
A further screening of the Atlas and H-l engine data removed information
related to earlier models as unsuitable for the analysis.
Figure 4, indicates the phase from which the failure data was drawn, relating
it to reliability growth. Because data from mature engine was desirable,
UCRs from the early life of the program were excluded.
•
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•Screen No.2. The next screening step was to select failure data from hot
fire tests, flight/launch operations and post hot fire tests. Each produc-
tion engine, before being delivered, is subjected to one or more hot fire
tests to determine its operational characteristics and to verify the integ-
rity of the system.
These tests, performed at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) test
stands (F-l testing was performed at Edwards Air Force Base facility) and
called acceptance tests, were found most suitable for the study. The
acceptance tests dupli~ate, as much as possible, the operation of the
engine systems during launch and flight with the exception of duration and
acceleration.
Screen No.3. Another screening step resulted from elimination of the fail-
ure reports due to causes that would obscure the goal of the investigation.
The following categories were excluded as unsuitable:
1. Procedural problems
2. Human error
3. Facility and vehicle discrepancies
4. Low frequency failures (one-time occurrences)
5. Experimental hardware or procedures
6. Secondary failures
7. Obsolete hardware
8. Information type instrumentation failures
Screen No.4. In addition, because the bulk of the failure data thus
obtained originated from the expendable rocket engine experience, the VCRs
were screened with respect to their impact on reusability. Also, where
design information exists, the life of the component was compared to its
design life. In addition, conditions that could have been monitored to
detect the incipient failure were listed.
Figure 5 shows the original data base that was available for the study and
the reduction in numbers after the successive screening operations.
4. Data Base After Screening
Figure 6 shows the distribution among the several engine systems of the
1771 VCRs that were left after screening. It is not surprising to note
that over three-fourths of the retained VCRs corne from engine systems that
represent 857. of the delivered engines.
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ENGINE INITIAL AFTER AFTER
SYSTEM NO. UCRs SCREEN SCREEN1 & 2 ** 3 4
SSME 5,600 851 218 101
J-2 18,321 2,218 1411 127
F·1 13,140 1,27' 103 102
H-1 9,751 1,521 328 326
THOR* 12,029 1,1148 47. 474
RS·27 1,284 260 101 101
ATLAS· 28,274 119 541 533
TOTAL 14,379 1,977 1990 1771
*ONLV LATEST MODELS CONSIDEftED AI'I'LICAILE
THOft MI 3·1, THOft MI 3·3
ATLAS MA-3, ATLAS MA·1i
H·'205K
•• SCftEENS 1 AND 2 WEftE PEftFOftMED SIMULTANEOUSLV
IV AI'PIlOl'ftlATE CftlTERIA DUftlNG COMI'UTEft ftETftlEVAL
OF DATA.
Figure 5. UCRs Applicable After Screening
Figure 6. Distribution of UCRs by Engine Systems After Screening
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FAILURE CHARACTERIZATION
Figure 7 presents the format for evaluation of each failure mode at the
Engine System and Component Level, and for listing the viable in-flight
condition monitoring systems and between-flight inspection techniques that
would be capable of detecting an incipient failure. Each failure mode
represents an event during which the resnective engine system failed to per-
form according to specifications.
Each component failure mode was evaluated and the following was determined:
1. If the failure was predictable or unpredictable
2. If the failure would be detectable in flight, on the ground, or
not at all
3. If the failure was functional or operational
4. If the failure was primary or secondary
5. If the failure caused performance degradation or was catastrophic.
In addition, where design information exists, the life of the component was
compared to its design life. Conditions that could have been monitored to
detect the incipient failures are also listed. The successive screenings
of the UCRs written against the failures of the matured applicable engine
systems have reduced the number of pieces of information from over 84,000
to 1771.
The UCRs that passed all successive screening steps were grouped by engine
systems prior to making an individual assessment. Within each engine system,
the UCRs were analyzed and the failure was evaluated with the aid of drawings,
schematics, exploded views and test data, when available. In addition, to
assist in understanding the failure mechanism, an analysis of the sequence of
events leading to the incident was made using a graphic illustration. This
is later described in Failure Propagation Block Diagrams, and shown in Fig. 8.
Based on the assessment, the UCRs were grouped in failure modes. The opera-
tion was completed separately for each of the engine systems selected for the
study. The resulting failure modes were then compared and integrated. This
effort resulted in 16 modes for 1771 UCRs.
All information collected from the failure reports was thus included in the
forms, called summary sheets, that are submitted in Appendix B. A brief
description of each failure mode is presented below.
lAo Bolt Torque Relaxation
A main oxidizer valve which controls the flow of propellant to the main com-
bustion chamber, caught fire during engine operation, requiring premature
engine shutdown. Investigation of the failure disclosed that a screw that
secures one of the internal seals of the valve had become loose as a result
of cavitation and vibration, and allowed fretting of aluminum assemblies in
a liquid oxygen environment.
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Figure 8. Sample - Failure Propagation Block Diagram
The rubbing of the two metal parts caused heat and subsequent fire t and
extensive damage. The valve was redesigned to eliminate this failure
mode.
lB. Bolt Torgue Relaxation
In another engine system, the same failure mode t bolt torque relaxation,
caused the loosening of a seal retainer in the sequence valve of the main
oxidizer valve t as a result of excessive vibration due to high flow velocity
and/or engine vibration. This t in turn t allowed the pressurant gas (helium)
to escape prematurely to the gas generator control valve open port, actua-
ting this valve out of sequence. Premature operation of the gas generator
control valve caused a detonation in the combustor with damage to the
assembly.
2. Coolant Passage Splits
The thrust chamber assembly, common to all engine systems t is the component
that transforms the energy stored in the fuel into kinetic energy. This
fluid is contained and directed by the sides of the thrust chamber. During
engine operation, the thrust chamber is exposed to high pressure, to vibra-
tion, to high temperature all in a brief period of time. The strength and
the cooling capability of the thrust chamber is achieved through an
ingenious design.
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Containment is accomplished by a series of circular bands that ring the
thrust chamber, the lightness by using thin walls, and the cooling by
recirculating fuel. The requirement of lightweight and high heat transfer
capability is achieved by constructing the thrust chamber walls of tubes
through which the fuel circulates. High thermal strains, stresses induced
by vibration, surges during the ignition and transition stages, containment
within the tubes causing obstructions and material deficiencies are some
of the causes of failure of the cooling passages. Loss of coolant through
the thrust chamber walls may cause loss in engine performance and loss of
cooling capability which will lead to engine failure.
3. Joint Leakage
All liquid propellant engine systems suffer from leakages from the inter-
faces of the propellant and pressurant fluid ducting. Defects in material,
improper installation causing damage to seals or sealing surfaces, warping
or distortion of sealing surfaces due to thermal strains during engine start
or operation, fastener torque relaxation during engine operation are causes
of this failure mode. Effects on this failure mode vary depending upon the
location and the type of leakage, and some of them have had catastrophic
consequences.
4. Hot Gas Manifold Transfer Tube Cracks
This failure mode is peculiar to one engine, which utilizes double-walled
ducts to convey hydrogen-rich hot gases from the preburners to the high
pressure fuel turbopumps. Excessive high temperature transients have caused
hot spots or cracks on the inner wall (liner) which may evolve into a com-
plete failure of the component with catastrophic effect.
5. High Torque
High torque, as a result of rubbing the labyrinth seal in propellant pumps
has been experienced in several engine systems. The seal consists of a
series of land and grooves designed to minimize leakage from the high pres-
sure side of the pump to the low pressure inlet side. Excessive temperature
and vibration can lead to friction between the static and rotating parts
thus increasing the torque of the turbopump with eventual subsequent
failure.
6. Cracked Turbine Blades
Generally, turbine blades are subjected during start and main stage opera-
tion to high energy transients which could be due to pressure, temperature,
or accoustical spikes leading to failure as a result of localized heating
of turbine parts. Impact on turbine blades of debris and contaminants in
the hot gases has also caused damage, with resultant loss of efficiency
and imbalance of the turbine.
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7. Failure of Bellows
Flexible ducting is used to convey propellants between some components to
avoid problems that afflict rigid ducting. The bellows are damaged by high-
cycle fatigue, which is caused by high energy transients and high flow
velocity. The effects of this mode of failure vary depending on the loca-
tion of the duct, as well as on the type of fluid conveyed through the
bellows.
8. Loose Electrical Connectors
Some engines are more dependent on electrical controls than the previous
generation of rocket engines, and have encountered instances where failures
were reported caused by incomplete electrical circuits. The failures were
due to connectors that loosened as a result of vibration from engine opera-
tion. The consequences of this mode of failure vary according to the
affected electrical circuit.
8. Bearing Damage
Excessive loading of bearings in the highly stressed turbomachinery may
lead to wear-out and eventual failure. Contributing factors are excessive
axial and radial loads, vibration, and friction, an4 the effects are generally
catastrophic if not detected in time.
10. Tube Fracture
The failure mode noted on one engine occurred on a particularly sensitive
component that caused premature engine operation cutoff, and was the result
of vibration-induced fatigue.
11. Turbopump Face Seal Leakage
In the engine systems that utilize turbopumps to convey the propellant under
pressure to the combustion chamber, it is imperative to prevent leakage along
the rotating shaft. The seal leakage is especially critical in the engine
systems that use a common shaft to power the fuel and the oxidizer pumps,
because the mixing of propellant at that location has catastrophic con-
sequences. The cause of the seal leakage is generally due to excessive
temperature gradients, vibration, friction, or interface material damage
since the seal has to prevent leakage in both a static and in a dynamic
condition.
12. Lube Pressure Anomalies
Several anomalies in the lube (oil) system have been noted during this inves-
tigation, and all have been grouped in the same category as they affected pri-
marily a subsystem peculiar to certain types of engine systems. The lubri-
cation subsystem delivers oil under pressure to the turbopump gearcase for
lubrication and cooling gears and bearings through jets and nozzles. The
failures included in this category consist mainly of obstruction of the flow
due to contamination.
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13. Valve Fails to Perform
In this category, failures of different valves were included. These failures
were mainly caused by contamination or excessive friction. The effects upon
the engine performance vary depending upon the function of the part.
14. Internal Valve Leakage
This category comprises all those incidents in which an engine failure was due
to internal leakage within valves. The several failure mechanisms which can
lead to this condition ate so noted in the summary sheet.
15. Regulator Discrepancies
All regulator failures were grouped in this categury since they pertain to
a subsystem that is used in a few of the engine systems included in this
study. The function of the regulator is to reduce pneumatic supply pressure
to a required level and to maintain it at that level throughout engine
operation. Malfunction was caused mainly by contamination.
16. Contaminated Hydraulic Control Assembly
The failures that were included in this category are peculiar to one engine
system. The hydraulic control assembly receives and directs hydraulic con-
trol pressure in the proper sequence for the operation of the engine main
valves during start and shutdown and controls also their position during
mainstage operation.
Viewing the number of UCRs that fell into the different categories gives an
interesting picture of relative magnitude. The pie chart (Fig. 9) depicts
the distribution of UCRs by failure mode and verifies what was known from
previous experience; that the major problem that plagues liquid propellant
rocket engines is leakage. Over three-fourths of UCRs are related to
leakage, either internal to components, or external from joints. Thus the
dependence on leak testing the engine systems at various stages of their
life, and the reluctance to break into a subsystem for minor reasons, dis-
turbing proven joints, is justified.
All summary sheets for the 16 failure modes are presented in Appendix B.
Revision to Failure Modes Listing
Further evaluation of the 16 failure modes indicated that some should be
dropped from the analysis. Consequently, failure modes 1 and 4 (bolt torque
relaxation, and hot gas manifold transfer tube cracks) were excluded because
the corrective action taken in both cases was redesign. Thus, under pre-
viously established ground rules they would have been eliminated as not meet-
ing the mature engine definition. They had escaped the screening because the
redesign occurred on flight engines, which were by definition considered
to be mature.
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Figure 9. Distribution of UCRs Among Failure Mod~s
Failure Mode 12, Lube system anomalies, was also deleted because it is not
applicable to a reusable engine.
It should also be noted that the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis of every
engine system under consideration indicates other possible failure modes in
addition to the 16 that were determined for this study. These additional
failure modes have not been experienced in testing the mature engines,
therefore, it has been established that further investigation was not
warranted for an occurrence that has an extremely low frequency.
In conclusion, the screening process has been effective in reducing a large
amount of failure data to a manageable number by following a series of logi-
cal steps saving only that information that could contribute significantly
to the study. It also showed that most failure modes are common within the
various engine systems. This gives more confidence in selecting these
occurrences for determination of suitable in-flight condition monitoring
devices and between flight inspection methods and equipment.
FAILURE PROPAGATION BLOCK DIAGRAMS
To support the study' for the applicable in-flight condition monitoring devices,
a method for depicting failure modes was provided to indicate the sequence of
contributing events.
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These events, usually an anomalous system performance, show the relationship
between a symptom which could be monitored and the eventual failure of the
engine system to perform. The analysis method was to attempt to slice the
period of time in which the failure develops into small increments and sur-
vey the changes that occur. Isolating the contributing factors in time
assisted in the selection of suitable sensors. As depicted in Fig. 10, the
events are shown as rectangles, and the sequence, left to right, indicates
passage of time.
The failure propagation block diagrams included in this report (Appendix C)
are typical for each failure mode listed and were not repeated for each
different engine system, which may have a similar mode for slightly differ-
ent components.
Flight Failures
To complete the failure investigation of the concerned engine systems, it was
deemeq necessary to examine also the flight failures caused by these systems
over the years, since these occurrences were not covered by VCRs but by
special reports. This examination resulted in preparation of failure propaga-
tion block diagrams similar to -those discussed in the previous pages. These
charts do not indicate sensing devices, since most of the flights were
boosted by engine systems developed for military use, which carried limited
instrumentation. The theory under which these engine systems were designed
and tested was to get the vehicle off the launch pad whether it was func-
tioning properly or not. The engines were generally devoid of monitoring
devices and the shutdown controls were inactive before a predetermined opera-
ting duration, the alternative being the destruct button.
'PleMATUPle
CUTOFF
r (VI.PlATION
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r+ VI.PlATION ....
CAVITATION I--< ~
4 ACOUSTICS l-
.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: PlETAININO FIPlE
1. PlEDESION SCPlEW ~ FPlETTING ~ EX'LOSION
LVALVE LOOSENING
b. SCPlEW
Figure 10. Sample Failure Propagation Block Diagram
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It can be clearly seen that the charts illustrating the failures indicate
possible points in the propagation of the failure where detection of the
incipient failure could have limited damage to the engine and to the vehicle.
FAILURE DATA CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis and evaluation of the 1771 failure reports screened from the
tens of thousands of VCRs in the Reliability Data Repository resulted in a
summary presented in Fig. 11 and accounts for only 16 failure modes.
Examination of the data surveyed during the performance of Task I did not
reveal any surprises, except that the expected number of failure modes
encountered in 30 years of testing and flying rocket engines was rather
small.
As expected, the Atlas engine system, which consists of 3 separate engines,
exhibited most failure modes - eleven.
Another feature that appeared during this investigation is the commonality
of failure modes among the various engine systems. That is not surprising,
since the similarity in configuration between most of the engines. The
failure modes that appeared only on one engine system are those that occurred
on a component peculiar to one system (like hot gas manifold transfer tube
cracks, or Hydraulic Control Assembly) or because the engine system is more
dependent than others for successful operation on proper functioning of the
component (Failure Mode 8, Loose Electrical Connectors).
FAILUftE ENGINE SYSTEM TOTALMODE FAILUftE MODE DESCftlPTION SSME J·2 H·l F·l ftS·27 THOft ATLAS MODECATEGOftY
1 10LT TOftOUE ftELAXATION:
A MAIN OXIDIZEft VALVE 3 3
I SEOUENCE VALVE 3 3
2 COOLANT PASSAGE LEAKAGE 34 3a I 71 1~ 25'
3 JOINT LEAKAGE:
27 71 231A. HOT GAS Ii I II 22 21
I. PftOP.• LUIE HYDft. 12 II 43 40 211 141 1i30
4 HOT GAS MANIFOLO TftANSFEft TUIE CftACKS 3 3
Ii HIGH TOftOUE. TIP 20 11 10 41
I CftACKED TUft liNE ILADES I 7 27 43
7 CftACK.CONVOLUTIONS IELLOWS Ii I 12 25
I LOOSE ELECTftlCAL CONNECTOftS I I
I IEAftlNG DAMAGE 4 1 12 I 2 21i
10 TUIE FftACTUftE 17 17
11 TUftlOPUMP SEAL LEAKAGE 13 21 2 12 II Ii 131
12 LUIE PftESSUftE ANOMALIES 37 4 2 14 21 71
13 VALVE FAILS TO PEftFOftM:
A. MOISTUftE.ICE 13 2 Iii
I. CONTAM/FftlCTION I 21 10 42
14 INTEftNAL VALVE LEAKAGE:
IIIA. CONTAMINATION iii 21 I so II
I. COMPRESSION OF SPftlNO I ,
C. VllftATION SEAT I 2 7 3 II
D. TRAPPED PRESSUftE 11 4 Iii
Iii ftEGULATOR DISCftEPANCIES Ii 33 44 12
II CONTAMINATED HYDft. CONTR. ASSY 21 21
TOTAL ENGINE 101 127 321 102 101 474 1i33 1771
Figure 11. Summary and Distribution Per Engine System
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IN-FLIGHT CONDITION MONITORING
The Task II objective was to identify those in-flight condition monitoring
devices, with an assessment of their maturity, which could detect rocket-
engine generic failure modes resulting from Task I. Several sequential
studies were conducted to this goal: A comprehensive literature search and
review generated a list of novel, state-of-the-art (SOTA) and conventional
sensors (Appendix E). Correlation with potential measurands applicable to
the previously experienced failures, plus some practical considerations,
pared this list to a manageable, relevant level for deeper analysis
(Appendix F).
The comparison of competing technologies was evaluated with a screening
system (Appendix G). The selected technologies were compared for technical,
economical and temporal factors which yielded a final list of ranked failure-
detection technologies.
SURVEY
The literature survey established a baseline for existing state-of-the-art
and novel technology used for condition monitoring On in-flight systems.
The survey revealed those sensors and monitoring systems used most frequently
for diagnostic and prognostic purposes. The survey was well rounded in that
it covered industrial processes, ground transportation, and the electronics
field, as well as aircraft and aerospace. From the surveyed 89 articles,
20 novel and 14 state-of-the-art sensors were found that may be applicable
to on-board rocket-engine condition monitoring. These sensors are listed
in Table 1, along with the sensors already used in in-flight rocket-engine
applications.
INTRODUCTION
A portion of the Task II effort was devoted to conducting a literature
search for in-flight condition-monitoring technologies that would be appli-
cable to a reusable rocket engine. The survey for condition-monitoring
systems covered the fields of aircraft and aerospace, transportation,
industrial processes, the medical industry and electronics. The results
of the literature search, including uncovered novel and state-of-the-art
condition monitoring devices, are presented in Appendix E.
FAILURE MONITORING SENSOR ASSESSMENT
The potential condition-monitoring detection technologies were to be
examined to determine their suitability for detection of the 16 failure
modes obtained from Task I. This was achieved by first transforming the
failure modes into the measurands that could potentially be detected by
sensors. To obtain all the measurands of each failure mode, the failure
mode was analyzed to determine the stages leading to its incidence and
identify corresponding measurands capable of detecting each stage of the
failure.
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TABLE 1. IDENTIFIED, IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
COMMONLY USED IN
ROCKET ENGINES
• RESISTIVE TEMPERATURE
DETECTOR
• STRAIN·GAGE PRESSURE
• MAGNETIC PICKUP
• POSITION (POTENTIOMETERS,
RVDT, LVDT)
• THERMOCOUPLE
• PIEZOELECTRIC ACCELEROMETER
• PIEZOELECTRIC PRESSURE
• TURBINE FLOWMETER
• THERMOPILE CALORIMETER
• FOIL RADIOMETER
STATE OF THE ART BUT NOT USED
IN ROCKET ENGINES
• SOLID STATE THERMOMETER
• DIGITAL QUARTZ PRESSURE
• CORIOLIS MASS FLOWMETER
• ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER
• TARGET FLOWMETER
• HALL TACHOMETER
• WIEGAND TACHOMETER
• FIBEROPTIC TACHOMETER
• MAGNETOSTRICTIVE
TORQUEMETER
• HYDROPHONE
• ULTRASONIC EXTENSOMETER
• PYROMETER
• EDDY-CURRENT DETECTOR
• ULTRA-VIOLET FLAME DETECTOR
NOVEL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVICES
• BETA-RAY DENSIMETER,
THERMOMETER
.• ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER
• FLUIDIC THERMOMETER
• FIBEROPTIC PRESSURE
• LASER DIGITAL PRESSURE
• SURFACE-ACOUSTIC-WAVE
PRESSURE
• FERROMAGNETIC TORQUEMETER
• ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR
• FIBEROPTIC DEFLECTOMETER
• EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION
DETECTOR
• POLAROGRAPH
• OPTICAL ACOUSTIC-EMISSION
DETECTOR
• ELECTRO-OPTICAL EXTENSOMETER
• TUNABLE DIODE LASER
SPECTROMETER
• RAMAN-LASER SPECTROMETER
• LASER-SCATTERING DENSIMETER,
VELOCIMETER
• TUNGSTEN-CAP CALORIMETER
• FIBEROPTIC HYGROMETER
• EMAT (ELECTROMAGNETIC
ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCER)
• NEUTRON-RAY CORROSION
DETECTOR
Figure 12 shows an example of the stages of a failure-mode propagation
diagram depicted in rectangular blocks, and the in-flight and between-
flight detection measurands presented in ovals and diamonds, respectively.
The remaining failure modes,including their failure detection measurands,
are presented in Appendix f. A total of 23 distinct in-flight measurands
are derived and presented in Table 2 according to their failure modes.
c==J EVENT
c=:J IN·FLIGHT MEASU~AND<> IElWEEN·FLIGHT MEASUftAND
~EST~ICTION
ICONTAMINATIONI
A. METAL
10 ICE
C. NON·METAL
D. DEFO~MATION
FAILU~E MODE 2
• COOLANT ~ASSAGE LEAKAGE
~~ESSU~E
SU~GES
METAL
EMI~ITTLE·
MENT
Figure 12. In-Flight and Between Flight Measurands for
Detection of Nozzle Failure
Next, the novel, state of the art, and current advanced rocket-engine
sensors, shown in Table 1, combined with conventional industrial sensors
were matched with these measurands. The result was a matrix, shown in
Table 3, that relates the in-flight potential failure-detecting devices
to the 16 failure modes. In this matrix, N, S, R, and C denote novel,
state of the art, rocket-engine and conventional sensors, respectively.
SENSOR SELECTION AND RANKING
The matched sensors of Table 3 were next graded and ranked. The in-flight
condition-monitoring technologies required grouping them into direct and
indirect condition-monitoring categories .for application of clear-cut
screens. A direct condition-monitoring technology detects how a component
22
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TABLE 2. FAILURE DETECTING MEASURANDS
FAILURE MODES MEASURANDS
1 - BOLT TORQUE RELAXATION VIBRATION FRETTING
ACOUSTICS EXTENSION
LEAK
2 - COOLANT-PASSAGE LEAKAGE/ METAL EMBRITTLEMENT MIXTURE RATIO SHIFT
RESTRICTION PRESSURE TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE RISE IN COMBUSTION
FLOW, REDUCTION
3 - JOINT LEAKAGE LEAK FIRE
4 - TRANSFER TUBE CRACK TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT FATIGUE
MIXTURE RATIO SHIFT
5 - HIGH TURBOPUMP TORQUE TORQUE, RIPPLES WORN PARTICLES
TEMPERATURE, SEALS RPM TAILOFF
VIBRATION CONTAMINANTS
ACOUSTICS
6 - CRACKED TURBINE BLADE FATIGUE VIBRATION
TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT ACOUSTICS
PRESSURE, TRANSIENT BALANCE
7 - CRACKED CONVOLUTION. BELLOWS. TEMPERATURE, TRANSIENT ACOUSTICS
SHIELDS PRESSURE. TRANSIENT VIBRATION
8 - LOOSE ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS TORQUE. RELAXATION . SEPARATION
CONTINUITY, INTERMITTENT
9 - BALL BEARING DAMAGE TEMPERATURE, EXCESSIVE RACE RPM TAILOFF
VIBRATION FATIGUE
ACOUSTICS CONTAMINANT
TORQUE. RIPPLES BALANCE
WORN PARTICLES
10 - SMALL TUBE FRACTURE VIBRATION DEFORr4ATION
EXTENSIVE
11 - TURBOPUMP SEAL LEAKAGE TEMPERATURE, EXCESSIVE RPM FAlLOFF
VIBRATION CONTAMINANT
WORN PARTICLES
12 - LUBE PRESSURE ANOMALIES PRESSURE. DIFFERENTIAL CONTAMINANT
FLOW, REDUCTION
13 - VALVE FAILURE MOISTURE, DEWING PRESSURE. ACTUATION
CONTAMINANT
14 - INTERNAL LEAKAGE WORN PARTICLES VIBRATION
ACOUSTICS TEMPERATURE, TRANSIENT
15 - REGULATOR DISCREPANCIES CONTAMINANTS WORN PARTICLES
LEAK
16 - CONTAMINATED HYDRAULICS CONTAMINANT WORN PARTICLES
LEAK
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TABLE 3. IN-FLIGHT CONDITION MONITORING DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
ACCORDING TO FAILURE MODES AND THEIR MEASURANDS
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is, whereas the indirect technology detects what the component does in
regard to the engine operation (temperature t .pressure, flow t speed and
thrust). It was with the help of this distinction that it was possible
to apply the speed (of a few milliseconds) screen to the indirect techno-
logies, to detect the process transients. In contrast, the speed screen
was not applicable to direct technologies. For example, relatively slow
pressure build up in a contained joint t indicating a slow leak t is best
sensed directly by a pressure sensor. Fast response time for this trending-
type observation is not significant.
Upon thorough review of various screens only four distinct screens were
determined to be unequivocal. Two of these screens were valid on~y for
indirect condition-monitoring technologies; namely speed and failsafeness.
The other two were applicable only to the direct condition-monitoring
technologies, i.e' t bulkiness and numerosity.
For indirect technologies it is necessary to capture the frequency and
amplitude of transients of process (f10w t pressure t temperature t rpm)
measurements. In rocket engines these transients are typically a few
milliseconds in duration. By totalizing the transients it may be possible
to determine the maximum stress exposures t which provides information
regarding the remaining life of the component. ConventionallYt however t
process sensors are designed with damping to generate an average signal.
This eases contro1lin~ of the process measurand.
The second indirect screen is failsafeness t which implies no catastrophic
hazard to the engine if the measuring device malfunctions. With the aid
of these four go-no-go screens, the 33 direct condition-monitoring tech-
nologies were reduced to 12 and the 33 indirect technologies were reduced
to seven as shown in Tables 4 and S.
Upon examination of the acceptably screened direct-diagnostic sensors,
five devices were recognized as possessing well established limitations
regarding their rocket engine applicability. To preclude carrying these
well-known conventional instruments any further in ranking t their utility
was termined. The five sensors t comprised of strain gage and piezoresistive
accelerometers and nicke1 t semiconductor and the thermocouple thermometers,
are denoted by a deletion sign in Table 6 resulting in only 12 direct
condition-monitoring technologies remained for grading and ranking.
In a11 t only 19 techno1ogies t consisting of 11 novel, 6 state-of-the-art
and 2 rocketry were acceptable for further grading and ranking.
GRADING AND RANKING
Upon successful application of the four screens t 19 technologies remained
to be graded and ranked.
A consistent and methodic rationale was needed to grade all these techno-
logies. To conceive such a rationale t each detection technology is
depicted by the liabilities (or penalties of that technology) versus its
25
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TABLE 4. IN-FLIGHT DIRECT-DIAGNOSTIC SENSOR SCREENING,
SENSOR1
NUMEROUS2 /SENSOR TYPES STATUS BULKY ACCEPTABLE SENSORS
ACCELEROMETERS:
- -
ACCELEROMETERS:
STRAIN-GAGE C NO NO
PIEZOELECTRIC R NO NO PIEZOELECTRIC
PIEZORESISTIVE S NO NO
HYDROPHONES:
- -
HYDROPHONES
PIEZOELECTRIC S NO NO PIEZOELECTRIC
FLAME DETECTORS:
- -
RADIOMETER S NO YES
-
TORQUEMETERS: -
-
TORQUEMETERS:
MAGNETOSTRICTIVE S YES NO
-
RELUCTIVE S YES NO -
STRAIN-GAGES, AC OR DC C YES NO -
OPTICAL C YES NO
-
DIGITAL, FERROMAGNETIC N NO NO DIGITAL, FERROMAGNETIC
DISPLACEMENT METERS: -
-
STRAIN-GAGES C - YES -
LVDT/RVDT3 R - YES -
POTENTI OMETRIC C
- YES -
DIGITAL ENCODER R - YES -
CAPACITIVE C - YES -
ULTRASONIC EXTENSOMETER S - YES -
EDDY CURRENT S
-
YES -
OPTICAL EXTENSOMETER N - YES -
ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR N NO NO ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR
FIBEROPTIC BEARING DETECTOR N NO NO FIBEROPTIC BEARING DETECTOR
EXO-ELECTRON MISSION N NO NO EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION DETECTOR
DETECTOR
POLAROMETER .N NO NO POLAROMETER
OPTICAL ACOUSTIC-EMISSION N YES NO -
DETECTOR
TUNABLE-LASER SPECTROMETER N NO NO TUNABLE-LASER SPECTROMETER
RAMAN-LASER SPECTROMETER N YES NO -
PRESSURIZED LEAK DETECTOR R NO YES
EDDY-CURRENT DETECTOR S NO NO EDDY CURRENT DETECTOR
EMAT5:; N NO NO EMAT
THERMOMETERS: 4
- -
THERMOMETERS
NICKEL RTD C NO NO NICKEL RTD
PLATINUM RTD 4 R NO NO PLATINUM RTD
SENICONDUCTOR C NO NO SEMICONDUCTOR
THERMOCOUPLE C NO NO THERMOCOUPLE
PYROMETER S NO NO PYROMETER
TOTAL: 33 12
1C = CONVENTIONAL, R = ROCKET, S = STATE OF THE ART, N= NOVEL
2MORE THAN 10 SENSORS PER ENGINE IS CONSIDERED AS TOO MANY CLUTTERED
3LVDT = LINEAR VARIABLE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSFORMER
4RDT = RESISTIVE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR
5EMAT = ELECTROMAGNETIC ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCER
•...
TABLE 5. IN-FLIGHT INDIRECT-DIAGNOSTIC SENSOR SCREENING
SENSOR1
FAST2SENSOR TYPES STATUS FAILSAFE ACCEPTABLE SENSORS
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS: PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS:
PIEZORESISTIVE DIAPHRAGM S YES YES
-
PIEZORESISTIVE BRIDGE/CIRCUIT S N03 YES -
DEPOSITED METAL BRIDGE R N03 YES -
BONDED STRAIN-GAGE BRIDGE C N03 YES -
DEPOSITED THIN FILM R N03 YES -
DIGITAL QUARTZ RESONATOR S YES YES DIGITAL QUARTZ RESONATOR
POTENTIOMETRIC C NO YES
-
DIGIIAL CYLINDRICAL RESONATOR S NO YES -
LVDT C NO YES
-
CAPACITIVE C NO YES
-
PIEZOTRANSISTIVE S YES NO
-
SILICON ON SAPPHIRE S YES NO -
FIBEROPTIC N YES YES FIBEROPTIC
LASER DIGITAL N YES YES LASER DIGITAL
SURFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE N YES YES SURFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE
THERMOMETERS: THERMOMETERS:
NICKEL RTD5 C NO NO
-
PLATINUM RTD R NO NO -
SEMICONDUCTOR (THERMISTOR) C NO NO
-
TERMOCOUPLE C NO NO -
BETA-RAY N YES NO -
UNTRASONIC N YES YES ULTRASONIC
FLUIDIC N NO NO -
TACHOMETERS: TACHOMETERS:
OPTICAL S YES YES OPTICAL
MAGNETIC PICKUP R YES NO -
HALL EFFECT S YES NO
-
WIEGAND EFFECT S YES NO
-
FLOWMETERS: FLOWMETERS:
OPTICAL S NO YES
-
THERMAL S NO NO -
CORIOLIS S NO YES -
ULTRASONIC S YES YES ULTRASONIC
VORTEX SHEDDER S YES NO -
TURBINE R YES NO
-
TARGET C YES NO -
TOTAL: 33 7
lC = CONVENTIONAL. R = ROCKET. S = STATE OF THE ART. N= NOVEL
2FAST = FAST RESPONSE (A FEW MILLISECONDS IS REQUIRED FOR TRANSIENTS)
3EXCESSIVE THERMAL LAG
4LVDT = LINEAR VARIABLE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSFORMER
5RTD = RESISTIVE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR
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TABLE 6. VIABLE IN-FLIGHT CONDITION-MONITORING SENSORS
FAILURE MODES
~
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DIGITAL QUARTZ PRESSURE SENSOR S S S S
FIBEROPTIC PRESSURE SENSOR N N N N
DIGITAL LASER PRESSURE SENSOR N N N N
SURFACE ACUOSTIC WAVE PRESSURE SENSOR N N N N.ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER N N N N N N NOPTICAL TACHOMETER S S S NULTRASONIC FLO~1ETER
.S
PIEZOELECTRIC ACCELEROMETER R R R R R RPIEZOELECTRIC HYDROPHONE S 5 S S SFERROMAGNETIC TORQUEMETER N NISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR N N N N NFIBEROPTIC BEARING DETECTOR N NEXO-ELECTRON DETECTOR N NPOLAROGRAPH N
TUNABLE DIODE-LASER SPECTROMETER N N N N N N NEDDY CURRENT DETECTOR S
PLATI NUM RTD** R R R R R R RPYROMETER S S
EMAT*** N NPERFECT SCORE
*FAILURES NO.1, 4, AND 12 ARE OBVIATED BY IMPROVED DESIGN, FAILURES
NO.3, 8, 10, AND 16 ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTICS.
**RTD = RESISTIVE TEMPERATURE DETECTOR
***EMAT = ELECTRO-MAGNETIC ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCER
LEGEND
N = NOVEL TECHNOLOGY
S = STATE OF THE ART TECHNOLOGY
R = ROCKET TECHNOLOGY
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•virtues (or rewards); the higher the net virtues the better the technology.
Both liabilities and virtues were divided into two categories which facili-
tate their comparison, economic and technical. Thus, the economic liabi-
lities consist of the expenditure to develop and integrate the technology
and the economic virtues represent the return on the investment in terms of
inspection-labor saving and hazard detection and prevention. The technical
virtues on the other hand, consist of elements called lumped descriptors
which describe the ability of the technology to detect accurately, correctly,
constantly and safely .
The salient descriptors of each of these lumped descriptors were selected.
The result is shown in Table 7. It should be noted that the signal-condi-
tioning and data-processing requirements are included under the electronic
group of technical liabilities and are not considered separately elsewhere.
Subsequently, quantitative values (scores) were assigned to each lumped
descriptor based on a consistant grading scale.
One additional dimension was added to the comparative ratings. This factor,
development time, is related to a program schedule which can influence the
viability of the technology according to the need and application deter-
mined by specific programs.
TABLE 7. TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL DESCRIPTOR CATEGORIES AND DESCRIPTORS
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE EXPENDITURES
• PHYSICAL • DETECTIBILITY • R&D
WEIGHT SPEED • INTEGRATIONSPACE ACCURACY
STRENGTH REPEATABILITY
MATERIAL SENSITIVITY
CHEMICALS RESOLUTION
RESONANCE DRIFT
FATIGUE ARTIFACTS
SUSCEPTI BI LITY
• ELECTRONIC
POWER. CONSUMPTION • DURABILITY
VOLTAGE RECALIBRATION
CURRENT INSPECTION
WIRING LIFE
FILTERING
• SAFETYAMPLIFICATION
ANALOG/D IGITAL FAIL SAFETY
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS FAILURE EFFECTS
SIGNAL CONDITIONING
LI NEAR IZATI ON
SHIELDING
• FUNCTIONAL
INTRUSIVE
POWER
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Using a 0 through 10 relative scale for each lumped descriptor, the detec-
tion technologies for each failure mode were numerically graded. To be as
objective as possible, each technology was graded according to its own
features, independent of its utility or need criticality. The functional,
detectabi1ity,and safety categories were considered more important, hence
were assigned a twofold weighting factor relative to the physical, elec-
tronic and durability categories; the rationale being that if you cannot
measur~ the failure without burdening and hazarding the rocket engine, it
does not matter how small, durable or electronically demanding the detec-
tion technology is. An example of each such rating is shown in Table 8.
This table is divided into direct and indirect condition monitoring groups
which are henceforth ranked independently. Indirect condition monitoring,
to detect a failure, requires extensive data processing to correlate engine
operational parameters under varying loads, rpm, temperatures, pressures.
Direct condition monitoring, in contrast, requires very little data process-
ing because it monitors the condition of the component independent of the
propellant temperature, pressure, or flow.
In all, nine similar tables were completed and are included as Appendix G.
It is noted that, of the original 16 failure modes, not all were developed
into technology rankings. Three modes were eliminated and four were not
detectable through any viable in-flight condition-monitoring means.
Next, the technical, financial, and development-time ranks of each techno-
logy were added together yielding the overall grade for the technology.
The technical rank was weighted significantly higher than the other ranks:
the rationale was based on the fact that any technology, regardless of
how well developed it is for non-rocket industry application, still requires
a significant amount of testing, adaptation, and modification efforts and
expenditures before it can be flown in a rocket engine.
The outcome of the detection technology grading and the corresponding rank-
ings is summarized in Table 9. Table 10 identifies the ultrasonic thermo-
meter and flowmeter as to the two top-ranking, most promising indirect con-
dition-monitoring technologies, followed by digital quartz pressure sensor
and optical tachometer. These four technologies combined could indirectly
detect eight generic failure modes, but they require extensive in-flight
engine-parameter correlation, trending, thresholding, totalizing, data
processing, etc. The same table identifies pyrometer, fiber-optic deflec-
tometer, isotope wear detector and tunable diode-laser spectrometer as the
most promising direct condition-monitoring technologies capable of in-flight
detection of all nine failure modes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, the computerized literature search, from an on-line six-million-
citation data bank yielded a review of 289 abstracts and 78 articles. From
this review, 20 novel and 14 state of the art in-flight condition-monitor-
ing technologies were identified.
30
TABLE 8. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMICAL GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC
SENSORS FOR DETECTION OF COOLANT PASSAGE LEAKAGE/RESTRICTION (#2)
DESC'UJITORS TECHNICAL
ECONOMICAL
DEVELOf'MENT
REQUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXI'ENDITURe TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>
~ ... Z ~~ ::; ~ 0Z ~ ii oJ j: C~ (J ~oJ 0 0 C ::; C ~ -'Cu a: t ... > ii Z I: III til III a~... u ... c 0 Q I: ~iii (J w w a: ~ Q w Z C C> w Z ... ... (J ... 0 >1:SENIORS ::l w C ::l w • (J I: w I:~ ~ ! 0 > 0 00L W ... Q
'"
Q ... I: w
I'ERFECT SCORe 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 $1 $1 $1 10 0 10 110
PRESSURE SENSORS
QUARTZ, DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 8 60 50 250 300 7 1 9 76
FI BEROPTIC 7 2 18 6 18 8 59 200 250 450 5 3 7 71
LASER DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 7 59 300 250 550 4 4 6 69
SAW. DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 7 59 200 250 450 5 2 8 72
ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER, 6 5 20 12 20 6 69 100 200 300 .7 3 7 83
FLAME
ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER, 10 5 20 6 20 9 70 50 150 200 8 2 8 86
NOZZLE
POLAROGRAPH 2 4 10 14 10 4 44 250 450 700 3 6 4 51
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 12 19 7 60 300 300 600 4 6 4 68
SPECTROMETER
rnXTURE RATIO
1 - IN THOUSANDS -
NOTE: THE REMAINING TABLES ARE PRESENTED IN APPENDIX G.
TABLE 9. IN-FLIGHT CONDITION-MONITOR TECHNOLOGY RANKING
GRADE* FAILURE MODES
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INDIRECT
ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER 1 83 69 7 7 N N N N N N N
ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER 2 81 65 8 8 S
DIGITAL QUARTZ PRESSURE SENSOR 3 78 62 7 9 S S S S
OPTICAL TACHOMETER 4 76 62 6 B S S S
SURFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE PRESSURE SENSOR 74 61 5 B N N N N
FIBEROPTIC PRESSURE SENSOR 73 61 5 7 N N N N
DIGITAL LASER PRESSURE SENSOR 71 61 4 6 N N N N
DIRECT
PYROMETER 1 85 71 6 8 S S
ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR 2 82 71 4 7 N N N N N
FIBEROPTIC DEFLECTOMETER 2 82 71 4 7 N N
TUNABLE DIODE-LASER SPECTROMETER 4 79 71 4 4 N N N N N N N
PIEZOELECTRIC ACCELEROMETER 78 64 7 7 R R R R R R
PIEZOELECTRIC HYDROPHONE 78 62 8 8 S S S S S
FERROMAGNETIC TORQUEMETER 76 72 3 3 N N
PLATINUM RTD (RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE 73 58 ., 8. R R R R R
DETECTOR)
N NEMAT (ELECTROMAGNETIC ACOUSTIC 62 51 5 6
TRANSDUCER)
EDDY CURRENT DETECTOR 62 49 6 7 S S
EXo-ELECTRON DETE~TOR 58 '51 4 3 N N
POLAROGRAPH 51 44 3 4 N
PERFECT SCORE 10 90 10 10
LEGEND
N= NOVEL TECHNOLOGY
S = STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGY
R = ROCKET TECHNOLOGY
* = THE HIGHEST SCORE AMONGST VARIOUS FAILURE MODES
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TABLE 10. IN-FLIGHT CONDITION-MONITOR TECHNOLOGY RANKING
FAILURE MODES
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DIRECT
FIBEROPTIC DEFLECTOMETER ~ @
@
PYROMETER ,~ 79 I@ 79 ~TURNABLE DIODE-LASER SPECTROMETER 78 82 82 82ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR 79- 79 79 75 79 78
INDIRECT
ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER @ ~ @ @OPTICAL TACHOMETER '-.:./ 83
ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER 81
DIGITAL QUARTZ PRESSURE SENSOR 76 78 78 78
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Next, the 16 failure modes and failure propagation diagrams were analyzed,
resulting in 23 distinct in-flight failure-detecting measurands. These
measurands were then correlated with novel, state of the art, rocket-engine
and conventional technologies resulting in 33 direct and 33 indirect
potential condition-monitoring technologies.
A selection approach was applied successfully using four nonequivocal
screens and several lumped descriptors. The screening process rejected
inapplicable technologies. The lumped descriptors were employed for
grading arid ranking of the remaining 19 applicable in-flight condition-
monitoring technologies.
The ranking was achieved by assigning relative numerical grades to each
device feature. Since these technologies vary in their state of maturity
and utility, they were graded and ranked assuming they are completely
developed and are used for only one failure mode at a time.
Such an approach resulted in identifying four top-ranking direct condition-
monitoring devices capable of detection of all failure modes and four top-
ranking indirect condition-monitoring devices capable of detection of eight
out of nine failure modes:
The direct condition-monitoring devices are:
1. Pyrometer detects rotating-blade temperature
2. Isotope wear detector detects bearing, rotary-seal
and valve-seat wear.
3. Fiberoptic deflectometer detects bearing loading and
deflection
4. Tunable diode-laser Spectrometer detects nonmetal wear
The indirect condition-monitoring devices are:
1. Ultrasonic thermometer
2. Ultrasonic flowmeter
3. Digital quartz pressure sensor
4. Fiberoptic tachometer
It should be noted here that other technologies such as Raman spectroscopy,
ferromagnetic torquemetering and exo-electron detection, although eliminated
by this screening and grading process, have unique condition-monitoring
capabilities and should be carefully followed for any major breakthrough
which could render them applicable to in-flight condition-monitoring.
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BETWEEN-FLIGHT INSPECTION
This task determined the between-flight inspection requirements that would
provide engine component reverification and remaining life assessment for
those failure-prone components identified in Task I. The applicability of
between-flight inspection technologies and their implications on engine
design and operation were evaluated with respect to those requirements.
The upgrading or development required of each technology was also identified.
An approach similar to the method used in Task II was taken. A survey was
performed to identify existing inspection technologies which might be
applicable to rocket engines. This included inspection procedures which
have been in routine use for many years as well as experimental techniques
used soley in a laboratory environment. The results of Task I were then
examined to identify the between-flight-detectible measurands associated
with each failure mode. This led to the development of general inspection
requirements and their correlation with the surveyed technologies. The
techniques corresponding to each failure mode were evaluated on an equal
basis of development, resulting in scores which ranked the technologies
and became inputs to Task IV. Accessibility requirements, engine confi-
guration modifications and estimates of the effects on engine reliability
and safety were determined for each inspection and included in the scoring.
INSPECTION TECHNOLOGY SURVEY
A survey was undertaken to find inspection technology which could be
applicable to reusable rocket engines between flights. This survey
included computer literature searches, periodical reviews, and personal
visits. Representative literature was enumerated and the inspection
techniques uncovered were then summarized (Fig. 13).
L1TEIIATUIIE
COMI'UTEII SEAIICHES
• IIOCKWELL TIl'S } 'EIIIOOICALSIIEFEIIENCES AND
• LOCKHEEO DIALOG 1.000.000
IIILIOOIIA'HIES
• NASA IIECON CITATIONS
1
14.
AISTIIACTS
!
.1
AIITICLES
30 II
STATE-DF·THE·AIIT NOVEL
TECHNOlOOIES TECHNOlOGIEI
Figure 13. Literature Survey Utilized Multiple Resources
to Uncover Inspection Technologies
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It should be noted that the purpose of these searches was to provide a
broad survey of between-flight engine condition monitoring technology, but
not a complete bibliography of this subject. Documents were selected for
enumeration if they contained different technology, applications, or
approaches than had been previously encountered. Also, literature
covering extensively used technology, or technology clearly not applicable
to rocket engines was not chosen for examination.
Resources
Four computerized searches were made, producing a total of 945 listings.
The search parameters were purposely left rather general so that techno-
logies which have only seen limited or specialized use might be identified.
Three of the searches looked for literature dealing with inspection tech-
nology for aerospace engines as well as various basic inspection concepts.
The fourth search dealt with leak detection only. Each listing was exa-
mined to determine if the defined document might contain new and useful
inputs to Task III. Literature which might pertain to the Task II effort
was also identified. A brief description of each search follows.
The Rockwell TIPS search (Fig. 14) was an on-line examination of the com-
bined database of five Rockwell International Divisions (Rocketdyne, Space
Systems Group, Science Center, and North American Aviation, both Columbus
and Los Angeles Divisions).
Two searches were conducted on Lockheed's DIALOG, a combined database of
the NTIS, Engineering Index, Inc., and Data Courier, Inc. (Fig. 15): a
search of leak detection technology and a more general inspection techno-
logy search.
The NASA RECON computer search yielded a total of 267 citations (Fig. 16),
but because of duplications of citations in the Rockwell TIPS and Lockheed
DIALOG searches, only 15 of these documents were selected for review.
Beyond the computer searches, discussions were held with Air Force person-
nel about their diagnostic and nondestructive (NDI) programs.
Additional information was obtained by reviewing the references of litera-
ture located by the computer searches and by examining recent periodicals
for articles concerning nondestructive inspection methods.
Survey Results
Literature that was found to contain useful information was tabulated as
shown in Table 11 and Appendix H. Information pertaining to in-flight
diagnostics was forwarded to the Task II effort.
The number of different inspection techniques described in each document,
as indicated in Table 11, have been divided into three categories. Rocket
Engine refers to technology which is or has been successfully applied to
liquid propellant rocket engine inspection. State of the art refers to
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TABLE 11. LITERATURE SURVEY EXAMPLE
IN-FLIGHT IElWEEN-FlIGHT
l- I-
.. ..
"
.
"• I- C' . I- C'
-
COl 1-0 ... COl 1-0 ...
1-" Oil: .. 1-" Oil: ..~g "'z > 0'" "'z >NUMIEII TiTlE AUTHOII SOUIICE 0 0 ",0 0 0 IIEMAIIKSII: z z II: Z z
I MAINTAINABILITY OF THE SPACE GOE, R. T. ROCKETOYNE 3 I EARLY SSME MAINTENANCE
SHUTTLE ORe ITER MAIN ENGINE CONCEPTS
2 DIVERSIFICATION OF ACOUSTICAL COLLINS, DR. H. HOLOSONICS, INC. I ACOUSTICAL IMAGING TECH-
HOLOGRAPHY AS A NONDESTRUCT NIQUES FOR CRACK
INSPECTION TECHNIQUE TO DETECTION
DETERMINE AGING DAMAGE IN
SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
3 WELDED ROTOR INSPECTION SUSHIEL, J. AVCO LYCOMING 2 ULTRASONIC AND ACOUSTIC-
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT T55-J-027 VICTOR, S. EMISSION INSPECTION OF
PAUL, J. GAS TUReINE POWER SHAFTS
4. USE OF LASER-POWERED OPTICAL HARDY, H. D. PRATT ~ WHITNEY I I ROTATING COMPONENT CLEAR-
PROXIMITY PRoeE IN ADVANCED AIRCRAFT ANCE MEASUREMENT
TUReOFAN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
5 ENGINE CONDITION MONITOR HEGNER, H. ~. ITT ~ESEARCH 2 2 DETECTION OF BLADE DAMAGE
SYSTEM TO DETECT FOREIGN INSTITUTE AND CRACK DEVELOPMENT IN
DeJECT DAMAGE AND CRACK AIRCRAFT ENGINES
DEVELOPMENT
6 A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING LEley, D. W. GENERAL ELECTRIC I I INTEGRATED CONDITION
APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE ENGINE MONITORING SYSTEM FOR
CONDITION MONITORING AIRCRAFT ENGINES
7 FROM CRACKING CRACKS TO MILEY, C. D. LOCKHEED -
eREAKING BEAMS, A REVIEW OF LEWIS, W. H. GEORGIA CO. I I DETECTION OF CRACK INI-
ACOUSTIC EMISSION FOR AIR- TIATION AND GROWTH IN
CRAFT STRUCTURE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES
8 STATE OF THE ART OF NON- COMASSAR, D.M. GENERAL ELECTRIC 3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION OF ULTRASONIC, EDDY CURRENT,
AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND PENETRANT INSPECTIONS
9 HIGH RESOLUTION RADIOGRAPHY PARISH, R. W. AERE I X-RAY, GAMMA RAY, AND
IN THE AERO-ENGINE INDUSTRY PARTICLE RADIOGRAPHY
10 WEAR DEeRIS ANALYSIS PARR, N. L. ROY AL AIRCRAFT I LUBRICANT PARTICLE DETEC-
RiTCHIE, J. ESTABLISHMENT TION AND ANALYSISTECHNIQUES
11 HIGH RESOLUTION ULTRASONIC MORAN, T. J. AIR FORCE I DETECTION AND CHARAC-
NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING OF MATERIALS TERIZATION OF FLAWS
COMPLEX GEOMETRY COMPONENTS LAIlORATORY
,
*SOTA = UP TO DATE, IN USE, PROVEN TECHNOLOGY **NOVEL = NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
techniques which are regarded as proven in concept and successful in
regular application in some other industry. Novel refers to any other
technology, ranging from the conceptual stage of development to having
seen only limited success as a maintenance facility technique. The
techniques uncovered through the survey are listed in Table 12 for each
category. Table 13 gives a brief summary of each technique along with
typical uses, advantages and limitations. Most of the techniques might,
with development, be usable in situ; meaning with the engine installed
in the vehicle. These in situ techniques are of significant interest
because of the savings in turnaround time afforded with no requirements
for engine removal.
TABLE 12. INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES LOCATED BY
LITERATURE SURVEY
ROCKET ENGINE STAH·OF THE ART NOVEL
• ULTRASONIC EXTENSIOMETRY
• ULTRASONIC FLAW DETECTION
• X·RAY RADIOGRAPHY
• GAMMA·RAY RAOIOGRAPHY
• MAGNETIC PARTICLE
• PENlTRANT DETECHON
• CONNECTOR CONTINUITY CHECKING
• HYGROMETRY
• FLOW I.EAI< DETECTION
• MASS SPEC·rROMfTRY
• THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY LEAK
CHECKING
• TORQUING
• LEAK SOLUllON
• 80AESCOPING
• ULTRASONIC LEAK DEl'ECTION
• ACOUSTIC EMISSION
• I)AIHICLE RADIOGRAPHY
• fl.UOROSCOPY
• MAGNETIC PlRTURBATlON
• BARKHAUSEN NOISE ANAL YSIS
• PARTICLE ANALY!SIS
• OllllCAL LEAK DETECTION
• DIFFl:RENTIAL RADIOMETRY
• ELlIPSOMETliV
• HOLOGRAPHIC MAPPING
• OPTICAL. PROXIMITY DETECTION
• RESISTIVITY MUNITOr-JING
• EDDY CURRENT
• HALOGEN UAK DETE.CTION
• PRESSURE DECAY
• ACOUSTIC flOLOGHf,PHY
• SCANNING ACUU,s,IC FLUW
OETECTION
• ISOTOPE HtE.FIMOMf. my
• ISOTOI'E TRACER Dl.TLCIION
• REMNANT MAGNf.: f1ZATION
• PENTOXIDE POLAROGflAI)HV
• HYDROGEN POLAROGFIAPHY
• LEAK TAPl/COAlING
• LASER SUBFAC[ SCAlf[ 1l111H.i
• L.ASER IN1UIHBOMlIIIV
• SCANNING OPTICAL PVI-lOMllllY
• HOI.OGIlAPHIC L1:AI( l.ll: TLCllON
• f.XOELECTHON f.MISSION
• POSIHION ANNIHILA nON
• ELECTRIC CURRE.N r INJECTION
• MILLlMHEIl·WAVE
INTElHEROMETI1V
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N TABLE 13. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF SURVEYED INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
Individuil Records Must fte
Kept For Eich Component.
Requires Trinsducer to be
Pliced Internilly. QUintif~
cition of Leikige Difficult
Component Must be Lo.ded
PiSt Previous Miximum
Stress Level.
Computer Processing Required.
Resolution Limited by
Ultrisonic Wivelength.
Expensive.
Smill Sensor Required for
Detection of Smill Fliws.
Diti Interpretition c.n
be difficult.
Must be High Velocity Flow.
Mechinicilly-coupled
Sensor Usuilly Required.
Detection of Fitigue ind
Deliminitions Difficult.
Expensive. Heilth Pre-
ciutions ~equired.
less Sensitive Thin X-riYs.
long Exposure Times
Needed. Heilth Preciutions
Required.
-- --r -- -- -_._~ "-------
LIMITATIONSADVANTAGES
Direct, Accurite, One-sided
Meisure of Deformition or
Preloid.
Excellent Sensitivity ind
Resolution of Intern.l
Defects. Cin be Interficed
With Cor.puter Processing.
Visual Imiging of Internil
Defects. Cin Utilize Ripid-
SCinning Liser Trinsducer.
Non-intrusive, R.pid Locition
of Internil Flow ftlockige.
Good Sensitivity ind Resolu-
tion of Intern.l Defects.
Cin be Applied With Access
to Only One Side. Cin be
Re.dily Interficed With
Computer Processing.
F.st Locition of Leiks
Isotope PliCed lnternilly in
Pirt Permits More Selective
Inspection.
Detects Internil Fliws in Wide
Viriety of Miteriils. Permi-
nent Record.
TECHNIQUE I MEASURANDS I FAILURE ~-Y'P~--- "-r- TYPICAL COMPONENTS
Ultrisonic Acoustic Wave I Torque Relixition I ftoltsExtensiometry Propigition Plistic Deformition
UHrisoni c Fliw Anoffiilies in Acoustic I Fitigue I lI1idesDetection Wive Properties Foreign Object Dimige Ducts
Cryst.llogriphic Chimbers
Chinges Shifts
I
-
Ultrisonic Leik Decre.se in Acoustic Leikige I JointsDetection Impedince it Leik Vilves
Pith
Acoustic Emission Acoustic Noise Generi-/ Fitigue I Ductsted by Anoffiilies in ChimbersComponent Under LOid III ides
Acoustic Hologriphy Anomilies in Acoustic I Fitigue I ChimbersWive Properties De limi nit ion Vilves
SCinning Acoustic Flow-generited I Restriction I Chimbers
Flow Detection Acoustic Noise
X-riY Ridiogriphy Anomil ies in X-riy Cricks Chimbers
Attenuition Thickness Ducts
Gilffili-riY Anomilies in Gil1Jl1i- Cricks Chil1lbers
Radiogriphy riY Attenuition Thickness Ducts
Restriction Shi fts
L _1. _ . __ . _. " __....._ I .. ......__ .
------
• T •
\I ~
TABLE 13. (Continued)
• }o
TECHNIQUE MEASURANDS FAILURE TYPE TYPICAL COMPONENTS ADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS
Particle Radiography I Anomalies in Particle
aeam Attenuation
Corrosion
Cracks
Thickness
Composites Good for Low-Density Materials. I Expensive. Bulky Equipment.
Poor Flaw Definition.
Health Precautions Requined
Fluoroscopy
Isotope Thermometry
Isotope Tracer
Detection
Magnetic Particles
Remnant
Magneti Ziti on
Anomalies in X-ray
Attenuation
Rate of aeta-ray
Emission
Radioactive Particles
Preferential Orienta-
tion of Magnetic Par-
ticles at Surface
Flows
Impact-Induced Magnet-
ization Anomalies
Cracks
Clearances
Peak Temperature
Weir
Galling
Fitigue
Foreign Object Damage
Turbopumps
alides
Chambers
alades
Valves
aeirings
aeirings
alades
TurboplJ11l>s
Detects Flaws and Clearances
of Operating Components
Post-facto Detection of Peak
Operating Temperature.
Minimal Health Hazard.
Sensitive and Selective Wear
Detection. Linear Wear/Count
Relationship ~rovides Good
Remaining Life Prediction.
Minimal Health Hazard
Simple. Low Cost. Sensitive
Detection of Cracks
Simple. Low Cost Detection of
Impact Damage
Expensive. Bulky Equipment.
Health Precautions Requined.
No Indication of Duration
at Peak Temperature. Must
be Impregnated aefore
Flight.
Filter or Some Other Collection
System Required In-Flight to
Retrieve Particles For Analysis
Component must be Ferromagnet-
ic. Requires Post-Inspec-
tion Cleaning.
Component must be Ferromag-
netic. Not Suitable for
Internal Defects.
Fatigue
~
LV
Magnetic Perturba-
tion
Barkhausen Noise
Analysis
Pentoxide
Polirography
Anomalies of Magnetic-
Induction Field In
Vicinity of Defect
High Frequency Changes I Fatigue
in Magnetic Flux Due
to Residual Stresses
Current Produced by I Moi sture
Electrolysis
learl ngs
aearings
Chambers
Ducts
Good Sensitivity to Surface or
Near-Surface Flaws
Early Detection of Internal
Defects. Applicable to
Computer Processing.
Good Indications of Water
Vapor in a Wide Variety of
Environments.
Component must be Ferromag-
netic. Not Suitable for
Internal Defects.
Component Must be Ferromag-
netic.
Intrusive Sensor
.p- TABLE 13. (Continued)
.p-
II TECHliIQUE I MEASU~liOS I F~lLUll.E TYPE I TYPIC~L COMPONENTS I ADVANTAGES LlMITATIONS
Hydrogen ICurrent Produced by I Hydrogen I Chil1lbers I Good Indicition of Hydrogen I Slow for Lirge Arei CoverigePo1irography Oxidition of Embrittlement Ducts Content of Miteriil
Entripped Hydrogen
Leik Tipe/Coiting I ViSUil Color Chinge Leikige Joints Low Cost. Fist Indicition of No QUintititive Diti Produced
Ciused by Reiction Leikige Produced During Tipe/Coiting Must Cover
to Leiking Fluid Engine Operiting Conditions. Entire Leik Pith in Extreme
Envi rorvnents.
Pirticle Anilysis IPirticles Weir leari ngs Spectrogriphic Anilysis Gives Filter or Some Other Collec-
Gilling Vilves Good Indicition ind Life tion System lI.equired In-
Contillli nints ~rediction of Weir. Flight. No Distinction
letween Weir of Components
of Sime Miteriils.
Opti Ci I Leik Absorption of Light At Leikige Joints Non-Conticting, QUintititive Leiking GiS Must Ie Distin-
Detecti on Selected Wivelengths Vilves Leik Diti Provided guishible From Environment
Liser Surflce Dispersion of Incident Weir Vilves Single, Non-Conticting Fiber- Fictors Other Thin Weir Cin
SCittering Liser 8eim Gilling Optic ~robe Gives Good Affect Dispersion. Inter-
Indicition of Surfice nil Access' Required.
Condition
Hologriphic Deformition Fringes Weir Joints ~rediction of Exc.sslv. Fll~ht I Expensive Equipm!ntDeflection Di stortlon Ducts Deformitions. Appl-
Prediction cible to Computer ~rocessing
Borescopi ng Visuil Surfice Cricks 8lides Versitile Detection of Fliws Operitor Dependent. Internil
Anomalies Deformition Vilves ind Frictures. Cin Be Film Access Required. Not
Injectors lI.ecorded. Highly Sensitive.
DifferentiA1 IDi fferenti i 1 Absorp- Leikige Joints QUintititive Leik Detection. Longer Simple Pith Required.
Ridiometry tion of Light At Two Vilves 8etter Distinction 8etween
Wivelengths. Environment' Leiking GiS
Ell i psometry I Chinges in State of Weir 8earings Extremely High SensitiVity. 11I.eqUires Precise Alignment
Reflected Polirized Surfice Fi lms Vilves Non-contacting. of Equipment' Skilled
Light Operitors
• 'Ir .. ',"
lTABLE 13.
\
(Continued)
t-
~
1Il
TECHNIQUE
Penetrint Detection
Ho10griphic Surfice
Mipping
Optici1 Prox1mity
Detection
SCinning OptiCil
Pyrometry
Ho10griphic Leik
Detection
Exo-E1ection
Emission
Positron
Annihilition
Electric Current
Injection
Resistivity
Monitoring
Eddy Current
MEASUAANDS
Absorption ind Emis-
ion of Penetrint
Fluid In Defects
Fringe Pitterns Pro-
duced lIy DUil-
Wive1ength Hologrim
I\eflection of Incident'
Liser lIeim
Temperiture Anomilies
Leik-Induced Fringes
of i Multiple-Pulse
Liser
Stimulited Emission
of Electrons
Beti-RiY Emission
Anomi1ites In Surfice
Temperiture Induced
lIy Defects
Resistince Chinges Due
To Cryogenic Leik
Anomilies in Electric
Conductivity
FAI LURE TV PE
Cricks
Porosity
Fitigue
Weir
Interference
Restriction
Leikige
Fitigue
Fitigue
Fitigue
Leikige
Fitigue
TY~ICAL COMPONENTS
Chimbers
Ducts
lllides
Vi1ves
III ides
Vi1ves
Chimbers
Joints
Chimbers
IIlides
lIeiri ngs
Ducts
11ides
Ducts
llides
Ducts
Joints
llides
Chimbers
Ducts
ADVANTAGES
Low Cost, Highly Sensitive
Indic.tions of Surf.ce
Defects
Simpler Thin Interferometry.
No Pre-Flight Reference
Required
Minimil Access to Gip Re-
quired. Non-Conticting
Fist Locition of Ilocked
Coo1int ~issiges. Cin lie
Automited ind Remote
In-Toto Detection of Multiple
Le.ks. Qu.ntititive O.t•.
Very Fist.
Excellent Fitigue Chiricteri-
zition ind Life Prediction.
Non-Contacting
Good Fitigue Chiricterizition
ind Life Prediction
Thermil Mipping Of Electri-
cilly Heited Surfice Provide
Fist Indicition of F1iWS
Leakige Cin Ie Detected At
Operiting Temperiture
Good Sensitivity for Moderite
Cost. Applicible to
Computer Processing
LIMITATIONS
Requires Post-Inspection
Cleining. Crick Must Ie
Open to the Surfice
Chinges in Surfice Conditions
More Difficult to Detect
~eflective Chiricteristics
of Reflective Surfice
Mus t lie Known
Pirtiil Restriction Difficult
to Detect. Purging GiS
Must lie Hot
Expensive Equipment
Surfice ind Neir-Surfice
Fitigue Only
Surfice ind Neir-Surfice Onl~
Must be Exposed to Vicuum.
Requires Positron Source
For Injection Into Pirt.
Surfice and Neir-Surfice Fli~
Only. Poor Resolution.
Not Highly Sensitive. Little
QUintitative Diti Produced.
Surfice ind Neir-Surfice
Defects Only. Affected lIy
Many Miteriil Viriibles.
+:-
'"
TABLE 13. (Concluded)
Connector Continuity/ Continuity
Checki ng
TECHNIQUE
Mi 11 imeter-Wive
Interferometry
MEASURANDS
Differentiil Milli-
meter-Wive
Reflection
FAILURE TYPE
Cricks
Connector Loose
TYPICAL CDHPONENTS
Chilmbers
Electricill
Connectors
ADVANTAGES I LIMITATIDNS
Differentiill Approilch Elimin- J Not Highly Sensitive
ites Most Miteriill Vilriibles
Non-Contilcting
Direct, Low Cost, verificiltion/ No Indiciltion jf Continuity
of Connector Dperiltion. Ciln Loss Is Imminent
be Automilted
Hilogen Leik
Detection
Hygrometer
Rite of Ion Formition
Impedilnce
Leilkilge
Moisture
Joints
Vilves
Chilffibers
Ducts
Sensitive to Low Leik Rites
Low Cost. Filst ftesponse
Requires Tricer GiS. Sensi-
tive to Iilckground Gilses.
Insensitive For High Leik
lites
Intrusive Sensor
Flow Leilk Detection I Leilkilge Flow
MiSS Spectrometry I Ion Concentrition
Leilkilge
Leilkilge
Joints
Villves
Joints
Villves
Direct Meisurement of Leilkige
Flowrite.
Highly Sensitive
Time-Consuming Procedure.
Milny Pass i b1e Errors.
Cilnnot Detect Low Leik Rilt~
Locition Difficult
Secomes Siturited At Higher
teik Riltes. Slow
Thermil Conductivity I Therrncl Conductivity
Leik Checking
Leilkilge Joints
Villves
Reliltively Sensitive To Leik r Trilcer GiiS Required.
lIut Insensitive To lIiCk-
ground GiiS. Filst. Low Cost
Torqui ng
Leilk Detection
Solution
Pressure DeciY
Torque
Leilkige
Pressure Loss
r
Solt Relilxition
Excessive Friction
Leilkilge
Leilkilge
1I0lts
Turbopumps
Joints
Joints
Villves
Direct Indiciltion of Insuffi-
cient or Excessive Torque
Direct. ViSUil Locition of
Leik
Simple, Low Cost. Indicition
of Leik.
f
Dperitor Error Ciln Ciluse
Dimilge. Slow
Requires Post-Inspection
Cleilning. Operiltor-Depen-
dent. Slow. No QUintitil-
tive Diltil
Volume of Test Component Must
lie Known. Slow. Locition
Df Leilk Difficult.
DEFINITION OF CANDIDATE TECHNOLOGY
Analysis of Task I Failure Modes
Each of the sixteen failure mode categories identified by Task I were
examined to determine what between-flight diagnostic requirements would
be necessary to predict that incipient failure. The measurands associated
with each failure mode were determined first as listed in Table 14. The
measurands are shown in Fig. 17 and Appendix C, along with the propoga-
tion of the failure to give a clear indication of where they become
detectible.
TABLE 14. INSPECTABLE FAILURE MODES AND MEASURANDS tDENTIFIED
2 COOLANT PASSAGE LEAKAGE
• METAL EMBRITTLEMENT
• RESTRICTION
• TUBE SPLITS
3 JOINT LEAKAGE
• WARPING DISTORTION
• TORQU~ RELAXATION
• LEAK
5 HIGH TURBOPUMP TORQUE
• PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE
• EXCESSIVE TEMPERATURE
• EXCESSIVE FRICTION
6 CRACKED TURBINE BLADES
• HIGH TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
• FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE
• FATIGUE
7 CRACKED CONVOLUTION, BELLOWS SHIELD
• HIGH TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
• FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE
• FATIGUE
8 LOOSE ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
• HIGH TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT
• TORQUE RELAXATION
• CONTINUITY
9 BALL BEARING DAMAGE
• EXCESSIVE TEMPERATURE
• EXCESSIVE FRICTION
• WEAR
10 TUBE FRACTURE
• LINE DEFLECTION
• FATIGUE
11 TURBOPUMP SEAL LEAKAGE
• PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE
• EXCESSIVE TEMPERATURE
• EXCESSIVE FRICTION
13 VALVE FAILURE
• MOISTURE
• INTERNAL FRACTURE
• GALLING
• CONTAMINATION
14 INTERNAL VALVE LEAKAGE
• FRETTING
• CONTAMINATION
• TORQUE RELAXATION
• DISTORTION
• STUCK COMPONENTS
• LEAKAGE
15 REGULATOR DISCREPANCIES
• CONTAMINATION
• LEAKAGE
• EXCESSIVE FRICTION
16 CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC CONTROL
• CONTAMINATION
• LEAKAGE
• EXCESSIVE FRICTION
47
SAMI"LE: FAILURE MODE 2
METAL
EMIIUTTLE·
MENT
RESTRICTION
CCONTAMINATIONI
A. METAL
t. ICE
C. NON-METAL
D. DEFORM...TION
TU'E
S..LITS
LOSS OF
FUEL
MIXTU"E "...TIO
SHIFT IN
TURIINE
TU...INE
TEM..E.....TURE
Rln
Figure 17. Task I Propagation Diagrams Reviewed to Determine
Diagnostic Measurands
Correlation of Surveyed Techniques With Diagnostic Requirements
After locating between-flight inspection technology with the literature
survey and defining diagnostic requirements based on the characterization
of past failures. the inspection techniques were matched to applicable
failure mode measurands. This correlation is shown in Table 15. The
measurands are listed across the top. grouped by failure mode and the
inspection techniques are listed at the left, grouped by detection type.
Each possible inspection is indicated by an N. S. or R, depending on
whether the use of that technique could be considered novel, state of the
art, or rocket engine state of the art for that particular failure type.
This table gives a singular summary of the multiplicity of use of each
inspection technique, the number of techniques available toward each
failure mode and the present level of detectibility of each failure type.
DESIGN AND INSPECTION COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT
Accessibility and engine configuration modification requirements to utilize
each inspection technique were identified and included in the technology
grading. In addition, engine configuration modifications which could
provide enhanced inspection capability were identified and assumed in the
grading.
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TABLE 15. BETWEEN-FLIGHT FAILURE MODE DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
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Accessibility Requirements
The accessibility requirements were determined for each inspection techni-
que as applied to each failure mode. It was found that six types of accesi-
bility could be defined, in approximately decreasing desirability, as
follows:
A - Direct External Access: where no interference problems with
other components would normally be encountered.
B - External Access with Interference: where considerations
regarding the engine configuration, such as duct routing,
would usually be required of the design in order to provide
adequate inspection accessibility.
C - Internal Port Access: where an inspection port (or flight
instrumentation sensor) would have to be removed to provide
access to the interior or a component.
D - Component Removal Access: where the removal of a component
would be necessary to provide adequate internal access for
the inspection.
where, after removal, a
disassembly to accomplish the
E - Component Disassembly Access:
component would require major
inspection.
F - Component Addition Access: where the addition of an on-board
component would be required in order to carry out the ground
inspection.
Table 16 indicates the accessibility requirements, using the above access-
ibility codes, in the same format as was used in the technology/failure
mode correlation matrix (Table 15). This information became an input to
the technology grading, affecting the engine application, hazard, inte-
gration, and development descriptors as appropriate.
Configuration Modifications
Although most of the inspection techniques would impact on engine design
configuration, few would affect it in a manner inconsistent with typical
design requirements. Access ports and component removal needs are consi-
derations normally encountered and, with prudent design practices, will
have minimal impact on engine weight or performance. Access to components
for inspection has not usually been a problem in regard to preventing
failures. The lack of adequately-developed (for rocket engine use)
inspection or prediction technology has been the major hinderance. There
are two engine sub-components, however, that have been typically difficult
to apply state-lf-the-art rocket engine inspection technology to. Both
are subcomponents of a turbopump, a high speed precision machine which
operates under extreme environmental conditions.
50
TABLE 16. BETWEEN-FLIGHT INSPECTION ACCESSIBILITY
I! ! I
, I
ll! I
, I
1
I I II •
, I ,
"
"I I
I I
t I i:i
I
, I
i I). , I
I "
)' I jl I
'I. I
Ie !'i' ,~,
I Ie c,
I I I II' 1'1 I I
I III t!' I
Ie I" Ie' :C!
r
I C I
I C C
...
, ,
, C . Ie I
" C
e
I •a
•
•
A
o
o
o
C C ,c c
•
..
@ ;; :;
, I I I II, , I ,
~ 0 0 0 I E 'IISIS I , ,
C
,, ; I I
I , ... I I 'I' I I I C I ,
... iii I I I;
"
, I ; I
,
'e ! : , I ,
C; I: I I II: , , ,
; 'I. , I I
I!I I ,; ,
E IC I ,. JE I , I' 'E , d, ;, r r , I I r il! :i' r
"
1;:- Ir,
, E ;\.
0
"
, I
c
•
•~m,~ I
NESSl..It£. DECAY C
·rAlLURE MOOE OIVIATED 8Y IM~RDVEDDESIGN
• ·T£CHNIQUE NOT ~L1CA8LE TO ANY rAILURE MODES
• • +TECHNJQUE NOT DIAGNOSTIC .ECAUSE CO..".HENT DJSASSE".lY IS "[QUI"EO
.l..i.Wit!
EXTEfIlNAL ACCESS CODES
A. , DIREC' ACCESS
•• HiTE'H"E~[NCrWITH
OTHER COtM"ONENTS
JNTEftNAL ACCESS CODES
C J 'ORT ftEQUJlltEO
o : COMPONENl "ENOVAL
fIlEOU(RED
E ; CO~PONENT O!S-
ASSEMBLY PlEoutftEO
F' c COM'ON[NT AOOlTIOh
ftEQU 1PI: EO
BETWEEN-FLIGHT
INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
51
The bearings, because of the manner in which they must be structurally
supported, have been difficult to inspect unless the turbopump is dis-
assembled. In-flight vibration monitoring has not been a reliable
indication of bearing condition either. The diagnostic technology
identified by this study should alleviate this problem as well as provide
much better failure prediction with only modest configuration considera-
tions. The isotope tracer techniques require an in line device, sensor for
in-flight monitoring or collector for between-flight analysis, which could
be external to the turbopump. The fiberoptic bearing detector requires
only fiberoptic access to the outside of the bearing outer race, a consi-
deration which might be difficult to retrofit on an existing turbopump but
which could be incorporated in a new design.
Access to turbopump turbine blades is typically difficult, especially for
multiple-stage turbines, often requiring removal of the turbopump from the
engine. These subcomponents operate at very high rotational speeds in a
hot gas and thus are vulnerable to over-temperature conditions and fatigue
lives which must be carefully monitored and predicted. Improved accessi-
bility to the turbines through the use of removable turbine housings (not
requiring the removal of the entire turbopump) or some other means would be
highly desirable. This would enhance the use of a wide number of inspection
technologies which are otherwise difficult to employ. The development of
this design feature would be significant but the benefits of great improve-
ments in inspectability, life prediction and repair would be a major
advancement in the maintainability of reusable rocket engines.
TECHNOLOGY SELECTION AND UPGRADING
The method for evaluation and ranking of the technologies was developed in
cooperation with the Task II effort. The evaluation method selected was,
as in Task II, a two-step approach. First, two clear-out screens were
identified and applied to the techniques, resulting in the elimination of
six technologies. Lumped descriptors, each made up of many specific des-
criptors, were then defined. The technologies applicable to each figure
mode were graded using these lumped descriptors, thus providing a ranking
of the techniques. All techniques were assumed to be equally developed
for use on rocket engines.
Before ranking the techniques, it was desirable to eliminate from further
consideration those technologies which were clearly not amenable to the
goals of this study. Although many criteria with which to screen out
these unacceptable techniques were considered, only two appeared to be
unequivocal. They are:
1. Need - Is the technique applicable to any of the Task I failure
modes? Although valuable diagnostic techniques which were
identified by the literature survey, three technologies, particle
radiography, fluoroscopy, and ellipsometry were eliminated by
these screen.
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2. Component Disassembly - Does the use of this technique necessitate
major disassembly of a component? Such disassembly would defeat
the goals of on-condition maintenance diagnostics. Three addi-
tional techniques, magnetic particle, magnetic perturbation, and
Barkhausen noise analysis were eliminated from consideration by
this screen. All three applied only to turbopump bearing
inspection.
Technique Grading
Inasmuch as many specific descriptors were not available to evaluate the
technologies, lumped descriptors were defined, each incorporating several
specific parameters. With this approach, errors in the judgments of
unknown information tend to balance with both other missing and known
descriptors for a fair grade of each lumped category. This, in turn,
reduces the possibility of biasing the overall ranking with a distorted
grade, appearing as a seemingly well-substantiated score, for anyone
descriptor.
The lumped descriptors were grouped as being either technical, economic,
or developmental in nature. The technical and economic groups were sub-
divided so as to differentiate between the required inputs and resulting
effects of using the technology. The lumped descriptors are:
Technical Requirements
Application
Auxiliary
Physical
Technical Features
Detectability
Durability
Speed
Those requirements concerning the use of the inspec-
tion equipment, including accessibility, human
interfacing, and engine configurational needs.
Weighted score to reflect the importance of these
factors.
Auxiliary requirements involved in performing the
inspection, including electrical, mechanical, and
computational needs.
Physical characteristics of the inspection equipment,
such as size, weight, complexity, material and
chemical.
How well the technique can identify the failure.
This includes many factors such as accuracy, repeata-
bility, sensitivity, resolution, drift, suscepta-
bility and level of failure progression. This is a
key descriptor and is weighted accordingly.
How rugged or reusable the inspection equipment is,
as well as how much maintenance such as recalibration
is needed to maintain the required level of detection.
The time needed to perform the inspection, including
equipment setup, use, removal, and data processing.
Since a reduction in turnaround time is a major goal
with associated savings in operational costs, this
descriptor was given a weighted score. 53
Hazard
Economic Expenditures
R&D Costs
Integration
Costs
Economic Savings
Operational
Savings
peve10pment
Development
Danger of initiating a failure with use of technique,
including the sensitivity to an improperly performed
inspection.
The estimated cost to upgrade or develop tbe techni-
que for use on rocket engines.
Approximate cost of incorporating the use of the
technique into an engine design after upgrading or
development. Does not include equipment costs.
Approximate savings through reduced turnaround and
labor or improved predictability with the use of
the technique. Savings were assumed at $100.00 per
hour for 1,000 inspections, i.e., a I-hour improve-
ment would result in $100,000.00 in savings for
1,000 inspections.
The number of years necessary to advance the techno-
logy to routine rocket engine use.
The technologies were graded as indicated in Table 17 and Appendix I for
each failure mode. In order to achieve technical scores which could be
fairly compared, the technologies were assumed to be equally developed for
use on rocket engines. The scores given for technical lumped descriptors
were summed to give an overall technical score. Economic costs were sub-
tracted from savings, resulting in an overall savings figure. An economic
grade was then assigned based on one point for each nearest $100,000 in
savings. The development grade was determined by subtracting one point,
from a maximum of ten points, for each year required for development. A
total overall grade was obtained by summing the technical, economic, and
development grades.
TECHNIQUE SELECTION
The results of the grading can be interpreted in many ways. In all cases,
however, it should be remembered that the grades are inherently subjective,
with disagreements over scores inevitable. For this reason, small differ-
ences between grades should be considered neither a decisive distinction
nor an indication of nearly equal status. For the purpoBe of selecting
technologies for further development, however, some ranking basis was
needed, so the total overall grades, as calculated, were employed.
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK $-K $«>K 10 0 10 120
SCANNING ACOUSTIC FLOW 14 5 6 12 7 16 9 69 200 10 600 390 4 2 8 81
ACOUSTIC HOLOGRAPHY 15 3 5 15 5 18 9 70 200 10 500 290 3 4 6 79
X-RAY RADIOGRAPHY 7 1 2 8 I 5 8 7 38 100 10 200 90 1 2 8 55
GAMMA RADIOGRAPHY 6- 2 4 15 7 8 3 45 100 20 400 290 3 3 7 55
PENTOXIDE POLAROGRAPHY 7 7 6 12 4 8 1 45 200 50 200 (50) 0 4 6 51
HYDROGEN POLAROGRAPHY 15 5 5 12 5 12 8 62 150 10 400 240 2 4 6 70
HYGROMETRY 7 7 6 10 5 7 1 43 50 20 200 130 1 1 9 53
SCANNING OPTICAL PVROMETRY 18 5 8 10 8 12 9 70 100 10 600 490 5 2 8 83
HOLOGRAPHIC LEAK 17 3 4 8 7 17 9 65 200 10 700 490 5 3 7 77
MILLIMETER-WAVE 15 3 4 8 6 12 8 56 200 - 10 400 190 2 4 6 64
INTE RFE RO~lETRY
Table 18 is a summary of the grading. It is important to note that the
grades given are maximum and, in general, apply to only one failure mode.
This table does give a good overall technology ranking because, as can be
seen by studying grading tables in Appendix I, a technique which may rank
highest in only one failure mode tends to rank high in others for which
it applies; similarly, a low-ranking technique tends to rank low for all
applicable failure modes.
In order to provide adequate detection or prediction for each failure type,
the top ranking inspection technique, based on its total overall grade, was
selected for each failure mode. As Table 19 shows, seven technologies were
chosen, three of which were highest for more than one failure mode. Two
of the techniques, thermal conductivity leak detection and connector con-
tinuity checking, are considered rocket engine techniques; one, particle
analysis, is a stage-of-the-art technology; and four, holographic leak
detection, exo-electron emission, scanning optical pyrometry, and isotope
tracer detection, are considered novel.
When developed, these seven technologies could be used to detect or predict
all of the failures identified by Task I. However, in some cases in-flight
detection may provide better or more timely detection and existing rocket
engine inspections, although not highest ranking, may be adequate. These
factors were evaluated, with resulting recommendations, in Task IV.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Task III effort paralleled the Task II approach. A literature survey,
over a database of over six million citations, was performed and yielded
56 tabulated documents. A review of these documents identified 14 rocket
engine techniques, 16 state-of-the-art techniques in other industries and
16 novel techniques. The results of the Task I failure characterization
were examined to identify between-flight measurands. The techniques
identified by the survey were then correlated to the applicable failure
mode measurands to provide a matrix of inspection possibilities.
A selection procedure was used to identify the top ranking inspection
technique for each failure mode. First, six technologies were eliminated
as being clearly inadequate. The remaining techniques were then graded
using lumped descriptors which included factors such as accessibility,
engine configuration requirements, detectibility, speed, costs, savings
and safety. The techniques were graded assuming an equal state of
maturity for each failure mode application. Based on the grades for
each lumped descriptor, the technologies were assigned total overall
grades which permitted a ranking of the applicable inspection technology
for each failure mode. Seven technologies were identified as being top-
ranking in one or more of the 16 failure modes. They are:
1. Holographic Leak Detection - Leak detection of multiple joints
2. Thermal Conductivity Leak Detection - Leak detection in localized
areas.
3, Scanning Optical Pyrometry - Detection of coolant passage
restrictions or leaks.
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•4. Exo-Electron Emission - Fatigue monitoring and characterization
5. Connector Continuity Checking - Verification of electrical
connector function.
6. Isotope Tracer Detection - Monitoring wear.
7. Particle Analysis - Monitoring wear and contamination .
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FUTURE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
The objectives of this task were to review the results from In-Flight Condition
Monitoring (Task II) and Between-Flight Inspection (Task III) and to establish
an objective prioritized list of technology development requirements.
TECHNOLOGIES SELECTED FROM TASK II AND TASK III
The procedures followed in Task II and Task III were similar; a survey of
technologies was made and matched with the failure modes identified in Task I,
which were then ranked and these technologies became the inputs to this task
and are:
Task II: In-Flight Condition Monitoring
Direct In-Flight Sensors
1. Optical pyrometer
2. Fiberoptic deflectometer
3. Isotope wear detector
4. Tunable diode-laser spectrometer
Indirect In-Flight Sensors
1. Ultrasonic flowmeter
2. Ultrasonic thermometer
3. Digital quartz pressure sensor
4. Optical tachometer
Task III: Between-Flight Inspection
1. Holographic leak detection
2. Thermal conductivity leak checking
3. Scanning optical pyrometry
4. Exo-electron emission
5. Connector continuity checking
6. Isotope tracer detection
7. Particle analysis
APPLICATION OF SELECTED TECHNOLOGIES TO ROCKET ENGINES
In~Flight Condition Monitoring
Considerable reductions in cost and time in maintaining a long service life
for reusable rocket engines can be realized by the use of in-flight condition
monitoring systems. The search and screening of such systems yielded eight
state of the art and novel technologies which can be used to detect symptons
related to failure modes previously experienced in rocket engines. They
include optical pyrometers, fiberoptic bearing deflection detectors, isotope
wear detectors, tunable diode-laser spectrometers, ultrasonic flowmeters,
ultrasonic thermometers, digital quartz pressure sensors, and optical tach-
ometers.
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A description of each of these technologies is presented in a discussion of
the steps in development required for their integration into rocket engines.
Direct In-Flight Sensors
..
1. Optical Pyrometer for Remote Temperature Monitoring of Turbine
Blades
Technical Description. All objects emit a spectrum of thermal radiation
characteristic of their emissivity and their temperature. An optical
pyrometer measures the frequencies and amplitudes of the spectrum of this
thermal radiation. and thus provides a noncontacting. nonintrusive. fast
means of temperature sensing. A system for temperature sensing by means of
a pyrometer is shown in Fig. 18. The pyrometer consists of a semiconductor
device in which electromagnetic quanta are converted into electrical current.
The current magnitude is measured by an electronic system. In measuring
the temperature of an object. the thermal radiation is optically filtered by
a window into one or two narrow frequency bands to give a unique thermal
fingerprint of the object. For observing the temperature of parts internal
to a system. the filtered waves are transmitted to the pyrometer by means of
optical fibers. allowing isolation of the detector and its electronics from
a hot. hostile environment.
. .
."
..
\ELECTRONIC
SIGNAL
PROCESSING
TEMPERATURE
INDICATDR\
DETECTDR7
OPTICAL/
FIBER
CABLE
OBJECT
OF
MEASUREMENT
•
Figure 18. Block Diagram of Pyrometer for Remote
Temperature Measurement
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Further advantages of this pyrometer system for turbine blade measurement
include the nonintrusiveness of the detector, preventing any hazard or aera-
tion as well as its immunity to creep and fatigue, by virtue of its crystal-
line structure. Furthermore, a response time of 0.6 microseconds or less is
possible, enabling transients to be accurately monitored. The versatility
of today's electronics makes possible complete thermal profiling or imaging
of a device, as well as strobed observation.
At the temperature range typical of rocket engine turbine blades (538 to
807 C), accuracies as good as 0.5% can be achieved by these devices.
Pyrometers have, in fact, been used for remote in-flight monitoring of tur-
bine blade temperature in airplanes.
Development Requirements. To be incorporated into a rocket engine, the
following steps in development are required. The measurement requirements
for the pyrometer must be defined in terms of its resolution, accuracy and
range of frequency sensitivity desired, and a choice of pyrometer made. The
proper fiberoptic and window materials for the high-temperature environment
of the turbine must be chosen. Finally, the electronics must be laid out,
the system integrated and a prototype fabricated and tested in the field.
2. Fiberoptic Bearing Deflection Detector
Technical Description. A fiberoptic deflection detector monitors the condi-
tion of a bearing by measuring the localized, cyclic deformations on the
outer bearing race caused by the passage of the balls, by a detector mounted
near the race. The key element of this detector, as shown in Fig. 19, is a
bundle of optical fibers with its end in close proximity to the outside
radial surface of the outer race. Light is both shined onto the race and
reflected from the race to a detector through this fiber bundle. The magni-
tude of the reflected photoelectric signal is a function of the variation of
distance between the race and the sensing element. ' The output of the probe
for a normal bearing is very similar to a clean half sine wave, corresponding
to the passage of each ball by the probe. When the surface of one of the
balls becomes pitted or flawed, the photoelectric output of the detector is
correspondingly distorted each time that ball passes over the fiberoptic
probe, thus generating a distorted half sine wave once per revolution. On
the other hand, a crack or pit on the inner surfaces of the bearing races is
noted as a distortion in each of the output peaks, corresponding to the
passage of each ball over the flaw in the race.
Fiberoptic bearing deflection detectors are well suited for bearing perform-
ance monitoring. The detector provides a noncontacting means of measuring
bearing deflections and loads directly. High levels of sensitivity, such as
50 mV/micron, are commonly achieved. By virtue of the fiberoptic coupling,
the device has a profile which facilitates installation and is immune to,
electromagnetic noise.
Development Requirements. Methods of mounting the detector should be evalu-
ated which minimize the effect of structural vibrations on the output. The
detector electronic circuitry should be laid out, fabricated and tested. A
fiberoptic material should be chosen which best functions in a cryogenic
environment.
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Figure 19. Fiberoptic Deflectometer
3. Isotope Wear Detectors
Technical Description. An isotope-wear detector measures the low-energy
OSHA-approved gamma rays of wear particles of ball bearing or rotary seals.
It consists of a gamma-ray detector and a particle catcher downstream of the
isotope-tagged bearings or seals. The y-photons emitted by the captured
particles strike the detector and are converted into an electric current.
Electronic circuitry then measures the magnitude of this current, determining
the rate of y-photon emission and thus the quantity of wear particles.
Tagging is effectively accomplished by immersing the part in a flux of
neutrons (e.g., by placing it in a storage hold of a nuclear reactor), con-
verting a small, uniformly distributed fraction of its atoms into radio-
isotopes. The part is then incubated for several months, leaving it tagged
with only long-lived radioisotopes suitable for long-term monitoring of wear.
Materials chosen for bearings because of desirable mechanical properties are
often ferromagnetic (such as the steel bearings in the SSME turbopump), and
debris from parts made of such materials could be captured by a magnetic trap
located on a duct at a bend in flow downstream of the part (Fig. 20). Cen-
trifugal forces would move the debris radially outward at the bend into a
bed of magnetic pins which capture these particles for measurement by a y-ray
detector. An alternative method, suitable for turbopump rotary seals, routes
the purging or cooling fluid passing through the seal through a duct to a
lower-pressure region, where a filter with a low pressure drop captures a
representative amount of the wear particles.
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Figure 20. Isotope Detector for Steel Bearing Wear Particles
Isotope wear monitors are thus a quantitative, noncontacting means of
monitoring the wear of rocket engine turbopump bearings and rotary seals.
Semiconductor detectors are small (less than I cm3) and lightweight (on the
order of a few grams). Several semiconductor detectors are available which
are 100% efficient in converting low energy y-photons into electrical signals,
so that parts can be tagged with small, safe concentrations of low y-energy
radioisotopes which are certified suitable for public handling by OSHA.
Development Requirements. In order to incorporate such a detector into a
rocket engine turbopump, methods of mounting the semiconductor device and
capturing the wear particles Should be evaluated and tested which minimize
the separation of wear particles from the detector, and thus attenuation of
the y-photons. The methods of capture should be further evaluated for their
efficiency in trapping wear particles. The signal to noise ratio should,be
optimized by a proper choice of commercially available semiconductor detec-
tors and proper design of the electronic circuitry.
4. Tunable Diode-Laser Spectrometer
Technical Description. A tunable diode-laser spectrometer is a highly com-
pact and rugged means of measuring the infrared spectra of the constituents
of rocket engine combustion gases. A p-n junction diode laser generates an
infrared beam whose wavelength is varied by altering the diode-laser bias
current. When transmitted through combustion gases, this beam is selectively
absorbed at certain wavelengths which are characteristic of the constituent
gas species (Fig. 21).
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Figure 21. Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer
To measure the concentration of a gas species, an optical filter (instead of
a bulky monochromator grating), consistent with an IR absorption line of the
gas, is placed in front of a wide-band photoelectric detector. The electri-
cal current of the detector is related to the intensity of the absorption
line, and thus to the concentration of the gas species. Thus, for example,
by selecting the absorption lines of HZ and O?, the combustion mixture ratio
of HZ-fueled engines can be monitored and conErolled.
Alternatively, the spectrometer can be used for condition monitoring. For
example, by selecting an absorption line of the C-F bond found in combusted
shavings of Teflon valve seats and measuring the photocurrent in that band,
the concentration of the Teflon shavings or wear particles can be measured.
Similarly, an absorption band of COZ can be selectively monitored, allowing
measurement of the concentration of the debris particles from worn graphite
rotary seals.
One of the principle advantages of the tunable diode spectrometer is its
size: the diode-laser itself can fit on top of a dime. Furthermore, while
power of only about a milliwatt is required, the intensity of the laser output
signal is quite high since it is monochromatic, allowing a high inherent
signal-to-noise ratio. The diode-laser also has all the advantages charac-
teristic of sem~conductor devices, inlcuding ruggedness and immunity to creep
and fatigue.
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Development Requirements. To incorporate this detector into a rocket engine,
a suitable hous.ing must be designed and fabricated which isolates the detec-
tor both mechanically and thermally. Appropriate diode-laser materials and
filters must be chosen which correspond to the combustion constituents to be
monitored. The optical arrangement and electronics of the detector must be
laid out, fabricated and field tested. Furthermore, a lightweight shielding
for the detector should be designed which minimizes noise due to background
cosmic rays. The effect, if any, of radioisotope labeling on the physical
properties of the parts should also be determined.
Indirect In-Flight Sensors
1. Ultrasonic Flowmeter for Propellant Flow Measurement
Technical Description. The velocity of a sound wave is altered when it
passes through a moving fluid, much like a boat crossing a flowing river.
Figure 22 shows a transit-time ultrasonic flowmeter which takes advantage of
this principle. A pair of transducers is mounted on the pipe, directed at
one another and oriented diagonally to the flow. Ultrasonic pulses are
alternately transmitted and detected by each of the transducers. Because the
upstream signal velocity is decreased and the downstream velocity increased,
there is a difference in their velocities and thus of their transit times.
This difference in transit times is analyzed by electronic circuitry to
measure the flow velocity. This measurement is rendered independent of
properties influencing sound in the fluid such as temperature, pressure,
density and viscosity, by the use of a judicious combination of the measured
upstream and downstream transit times.
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Figure 22. Block Diagram of Transit Time Ultrasonic Flowmeter
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The flowmeter has the advantage of being completely nonintrusive and thus
could never become an impedance to flow or a hazard in case of structural
failure. Accuracies of 0.4% and repeatabilities of 0.2% have been achieved
commercially.
Development Requirements. Ultrasonic flowmeters should be developed for
suitability in a cryogenic environment. Methods of attachment of transducers
and piezoelectric elements must be optimized. Furthermore, since structural
vibrations and flow noise can both produce piezoelectric signals, the fre-
quency and acoustic polarization must be optimized to minimize these effects.
2. Ultrasonic Thermometer
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Technical Description. An ultrasonic
thermometer measures the transit time
of an ultrasonic pulse transmitted
across a hot gas chamber. From this
transit time, the acoustic speed and,
in turn, the gas temperature are
determined. Figure 23 diagrams the
basic concept of this sensor. A pair
of piezoelectric transducers alter-
nately transmit (by means of an elec-
tronic driving signal) and receive
ultrasonic pulses sent across the gas
chamber. The transit time of these
pulses is then determined by electronic
circuitry, yielding the mean acoustic
velocity across the chamber. From the
acoustic velocity, the temperature of
the gas is determined. By a judicious
combination of the measured transit
times of pulses in both directions
across the chamber, the acoustic vel-
ocity determination and thus the
temperature measurement will be
independent of the gas flow speed.
The advantages of this sensor include
high temperature capability (greater
than 1650 C with cooled transducers)
and fast response. Unlike other tem-
perature sensing probes, the ultrasonic
thermometer measures the path-averaged
temperature across the gas chamber. It
nonintrusive.
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Development Outline. Steps for development of such a system for use in a
rocket engine include design of electronics to optimize small-signal
recognition and signal-to-noise ratio, and design of a system of mounting
and cooling the piezoelectric transducer pair. The system would then be
mounted on an engine and tested in the field.
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3. Digital Quartz Pressure Sensor
Technical Description. With a digital quartz pressure sensor, one takes
advantage of the pressure dependence of the resonant frequency of a quartz
crystal. In the sensor, an electronic oscillator circuit connected to a
quartz beam forces the beam into resonant ultrasonic oscillations. Compres-
sion of the beam alters its resonant frequency, which is then detected by the
electronic circuitry, generating a time-domain digital signal. Figure 24
shows a design of a digital quartz pressure sensor for measuring absolute
pressure. The input pressure is transformed through a bellows and a canti-
lever into a force imposed on the quartz crystal.
The advantages of digital quartz pressure sensors are manifold. Quartz
crystal has long-term stability (no creep) ease of vibrational excitation
(resulting in lower power consumption) and low-temperature sensitivity
(sensitivities of 0.0057./C are experienced in quartz pressure sensors). It
is for these very reasons that quartz oscillators are the most commonly used
frequency standards for clocks, etc. Additional advantages include high
repeatability (within 0.005i.) and a dynamic range of up to 200,000:1.
Miniaturized digital quartz sensors are available (see Fig. 25) which can
measure as high as 6.9 megapascal and weigh only 57 grams.
Development Outline. The candidate miniaturized digital quartz pressure
sensor must be tested for compatability to engine environments. Further
tests should be made to determine its performance trends and durability.
The device then can be adapted for incorporation in an engine.
4. Optical Tachometer
Technical Description. An optical tachometer measures the rpm of a rotating
shaft by measuring the time between reflections generated by an encoder which
is attached to and rotates with the shaft. The configuration of an optical
tachometer is shown in Fig. 26.
An LED acts as a light source, transmitting through optical fibers onto the
encoder. The encoder, in turn, reflects the light back through a set of
optical fibers coaxial to the input fibers, onto a semiconductor element
which coqverts these light pulses into an electrical signal. To this end,
the encoder is appropriately bevelled and contoured to provide maximum
contrast between the reflective and nonreflective areas. From the known
geometry of the encoder and the measured time between the pulses, electronic
circuitry connected to the sensor determines the rpm of the shaft. The
optical fibers are terminated "in a fused quartz rod whose end is fashioned
into a lens which focuses both the incident and reflected light, thus allows
the sensor to be placed a considerable distance from the encoder; i.e.,
outside the liquid flow and flush with the housing wall.
Contrast ratios well above 10 and input signal to noise ratios of about 38
have been calculated for optical tachometers of the above description.
Being flush with the shaft housing, the detector is completely nonintrusive
to cryogen in flow.
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Figure 25. Housing for Miniaturized Digital Quartz Pressure Sensor
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Development Outline. Before incorporation in a rocket engine turbopump, the
lens, reflecting surfaces and fiber optics should be tested to determine
their properties in the cryogenic and vibrational environment of the pump.
Designs for sealing the optical fibers to the fused quartz lens and for
sealing the lens to the metal sensor port need to be evaluated. Finally,
tests must be made to determine the effect of bubbles and fluid turbulence
which determine the ultimate performance of this optical sensor.
Between Flight Inspection
Seven technologies were chosen from the inspection techniques for the detec-
tion of prediction of the failures identified by Task I; two are considered
rocket engine state-of-the-art, one state-of-the-art, and four are novel.
The technologies are holographic leak detection, thermal conductivity leak
detection, scanning optical pyrometry, exo-electron emission, connector
continuity checking, isotope tracer detection, and particle analysis.
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A brief descritpion of each of these technologies is made here.
1. Holographic Leak Detection (Figure 27)
Holographic leak detection is a technique capable of simultaneously locating
and quantifying multiple leaks. This is achieved by illuminating the test
area with a triple-pulse coherent light source. The first pulse reflects
off the test object and is combined with a reference beam, obtained with
optical beam splitters, thus forming a hologram of the object. The second
optical pulse, shortly following the first one, forms another hologram in
the same manner. These holograms, recorded on the same photographic film,
interact to cancel each other if the object has not been altered at all.
However, if the object has undergone even minute changes between the pulses,
an interference pattern is formed. If the object is purged with a gas that
is optically different from the ambient gas, any leak will produce such an
interference pattern. The volume of the interference pattern is proportional
to the volume of the leaking gas. The third pulse of the coherent source
enhances the interference fringes, the spacing of which are proportional to
the speed of the leakage. Since the product of volume and velocity is pro-
portional to flowrate, the leakage rate can be determined simultaneously for
all leaks in the line of sight of the detector.
Holographic leak detection can provide significant reductions in the time
required for leak detection with the advantage of being a noncontacting tech-
nique capable of locating multiple leaks simultaneously. Both qualitative
and quantitative data reproduced in a manner which can be readily inter-
faced with computer processing. As an optical technique, it has the virtue
of providing simplified scanning ability and permanent image recording.
Figure 27. Holographic Leak Detection Schematic
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Development Outline. The development required of holographic leak detection
bef9re its routine use on rocket engines includes establishing laser require-
ments and recording needs so that equipment may be selected. Real time
imaging of the leakage hologram should also be investigated. Procedures to
inspect the maximum number of ducts with a minimum of different viewing
angles should be defined.
TASK/YEAR 1 2 3
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2. Thermal Conductivity Leak Detection (Figure 28)
Thermal conductivity leak detection uses a hot wire resistance bridge with
one element of the bridge exposed to air' (reference side) and the other
element exposed to the leak (tracer gas). Conductivity of the air changes
with concentration of the tracer gas which causes a change in resistance or
temperature of the element. Leakages are detected with a probe. Helium gas
may be used for the tracer. The instrument is sensitive to approximately
1 x 10-4 sec/sec, portable, relatively insensitive to background interfer-
ence and has a good response (1 to 5 seconds). After saturation, the
instrument returns to zero immediately when the tracer gas source is removed.
This type of device, the·Uson 500, has been successfully used on the J-2
engine.
Thermal conductivity leak detection provides a fast and reliable location
of leakage at low cost. The device is easily used and interpreted by main-
tenance personnel. The technique is versatile and may be used to pinpoint
leaks indicated by other means.
Development Outline. Thermal leak detection has previously seen limited
application on the J-2 engine. Although these devices are commercially
available, an investigation to compare tracer gases and explore means of
reducing sensitivity to background effects would improve the usability of
this technique on rocket engines.
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3. Scanning Optical Pyrometry (Figure 29)
Scanning optical pyrometry locates restrictions in chamber coolant passages
by automatically sweeping the inner chamber walls and noting temperature
profile anomalies. The optical pyrometer measures the frequencies and
amplitudes of the spectrum of the thermal radiation, characteristic of the
emissivity and temperature, emitted by the chamber wall. With blockage of a
hot purge gas, localized cooling occurs downstream which can be detected by
the pyrometer. The pyrometer incorporates optical filters to isolate the
thermal radiation into selected narrow frequency bands. This radiation is
then converted into electrical current by a semiconductor device. The
current is measured by an electronic system and converted to a temperature
indication. The pyrometer automatically scans the chamber wall by a
combination of mechanical and optical means in both the azimuth and chamber
axis directions. Data can be presented with imaging of the temperature
profile and/or by having the coordinates of all anomalies automatically
calculated and listed.
Scanning optical pyrometry provides fast, positive location of coolant pass-
age restrictions. Automatic and remote operation can also provide enhanced
safety to maintenance personnel and, because of the noncontacting nature of
the scanning, less engine hazard. The technique can be used during purging
operations to provide little impact on turnaround; its use might even permit
reduced purging requirements.
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Figure 29. Scanning Pyrometer Concept for Detection of Coolant
Passage Restrictions
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Development Outline. In order to develop this technology for use on rocket
engines, the measurement requirements for the pyrometer must be identified
in terms of resolution, accuracy and range of frequency sensitivity so that
a pyrometer may be selected. A suitable scanning mechanism must be worked
out and its control circuitry defined. The manner of data display must also
be selected and the appropriate electronics and software laid out.
TASK/YEAR 1 2 3
FEASIBILITY
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4. Exo-Electron Emission (Figure 30)
Exo-electrort emission is a means of locating and characterizing fatigue
damage in order to provide remaining-life prediction. This technique refers
to the photoelectron emission from a metal part which emanates through micro-
cracks in the brittle surface oxide. By scanning the test surface with a
small beam of ultraviolet radiation, this exo-electron emission may be
collected and amplified by an electron multiplier and measured by a current
meter. The intensity of the emission increases as fatigue-induced cracks
grow with continued cycling. By this means, a clear, accurate indication
of the location and progression of fatigue can be obtained.
Fatigue damage produces highly localized exo-electron emission very early,
i.e., on the order of 17. of the fatigue life. Cracks, on the other hand,
are not visible until about 10 to 15% of the fatigue life has expired. This
very early detection, as well as the characteristic increasing emission as
fatigue damage progresses, permits correspondingly earlier and more accurate
prediction of remaining life with the use of this technique.
Development Outline. Before exo-electron emission may be used routinely for
rocket engine inspections, equipment suitable for in-field use may be devel-
oped. Scanning methods and sensors need to be optimized for each application.
The emission behavior of the materials to be inspected also must be carefully
characterized. Finally, the best method of data presentation, such as plots
or imaging, needs to be identified.
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s. Connector Continu~ Checking
Connector continuity checking verifies proper functioning of connectors by
simply determining the electrical continuity through them. This is done as
part of the automatic checks that also confirm the functioning of valves,
igniters, instrumentation, etc. The on-board controller executes a checkout
program that sends signals to components (through connectors) and compares
the output signal to stored limit valves. Any discrepancies are noted so
that maintenance personnel may isolate and correct the faulty wiring, con-
nector, or component. Connector continuity checking thus provides a fast,
automatic determination of connector function.
Development Outline. Connector continuity checking is presently used on the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. Because it performs satisfactorily, no special
development needs are considered necessary.
6. Isotope Tracer Detection (Figure 31)
Isotope tracer detection measureS the low-energy (OSHA approved) gamma rays
of wear particles. These particles are captured by a catcher downstream of
the isotope-tagged part during flight. The gamma-photons emitted by the
captured particles are detected between-flight by removing the catcher from
the engine and placing it in a gamma-ray detector. The magnitude of the
electric current from the detector indicates the rate of gamma-photon
emission and thus the quantity of wear particles.
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Figure 31. Magnetic Wear Particle Trap
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Tagging is accomplished by immersing the part in a flux of neutrons (e.g.,
in a storage hold of a nuclear reactor), converting a small, uniformly dis-
tributed fraction of its atoms into radioisotopes. The part is then incubated
for several months, leaving it tagged with only long-lived radioisotopes
suitable for long term monitoring of wear.
Materials chosen for bearings are often ferromagnetic because of desirable
mechanical properties, so debris from parts made of such material could be
captured by a magnetic trap. An alternate method would route the purging
or cooling fluid through a duct to a lower-pressure region where a low-
pressure-drop filter catches a representative amount of the wear particles.
Isotope tracer detection thus offers a quantitative, noncontacting means of
monitoring the wear of components. Isotope tagging provides excellent iden-
tification of the wear particles of a selected component in an environment
where wear particles generated from several different parts might be present.
Development Outline. In order to apply isotope tracer detection to rocket
engine components, methods of capturing the wear particles must be evaluated
and tested for efficiency lin entrapment and retention. The effect, if any,
of radioisotope tagging on the physical properties of the components should
be determined. Engine performance effects must be evaluated. Selection of
a rapid and reliable ground-based gamma-ray measurement system should also
be investigated.
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7. Particle Analysis (Figure 32)
Particle analysis is a means of determining wear or contamination by examin-
ing the debris in a working fluid. These particles are captured in-flight
and analyzed between-flight. The analysis identifies the concentration of
each type of particle material so that, with the materials of engine compo-
nents known, the upstream wear or contaminant source can be monitored.
Selection of different materials for wear surfaces of different parts
provides good wear isolation. By trending the wear history of each
component, sudden excessive wear or incipient failure can be identified
and appropriate actions taken.
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Figure 32. Typical Wear Particle Trending
Materials chosen for bearings are often ferromagnetic because of desirable
mechanical properties, so debris from parts made of such material could be
captured by a magnetic trap. An alternate method would route the purging or
cooling fluid through a duct to a lower-pressure region where a low-pressure-
drop filter catches a representative amount of the wear particles.
The analysis of the particles can be accomplished in several ways, the most
common being spectrometry. The particles are identified as to their mate-
rial makeup and the corresponding concentrations of each material. Trending
of wear or identification of contaminants can then be used to make timely
maintenance actions.
Particle analysis thus offers a quantitative noncontacting means of monitor-
ing wear or contamination. Trending of wear data can permit use of compo-
nents for their full life as well as enhanced maintenance planning capability.
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•Development Outline. Before particle analysis can be applied to rocket
engines, methods of capturing wear particles and contaimnants must be
evaluated and tested for efficiency in entrapment and retention. This
would include an investigation of performance effects on the engine.
Selection of a rapid and reliable ground-based particle analyzer should
also be evaluated.
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SELECTION OF PREFERRED IN-FLIGHT OR BETWEEN-FLIGHT TECHNOLOGY
The highest ranked technology selections that were considered upgradable for
both in-flight and between-flight, and the effort required to develop these
technologies have been identified. A comparison is now made between these
technologies for a given failure mode and the preferred technology selected.
In two cases, however, technologies have been combined to form:
.. 1.
2.
Wear Detection
In-Flight Indirect Condition Monitoring
...
•
WEAR DETECTION
The two technologies used to detect wear are:
1. Isotope wear detectors
2. Tunable diode-laser spectrometer
Wear can be monitored by tagging certain engine parts, i.e., turbopump
bearings. The debris from these parts can be captured in-flight and recorded
or the debris may be entrapped and retained and measured between flights.
Details of the capturing system remain to be defined.
The tunable diode-laser spectrometer can be used for detecting wear for
condition monitoring by selecting absorption lines for appropriate materials
which would be indicative of wear, i.e., the C-F bond corresponding to Teflon
valve seats.
The combination of these two technologies will provide data on surface wear
and to identify the wear surface within the engine. The detection can either
be in-flight and/or between-flight. In any event, detectable wear would be
cause for further investigation between-flight.
The need exists to identify liquid rocket engine internal wear surfaces and
wear rates. One of the differences between air breathing engines and liquid
rocket engines is that the latter currently have no procedure to indicate
surface wear, as contrasted to SOAP (Spectrographic Oil Analysis Procedure)
for air breathing engine lubricating systems. The need exists to identify
liquid rocket engine internal wear surfaces and wear rates. The combination
of these two technologies provides such a possibility. The system would
satisfy an existing need, be fail-safe, non-intrusive, with medium-to-long-
development time and effort. It is strongly recommended.
IN-FLIGHT INDIRECT CONDITION MONITORING
An in-flight indirect condition monitoring system acquires performance data
on the engine fluid path and rotating mechanical parameters. This in-flight
data can be used to predict, detect, and diagnose failures after it has been
validated, corrected, displayed and interpreted. The objective is to predict,
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detect and diagnose prior to loss in mission capability. The important result
from an engine monitoring system is 'the effect of the information on the main-
tenance system. Air breathing engine monitoring systems have been designed
with various degrees of sophisticated electronic systems, automatic recording,
amount of data, etc., and with various degrees of success.
The basic required data of the fluid path is the f10wrates, pressures, and
temperatures at each desired station. The data for the rotating mechanical
equipment is the rpm.
From Task II, four technologies were recommended for in-flight indirect
condition monitoring:
1. Ultrasonic flow meter
2. Ultrasonic thermometer
3. Digital quartz pressure sensor
4. Optical tachometer
An assessment has been made that the current pressure sensors, even though
they may have some less than desirable characteristics, are adequate to meet
the engine condition monitoring requirements; and similarly, adequate tach-
ometers also exist. Therefore, technologies No. 3 and 4, digital quartz pres-
sure sensor and optical tachometer, will not be considered further.
With these two combined technologies, each failure mode will be discussed and
the selected technology noted, as well as the reasons for the selection.
Failure Mode 2: Coolant Passage Leakage/Restriction
The in-flight sensor depends upon the measurement of several f10wrates and
finding a small difference of two large numbers, while the between-flight
technology consists of locating coolant passage restrictions prior to the
generation of a hot spot and the probable burn-through of the cooling passage.
The primary problem of locating a coolant passage restriction is the fact that
the restriction must be located by viewing from the outside of the passage.
This problem has always existed and, in general, is similar to the problem of
restrictions occurring in air breathing engine turbine air cooled blades. The
proposed solution approach is similar - locating an internal passage restric-
tion by the measurement of the external surface temperature. Under some con-
ditions, this solution approach has been successful for air breathing engine
turbine air cooled blades.
The selection is the Scanning Optical Pyrometer of between-flight technology.
Failure Mode 3: Joint Leakage
Since this failure mode does not lend itself to an in-flight sensor, the
holographic leak detection was selected.
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•Failure Mode 5: High Torque Turbopump
Both in-flight and between-flight suggest a wear detector. A combination of
this technology, and with existing rpm tail-off and break-away torque would
improve detection of a high torque.
Failure Mode 6: Cracked Turbine Blades
The selection was the optical pyrometer of the in-flight sensors and was the
choice of a state-of-the-art technology over a novel technology. Currently
the optical pyrometer is being used in several air breathing turbo-fan engines
with a large degree of success. The pyrometer can detect, follow, and control
turbine blade material temperature transients, as well as detect certain fail-
ure modes for cooled turbine blades. It is proving a very valuable sensor.
Rocket engines historically experience very large temperature transients
(often thousands of degrees per second). This is associated with the rapid
start and cut-off transient brought about by the application requirements and
the engine control system. These large temperature transients result in large
thermal stresses. They have existed in the past, they exist today, and prob-
ably will exist in the near future. The result is failed turbine blades. It
is anticipated in the near future that cooled turbine blades will be incorpor-
ated into liquid rocket engines.
Therefore, the optical pyrometer is needed currently and within the foreseeable
future. The optical pyrometers can be incorporated in liquid rocket engines
with a large pay-off, non-intrusive, fail-safe, short development time, minimum
effort, and is state of the art. It is very strongly recommended.
Failure Mode 7: Cracked Convolution Bellows
The in-flight sensor, a digital quartz pressure sensor, depends upon measuring
the pressure difference between a cracked and an uncracked convolution. The
between-flight technique would be exo-electron emission as a means of locating
and characterizing fatigue damage. The current between-flight technique would
be a baroscope inspection. The between-flight inspection technique is prefer-
red and the existing procedure appears adequate.
Failure Mode 8: Loose Electrical Connector
No reasonable in-flight sensor or technique was determined. The procedure
would then be performed between-flight and the recommended technique would be
connector continuity checking.
Failure Mode 9: Bearing Damage
Damage to the bearing probably occurs under dynamic conditions and could be
detected by the in-flight fiberoptic deflectometer permitting corrective action
either in-flight or between-flight. The wear detector (isotope tracer detec-
tion) inspected between-flight would also indicate bearing damage. However,
between-flight inspection does not permit the option of corrective action in-
flight. Therefore, the in-flight sensor is preferred.
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Failure Mode 10: Tube Fracture
No reasonable in-flight sensor or technique was determined. The between-flight
technique was exo-e1ectron emission. The current between-flight technique
would be an optical inspection for fluid leaks and is the preferred between-
flight inspection technique.
Failure Mode 11: Turbopump Seal Leakage
Both the in-flight and between-flight technologies are wear detection; however.
the existing technology consists of pressurizing the seal cavity with an inert
gas between flights and measuring the pressure decay. which can be related
directly to a leakage rate. Historically. acceptable leakage rates have been
established and if the leakage rate exceeds acceptable limits. corrective
action is indicated. Corrective action in-flight based upon wear detection
and wear rates is very remote. The existing technology will be retained and
wear detection will be added for between-flight inspection.
Failure Mode 13: Valve Fails to Perform
The in-flight selection is for the "Indirect Condition Honitoring". The
performance data along the fluid path would indicate the failure of the valve
to perform and permit early corrective action. The between-flight inspection
technology would not permit this possibility of early corrective action.
Therefore, the in-flight technique is preferred.
Failure Mode 14: Internal Valve Leakage
The in-flight selection is for indirect condition monitoring. I The performance
data on the fluid path would indicate the internal valve leakage failure and
permit early corrective action. The between-flight inspection technology
would not permit this possibility of early corrective action. Therefore. the
in-flight technique is preferred.
Failure Mode 15: Regulator Discrepancies
The in-flight selection is for indirect condition monitoring. The performance
data along the fluid path would indicate a regulator discrepancy and permit
early corrective action. The between-flight inspection technology would not
permit this possibility of early corrective action. Therefore. the in-flight
technique is preferred.
Failure Mode 16: Contaminated Hydraulic Control Assembly
Since this failure mode does not lend itself to an in-flight sensor. the
particle analysis of between-flight inspection technology was selected. These
selections are shown in Table 20.
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TABLE 20. UPGRADABLE TECHNOLOGY SELECTION
FAILURE UPGRADABLE TECHNOLOGY
MODE FAILURE MODE SELECTED
CATEGORY OESCRI PTION IN-FLIGHT (I) BETWEEN- FLI GHT (B)
2 COOLANT PASSAGE ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER SCANNING OPTICAL B
LEAKAGE RESTRICTION PYROMETER
3 JOINT LEAKAGE - HOLOGRAPHIC LEAK B
DETECTOR
5 HIGH TORQUE TURBOPUMP RPM TAIL-OFF (EXISTING) BREAK-AWAY (EXISTING) BOTH
WEAR DETECTOR WEAR DETECTOR (ISOTOPE
(TUNABLE DIODE TRACER DETECTION)
SPECTOMETER)
6 CRACKED TURBINE BLADES PYROMETER EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION I
7 CRACKED CONVOLUTIONS DIGITAL QUARTZ PRESSURE BOROSCOPE (EXISTING) B
BELLOWS SENSOR EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION (EXIST! NG)
B LOOSE ELECTRICAL - CONNECTOR CONTINUITY B
CONNECTOR CHECKING (EXISTING) (EXISTI NG)
9 BEARING DAMAGE FIBEROPTIC DEFLECTOMETER WEAR DETECTOR (ISOTOPE B
TRACER DETECTION)
10 TUBE FRACTURE - OPTICAL INSPECTION B(EXISTING) EXO-ELECTRON (EXISTING)
EMISSION
11 TURBOPUMP SEAL LEAKAGE WEAR DETECTOR (TUNABLE PRESSURE DELAY (EXISTING) BOTH
DIODE SPECTOMETER) WEAR DETECTOR (ISOTOPE
TRACER DETECTION)
13 VALVE FAILS TO PERFORM / WEAR DETECTOR (ISOTOPE I
I INDIRECT TRACER DETECTION)
14 INTERNAL VALVE LEAKAGE THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY LEAK I< CONDITION
MONITORING DETECTION
15 REGULATOR DISCREPANCIES THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY LEAK I, DETECTION
16 CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC - PARTICLE ANALYSIS B
CONTROL ASSEMBLY (EXISTING) (EXISTING)
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PRIORITY OF SELECTION
Two priority selection bases have been identified for the upgradable
technology: (Table 21)
1. The first selection basis is for a priority based-up frequency of
occurance of the failure mode. Failure Mode No.3, Joint Leakage,
accounts for almost half the failures (45%). The other three large
frequencies are Failure Mode No.2, Coolant Passage Leakage/Restric-
tion (15%), Failure Mode No. 14, Internal Valve Leakage (12%), and
Failure Mode No. 11, Turbopump Seal Leakage (8.5%). The first two
Failure Modes (3 and 2) result in 60% of the total failures and the
first four Failure Modes in over 80% of the total failures. Three
of these four are between-flight technologies. Clearly, these
upgradable technologies are very important.
2. The second selection is based upon the magnitude of development
effort required. Assuming limited developmental effort, which
technology can be established for the least effort? The first is
the pyrometer for detecting turbine blade temperatures in-flight.
The second is the fiberoptic deflectometer for measuring turbopump
bearing loads and damage in flight. The third is the indirect
condition monitoring system. The first three are all in-flight
technologies. The last three are all between-flight technologies
and are wear detector, scanning optical pyrometer, and holographic
leak detector.
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TABLE 21. PRIORITY SELECTION LIST FOR UPGRADABLE TECHNOLOGY
FAILURE UPGRAOABLE TECHNOLOGY OEVELOPf.1EIH
FREQUENCY FAILURE MOOE '~OD[ PERCENT STATUS EFFORT
RATING DESCRI PT IO~ CATEGO~Y WHERE DETECTED TECHNOLOGY RANKIt~(,
1 JOINT LEAKAGE 3 45 ~ETWEEN-FLJGHT HOLOGRAPHIC LEAK OETECTOR N 6
2 COOLANT PASSAGE LEAKAGE/ 2 15 BET,JEEN- FLJ GHT SCANN I NG OPT I CAL N ;,
RESTRICTION PVROflETER
3 INTERNAL VALVE LEAKAGE 14 12 I N- FLIGHT INDl RECT CONDITION N/S 3
110NITORI NG
4 TUReOPUMP SEAL LEAKAGE 11 e.5 BETWEEN- FLI GHT PRESSURE DECAY WEAR EXISTING -
DETECTOR N 4
5 REGULATOR DISCREPANCIES 15 5 I N- FLI GHT I NDI RECT CONDITION N/S 3
MONITORING
6 VALVE FAILS TO PERFORM 13 3.5 I N- FLIGHT INDIRECT CONDITION N/S 3
MONITORING
7 CRACKED TURB I NE .LADES 6 2.5 IN-FLIGHT PYRO~lETER S 1 \
i HIGH TOROUE PUMP 5 2.5 I N- FLI GHT RPM TAIL-OFF EXISTING -
eETWEEN- FL I GHT BREAK-A\,AY EXISTING 1
WEAR DETECTOR N 4
9 CONTAfHNATED HYDRAULIC 16 1.5 eETWEEN-FLI GHT PARTICLE ANALYSIS EXISTING -
CONTROL ASSEMBLY
10 eEARING DAMAGE 9 1.5 IN-FLIGHT FIBEROPTIC DEFLECTOMETER N 2
WEAR DETECTOR N 4
11 CRACKED CONVOLUTION 7 1.5 eETWEEN- FLI GHT eO~OSCOPE EXISTING -
eELLOWS
12 TUIE FRACTURE 10 1 IETWEEN-FLIGHT O~TICAL INSPECTION EXISTING -
13 LOOSE ELECTRI CAL B 0.5 IETWEEN-FLIGHT CONNECTOR CONTI NUlTY EXISTING -
CONNECTOR CHECKING
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CONCLUDING REr1ARKS
The following concluding remarks are made with regard to this report.
1. Approximately 85.000 liquid rocket engine failure reports. from
30 years of developing and delivering major pump fed engines. were
reviewed and screened. and reduced to 1771. These were categorized
into 16 different failure modes. These failure modes were common
to all engines and historically consistent.
2. The state of the art of engine condition monitoring for in-flight
sensors and between-flight inspection technology was determined.
3. Failure propagation diagrams for the 16 failure modes were estab-
lished; the potential measurands and diagnostic requirements were
identified and compiled. The sensors and inspection technology
were matched with the measurands and requirements.
4. The sensor and inspection technology was assessed and ranked.
5. Areas requiring advanced technology development have been identi-
fied and are as follows:
a. Direct In-Flight Condition Monitoring
(1) Optical Pyrometer - turbine blade temperatures
Very strongly recommended
(2) Fiberoptic Deflectometer - bearing condition
Very strongly recommended
(3) Isotope Wear Detector - wear particles
Strongly recommended
(4) Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer - wear particles
Strongly recommended
b. Indirect In-Flight Condition Monitoring
(5) Ultrasonic Flowmeter - propellant flow
Very strongly recommended
(6) Ultrasonic Thermometer - high temperatures
Very strongly recommended
c. Between-Flight Inspection Techniques
(7) Holographic Leak Detector - fluid leaks
Strongly recommended
(8) Scanning Pyrometer - blocked fluid passages
Recommended
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APPENDIX A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF
CONVENTIONAL ROCKET ENGINES
APPENDIX A
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CONVENTIONAL ROCKET ENGINES
Conventional rocket engines are defined as bipropellant engines that use liquid
oxygen and a hydrocarbon based fuel (RP-l) for combustion (Fig. 33). The pro-
pellants are fed into the thrust chamber (the major engine component that trans-
forms, through combustion, the potential energy stored in the fuel into kinetic
energy by means of centrifugal pumps powered by gas generator-driven turbines.
The flow of propellants is regulated by valves which, in turn, are controlled by
hydraulic, electrical and/or pneumatic systems to establish required valve actua-
tion relationship for engine operation. An ignition system, either by means of
hypergolic pyrotechnics or electrical spark plugs, initiates combustion in the
thrust chamber and gas generator. Most engine systems are provided ~ith a purge
system that protects some components from contamination by the external environ-
ment or protect critical areas against mixture of potential hazardous leakage of
propellants. Other subsystems might be found on conventional engines depending
on their cycles of operation or state-of-the-art development.
The conventional rocket engines (Fig. 34 ) referred to in this study are: Atlas
MA-3 and MA-5, Thor, RS-27, F-l and H-I. The J-2 engine is a more advanced type
of propulsion system since it uses hydrogen as fuel, yielding a higher specific
impulse (426 sec/vacuum). The SSME propulsion system, again using hydrogen as
fuel, is another step forward in state of the art, and uses a two-stage combustion
process requiring higher pressures and making a more efficient use of propellants.
A brief description and application of these propulsion systems follows.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
The high performance requirements of the SSME engine demand the use of a staged
combustion power cycle (Fig. 35) coupled with high combustion chamber pressures.
In the SSME staged combustion power cycle, the propellants are partially burned
at low mixture ratio, very high pressure, and relatively low temperatures in the
preburners to produce hydrogen-rich gas to power the turbopumps. The hydrogen-
rich steam is then routed to the main injector where it is injected, along with
additional oxidizer and fuel, into the main combustion chamber at a high mixture
ratio and high pressure. Hydrogen fuel is used to cool all combustion devices
directly exposed ~o contact with high-temperature combustion products. An elec-
tronic engine controller automatically performs checkout, start, mainstage and
engine shutdown functions.
The SSME was developed especially for the Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle, which
uses three systems for launch. The SSME is a reusable, high performance, liquid
propellant rocket engine with variable thrust. The engine is ignited on the
ground at launch and operates in parallel with the solid rocket boosters during
the initial ascent phase and continues to operate for approximately 480 seconds
total firing duration. Each of the rocket engines operates on a mixture ratio
of 6:1, and a chamber pressure of 3000 psia to produce a sea-level thrust of 375K
pounds of thrust. The engine is throttleable over a thrust range of 65 to 109i.
of design thrust level. This provides a higher thrust level during liftoff and
the initial ascent phase, and allows orbiter acceleration to be limited to 3 g
during the final ascent phase. The engines are gimbaled to provide pitch, yaw,
and roll control during orbiter boost phase.
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J-2 ENGINE
The J-2 rocket engine is a high-performance, multiple-restart engine that uses
liquid oxygen for oxidizer and liquid hydrogen for fuel. Each propellant is
pumped into the thrust chamber by separate gas-turbine-driven, direct-drive turbo-
pumps. The two turbopumps are powered in series by a single gas generator that
uses the same propellants as the thrust chamber. The thrust chamber is tubular-
walled and is regeneratively cooled by circulating fuel through the tubes before
the fuel is injected into the combustion area. The engine has a refillable start
tank from which pressurized gaseous hydrogen is routed to the turbopump turbines
for starting the engine. This feature, combined with the augmented spark ignition
system, makes the J-2 a multistart engine.
The J-2 engines were ignited at altitude as they powered the second stage of the
Saturn V Vehicle and developed 225K pounds of thrust. The burn duration was
480 seconds with a mixture ratio of 5.50 (O/F). It yielded a specific impulse
(I ) of 423.8.
sp
The J-2 rocket engine was developed to provide the power for the SIVB stage of the
Saturn IB vehicle and for the SII and SIVB stages of the Saturn V vehicle.
The SII stage is propelled by a cluster of five J-2 engines, four outboard engines
and one inboard engine. Because only a single engine start is required for SII
stage application, the engines are modified to delete the engine restart capability
by blocking off the start tank refill lines. The inboard and outboard engines are
basically identical.
The SIVB stage is propelled by one J-2 engine. The engine used in the Saturn IB,
SIVB stage, and the engine used in the Saturn V, SIVB stage are basically identical.
H-I ENGINE
The H-I rocket engine is a single-start, fixed thrust, pump-fed, regeneratively
cooled liquid bipropellant engine that uses liquid oxygen and RP-l fuel. The
propellants are supplied to the gimbal-mounted thrust chamber by a gas generator-
driven turbopump that has two centrifugal pumps on a single shaft. The engine is
calibrated to develop a sea-level rated thrust of 205,000 pounds of thrust with an
I sp of 263.4 seconds at a mixture ratio of 2.23:1 oxidizer/fuel. The B-1 engine
was ignited on the ground and the scheduled burn duration was 150 seconds.
The H-l engine was developed to boost the Saturn IB vehicles. In the first stage
booster, eight B-1 engines were used in a two-concentric arrangement, four out-
board, and four inboard. The outboard engines were capable of being gimbaled for
pitch, yaw, and roll control. At launch the vehicle was held down until satisfac-
tory mainstage combustion was established in all eight engines.
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F-l ENGINE
The F-l engine is a single-start, fixed thrust, liquid bipropellant engine, cali-
brated to develop a sea-level-rated thrust of 1,522,000 pounds with an I sp of 265
seconds during 150 seconds of operation. Engine propellants are liquid oxygen and
propellant RP-l (kerosene) fuel at a mixture ratio of 2.27:1. The propellant fuel
is used as the working fluid for the gimbal actuators and for the engine control
system, and is also used as the turbopump bearing lubricant.
The F-l engine features a two-piece thrust chamber that is tubular-walled and
regeneratively cooled to the 10:1 expansion ration plane, and double-walled and
turbine gas cooled to the 16:1 expansion ration plane; a thrust chamber mounted
turbopump that has two centrifugal pumps on a single shaft driven by a two-stage,
direct-driven turbine; one-piece rigid propellant ducts that are used in pairs to
direct the fuel and oxidizer to the thrust chamber; and a hypergolic fluid car-
tridge that is used for thrust chamber ignition.
Thrust vector changes are achieved by gimbaling the entire engine. The gimbal
block is located on the thrust chamber dome, and actuator attach points are pro-
vided by two outriggers on the thrust chamber body.
The F-l propulsion system was developed to provide the power for the booster
flight phase of the Saturn V vehicle. Five engines are clustered in the S-IC
stage of the Saturn V to obtain the necessary 7,610,000 pounds thrust. The
ignition of the engine takes place on the ground and the vehicle was not released
until satisfactory mainstage operation was established in all five engines.
RS-27 ENGINE
The RS-27 rocket engine is, like the H-l engine, a single-start, fixed thrust,
pump-fed, regeneratively cooled liquid bipropellant engine that used liquid
oxygen and RP-l fuel. The propellants are supplied to the gimbal-mounted thrust
chamber by a gas generator driven turbopump that has two centrifugal pumps on a
single shaft. The engine is calibrated to develop a sea-level thrust of 205K
pounds of thrust with an lsp of 262.7 seconds and a mixture ratio of 2.24:1
oxidizer/fuel.
The RS-27 engine system was developed from H-l and Thor engines hardware, to serve
as a booster engine for the Delta Launch vehicle.
The engine is ignited on the ground and for over 240 seconds operates in parallel
with a number of solid propellant booster rockets clustered around the vehicle.
Its mission is to power the first stage of the Delta launch vehicle used to place
in orbit a variety of commercial satellites.
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•THOR ENGINE
The Thor engine is like the RS-27, a single-start fixed thrust, pump-fed, regener-
atively cooled liquid engine that used liquid oxygen and RP-l fuel. The propel-
lants are supplied to the gimbal mounted thrust chamber by a gas generator-driven
turbopump that has two centrifugal pumps, on a single shaft. The latest version
of the engine is calibrated to develop a sea-level thrust of l70K pounds of thrust
with an I of 247 seconds and a mixture ratio of 2.30:1, oxidizer/fuel.
sp
The Thor engine, developed in the late 1950's, was designed to serve as the main
propulsion system for the Thor missile.
Lately, the Thor, with a burn duration of 175 seconds, has been used to orbit
payloads.
ATLAS ENGINE
The Atlas propulsion system is composed of two separate types of engines, booster
and sustainer. The booster consists of two low altitude thrust chambers with
their components, similar to the H-l or RS-27 engines. The sustainer engine is a
high-performance propulsion system designed for high-altitude operation. The
design of the system is such that the booster engines deliver 330K of thrust and
burn of 145 seconds, the sustainer engines have a thrust of 57K and operate for
320 seconds.
The Atlas engine, MA-3 version, was developed to power the ICBM missiles in the
late 1950s. An uprated version, the MA-5 engine, was developed for use as an
intermediate launch vehicle.
The Atlas engine systems yield a specific impulse of 258 seconds for the booster
and 219 for the sustainer. The mixture ratio for both enginesis 2.25.
Currently the Atlas MA-3 version E/F series is used to boost classified payloads.
The MA-5 engine systems are incorporated into NASA's SLV-3D launch vehicle that is
used to place satellites in orbit .
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A....ENDIX B. FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
APPENDIX B
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
Each failure mode that passed the UCR screening process has been documented as
one of the following sheets. Each sheet, one per each failure mode, records the
failure mode and cause, the frequency of failure, the design life, if available,
and the effect of the failure upon the subsystem and/or engine. Further identi-
fication is shown with respect to the failure type, criticality, reaction time,
and the detection method used. An evaluation is made with respect to failure
predictability, and potential measurands of the parameters that are affected by
the failure. Based on these elements, a selection of suitable in-flight monitor-
ing systems and between-flight inspection techniques is presented for each failure
mode. All these data are recorded in a format that was approved and found appro-
priate for conducting this study.
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FACTOR
IDENTI FI CATION FACTORS
(i1) COMPONENT NM1E - EVALUATION CONDUCTED AT THE ENGINE SYSTEM AND COMPONENT OR LINE
REPLACEMLE UNIT (LRU) LEVEL. THE ~lAJOR CATEGORIES TO ~E EVALUATED ARE:
1. ENGINE SYSTEM
2. THRUST CHAMBER
3. NOZZLE
4. INTERCONNECTS
(a) DUCTS AND LINES
(b) HEAT EXCHANGER
(e) SEALS
5, COMBUSTION DEVICES
(i1) GAS GENERATOR
(b) PRE~URNER
(e) IGNITERS
• HYPERGOL
• ELECTRICAL
6, CONTROLS
(i1) PROPELLANT CONTROL VALVES
• FUEL VALVE
• OXIDIZER VALVE
• GAS GENERATOR AND PREBURNER
VALVES
• IGNITER VALVES
(b) ELECTRONIC CONTROLLERS
(€') PNEUrt,ATIC SYSTEM
(d) HYDRAULI C SYSTEM
7, TUR~ot1ACHINERY
(a) FUEL PUMP
(b) OXIDIZER PUflP
(b) FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE - A ~RIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURE flODE AND CAUSE
WHICH CONTRI~UTED TO THE FAILURE. APPLICABLE HYPOTHESIZED FAILURE MODES
AND CAUSES WILL ALSO ~E INCLUDED.
(e) FREQUENCY OF FAILURE - THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF SU~JECT FAILURE I~ODE
EXPERIENCED I\Y ENGINE SYSTEM AND/OR COMPONENT WITH RESPECT TO TOTAL ENGINE
OPERATIONS
(d) DESIGN/ACTUAL LI FE - WHERE DESIGN AND LIFE INFORMATION EXIST, THE LIFE OF THE
COMPONENT UNTIL FAILURE OCCURRENCE AND DESIGN LIFE WILL ~E DOCUMENTED
(~) EFFECT OF FAILURE - EFFECT OF FAILURE INCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURE MODE
SHOWING FREQUENCY OF'EVENTS RESULTING IN THE ULTIMATE FUNCTIONAL EFFECT ON ENGINE
OPERATION (i. e., PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION, PREMATURE SHUTDOWN, EXPLOS ION -
UNCONTAINED, ETC.).
(f) FAILURE TYPE - LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL, OVERPRESSURE, OVERTEMPERATURE, OPERATIONAL,
EXCESSIVE WEAR, ETC.
(g) PRIMARY OR SECONDARY FAILURE - FAILURE MECHANISM OR COMPONENT FAILURE BEING THE
PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE FAILURE r~ODE OR FAILURE flODE MANIFESTED BY ANOTHER FAILURE
OCCURRENCE
(h) CRITICALITY - THE FAILURE r10DE ASSESSED AS TO ITS FUNCTIONAL EFFECT ON ENGINE
OPERATION:
CRITICALITY CATEGORY
1
2
3
4
5
ENGINE EFFECT
EXPLOSIDN, BURNTHROUGHS, UNCONTAINED
FRAGMENTATION
PREflATURE ENGINE SHUTDOWN - ENGINE DAMAGE
PREMATURE ENGINE SHUTDOWN - NO DAt1AGE
PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION
NO EFFECT
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(il
(j)
(k)
(1)
(ml
(n)
(0)
REACT TIME - ESTIMATE OF THE TIME FROM DETECTION OF EFFECT TO FAILURE OCCURRENCE
Imm = IflMEDIATE (MILLISECONDS RANGE)
Inst = INSTANTANEOUS (LESS THAN A FE\1 SECONDS)
TIME GREATER THAN A FEW SECONDS TO ~E AS NOTED
DETECTION METHOD (USED) - DESCRI~E METHOD OR INSTRUMENT ~Y WHICH FAILURE WAS
DETECTED
FAILURE PREDICTAIILITY - DESCRIBE WHETHER FAILURE MECHANISM COULD BE PREDICTED
THROUGH REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL DATA OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONS AND/OR GROUND INSPECTION
TECHNIQUES. (WEAR INDICATORS, TRENDS ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS, ETC.)
RESOLUTION - ~RIEFLY DESCRI~E RESOLUTION flETHOD FOR PREVENTING RECURRENCE OF FAILURE
VIAeLE IN-FLIGHT MONITORING - LISTING VIMLE ENGINE CONDITION r10NlTORING DEVICES
CAPMLE OF DETECTING FAILURE (TASK II)
~ETWEEN-FLIGHT INSPECTION - LISTING OF ~ETWEEN-FLIGHT INSPECTIONS AND TECHNIQUES THAT
WOULD PROVIDE VERI FICATION OF ENGINE INTEGRITY PRIOR TO NEXT FLIGHT
REMARKS - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
SSME DATA
I-'
o
o
(Moln)SSI1E Oxl~l ..r VolE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT ._ ' .... ··f r;J~e I
FPlEQUENCY LIFE ' .. IMARY PlEACT DETECTION FAILUPlE ~TENTIAL
FAILUPlE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FAILUftE FAILUPlE TY~E OPl C'UT1CAliTY METHOD ~PlEDICTAIILITYFAILuRe,
"
SECQNDAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUPlANOS
"
FAILUPlE
.. Iolt Tor!ue ftelilQtton 2f 'refMture en,lne shuttlown Cilvl tatfon Itr (mary 2 er 3 I... Vilirati~ Vl~ratl.n
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·Are Detect.~le
letween Fli,ht Only
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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E
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT SSME/llozz1./e..,.ustar 'iltlle ~
~
o
~
FREOUENCY LIFE PRIM...RY
"EACT DETECTION FAILU.. E POTENTI...LF... ,LU.. E MODE AND C"'USE OF OESIGN/...CTU"'L EFFECT OF F""LU"E FAILU..E TYPE OR CRITIC...L1TY METHOD P.. EDICT.... ,LlTYF... ,LURE. TIME MEASU"ANDS
"
SECOND...RY USED "'NDMETHOD
"
F",'LURE
2. Ceolilnt flilssa,e Leilka,e 4f less .f fuel at nezzle Overtem, anti Itrlmary 3 I"",. Hllor turlt i ne
2.2n tulles cause41 ~remature I ••"",•. Tem, cut.ff Metll Embrlttl ....ntNozzle Tulle S,lits .anll
en! foe cut.ff t'ue te HPOT 'ressure TrlnslentlItu,tures 4Isch."te tem,erilture "Tube Spll ts
C.ause4 Ity material emllrlttle- exceetlln! retltlne. Flow, ~eductlon
ment from ,rior repairs, Mixture ~Itle Shift
stilrt .anti shuttlewn trans' ent Temperlture, ~1se In
surtes, contilminatien Combust I en
etOIle. tultes, intermittent
!traze with reti .... s .f nen-
iraze.
Causellll Ity thermal strilln 30f External fuel leak"!Ie The,.IMI strain flrhMry 4 ar N/... fI.st-test
antl/.,. Itrilze ,er.5 f ty ".7St weuhl result In fire ,ote"tl•. I"s,ect'."!leeause .f IIlrle" re,alrs. hilzar4 an4 weul4 Ciluse I
leilka,e threu,h "raze joint ,erfermllnce 4etratla t Ien ,
tlue to Insufficient Itontlln, anti c.. lant less.
"Are Oetectlb1etlurln, Itraze cycle.
aetween Flllht Only
VI....LE IN·FLlGHT MONITO'UNG SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES ~EMA~KSlCOMMENTS
Pressure
UltrlSonlc L..k
Aceus t f c No1olrlphyQulrtz, OI,lhl X-rlY ~Idlolrlphy
Fi.eroptlc ;11lI11I ~14iolrlphy
LlSer, Oi fltll
" ..to.ide 'olo..metryS.A.W•• 0 gltll Hy4rolen 'olortlllll!tryUltrlsonlc Thermometer (Flome) Hygrometer
UHrlsonic Flowmeter (Nozzle) Opticil 'yrollll!try
'olorometer Holelrlphi c leik
Tunlble 0104e LlSer Spectrometer (Mixture ~Itio) Mllllmeter-wl.e Interferometry
I--'
o
N
SSHE/H~ Fuel Turlt.,um,-Stiltic SeillsENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT r"~,!e :J
FfteQUENCY LIFE '''IMA''V IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIAL
F... ILUIIE MODE "'ND C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF F... ILUIIE F... ILUIIE TY~E 0" C",TICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTA.ILlTYFAllu..e.
"
SECONOAI'IY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUII...NDS
"
FAILUI'IE
3. Joint Leaka,e 5f One instance resulte4 in Defects in Primary 2 er I"", O,erator
A. Hot Gas 2.U ,rema ture cuteff tlue t. ~teri.. , ,otent la I ~server cuteff-fire In LPFT' area. This Im,ro,er I visual "Distortion
C.ausetl Ity scratchetl .1" Is ,rlmary cencer" .f !let installat it" "Torque ~ellxatlon
4i1Illoi1!e4 seills antl/or f1 an!e,. 'IS leaka!le which can Wilr,in!l Lelk
flan!e anlll/or seal .. Ist.rtf." result In flre/ex,l.sf." Tortllue Fire
from manufacturin!l an" .,. at Illest I tIIamll'. t. relaution
insUllat lon-I-oesenetl "lUI .1IIjacent hartlw.re.
In ta,.
"Are Detectable
letween Fll,ht Only
VI.... LE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEM...IIKSICOMMENTS
Ultrasonic Extensi_ter
Ultrasonic Leak
Leak TI,e/C.at1n,
Dpticil Lelk
Laser Interferoml!try
Different lal ~a~lometry
Holo,rlphlc Leak
~eslstlvityMenlt.rln,
Halogen Lelk
Flow Leak
Mass Spectrometry
Thennal Leak
Torquing
Leak Fluid
Pressure Decay
~
"SSHE Static Seals r"iI,e ..
FREQUENCY LIFE '''IMARY PlEACT DETECTION FAILUPIE ~TENTIAL
FAILUPIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUPIE FAILUPIE TY~E 0" e'UTICAlITY METHOD ~PlEDICTAlllITYFAILU"E.
"
SECONDAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUPIANDS
"
fAILURe
3. Jeint leaka,e Contincell 12 One instance resultetl In Defects in Secentlilry Z I... H'FT turlll tne
~. 'ro,ellant Lelka!le
,.,~ IIrelnilture cuteff when material tllschar!e Tem,
fuel turllline tlischar,e ImltrOller cuteff .
rem, exceetletl retll tne installation
tlue t. MFV leak. Tertlue
Other IIreile Illnt leaks relaXiitien Prltnilry Potentfal NIA flre/,.st test
can 'eilt! te f fre antl'er I or 5 ins,eet Ion
ex,Jes Jen In the ,resence
.f an 1,01tl." 5.urce
er to tlatnille te atljacent
hartlware. The ether
recertletl five instances
were ,re/IMst test where
cerrective act len was
taken te ,revent
recurrence.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES PlEMAPlKSlCOMMENTS
...
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
f-'
o
UJ
i-'
o
~
ENGINE SYSTEM/CDM~ONENT SSME Hot CoilS Hanif.14 5
FftEQUENCY LIFE "HMAftV ~EACT DETECTION FAILU~E ~OTENTIAL
FAILURE MOOE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILU~E FAILUIIE TY~E 0" Cft'T1CAlITV METHOD ~~EDICTAIILlTYFAILUftE.
"
SECQNO.....V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILU"E
4. Hot G.. S H.mifohl )f These occurrences were Overtem, Primary S or N/A '.st-test
Trilnsfer Tuite Liner ).)= .iseever-e" IMSt test <iIIn. ,etentl,1 ins,eet i en Transfor Tube Crack
~ corrective IIct len taken I T~mp~ratu~ Trans 1~nt
Causetl Ity material fati!ue t. ,revent recurrence. Mtxtur. ~atlo Shl ft
,ro,erty 4e!r.tliltlon _ue te
're,lItatJe" .f thls Fltl,uo
excessive .,erath" Tem,
of en, i ne 2004 ,relturner failure if net tletectetl
.nt! cerrectellll, ceultl
cenfi,uroittien, resultin, In
,.ssiltly result In Iturn-hilh cycle fatitue. threu,h .f tuM with
~etle51,n .f hllrtlware resul tilnt het ,.5 luk
ollvl .. tes new tletectl." .nll c.t.stre,hlc
4evices. censelluences.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES IIEMA~KSlCDMMENTS
If
•~Laillvr Inth 511i1nt Tur..SSHE ~CI'IUIP'C;;t 1.;J I C1VIIl..UMrV'''t:I'I1 - ..- .. -..- ...-...,. -_. P'a.e
FReOUENCY DESIG~~A~UAL ,,,IMARY PlEACT DETECTION F",ILUPIE ~OTENTI"'LFAILUPIE MODE AND C"'USE OF EFFECT OF FAILUPIE FAILUPIE TY~E Oft C.. ITIC....LITy METHOD ~PlEDICT .... ILlTYFAILURe. SECONDARY TIME USED "'ND METHOD MEASUPIANDS
" "
FAILURe
5. Hi,h Tor!ue 2f "re~ture test cut.ff .y Interference 'r'ilNry 3 ,... HftFT villlratien
.. Excessive Villration I.I~ HItFT vj~riltl.n rrK>nitor. Excess Ive menlt.r. Torqu. ~lpplosN. si,nlfic.nt ~i1Jni1,e to temlterature romp.rltur., S.lls
Causetl Ity rultlt I"! .f the en!ine. VIltrat Ion Vlbrotion
AcousticsInterstil!e seal with
Worn '"rticlosc.nse~uent iI"norma I ~'H TliloffG-Ievels.
Contlminlnts
~. Excessive Tortlue
Coiusetl iy rultlt tn!· of the , 3f These eccurrences were Interference IIr lmary 5 er N/... "cst-testinterstil!e seal imtl/.r 7.3~ tleteete" durin! lIost-test Excess lve Ifatent i a I ins,ect len.
malfunctien .f turllTne tl, tor'lue checks with temperature 2 or 3
seal s. c.rrective actl.n taken VIltrat fen
te ,revent recurrence.
I'r.~~latfon of thi s
fall ure, if not detectel1
anl1 cerrectel1 weull1
result in effects ~s
not~11 l~, ".11 anl1 ,ossiltle
-
VI....LE IN-FLIGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIQUES PlEM... PlKSlCOMMENTS
~TO Th.rmoroot.r Isotop. Th.rmornotry
Optical Tlchoroot.r !sotop. Trac.rs
Accl!ll!roml!tl!r ,,,title Anllysis
!sotop. W•• r Dot.etor lor.seoping
Hydrophon. Opticil 'roximity
Fl!rrOfTlignl!ti c Torqul!lTl!tl!r Torquing
Tunabl. Oiod. lls.r Sp.ctromet.r
.... _-
-_•.-
--- -
f-'
o
Ln
I-'
o
0\
7SSME !'r.,ellant TurlK>,um, __L~~..'lrlnth SealEM/COM~ONENTSE "'..,e
FftEQUENCY LIFE I'ftIM""V IlEACT DETECTION FAILUftE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TY~E Oft CftlT1CALITY METHOD ~IlEDICTAIILITYFAILUltE.
"
SECQNOAPl:Y TIME USEO AND METHOD MEASUIlANOS
"
FAllu .. e
c. Excess I ve Tern!erature Sf These five fallures Excessive I'rlm.ry 2 I"," Turitlne
Cent! i t Ions 2.U re,resent a ,ro!ress ive tem,erature tlischar!e over-
Cilusetl Ity rultltln! .f the hllure culmlnatln9 in tem, retl11 ne
,rernature test cutoff cut.ff.intersU'!le se~d anti alnllin!
wi th maj.r .~a!le t. ,urn,
of thlrtl sta,e im,e11er
with f.II.4 HftD rln!
resultint In Inc..,.atfitle
start trans lent centlft Ions.
lIossiitly inltl.tet! Ity metal
chi,.
"elles I,n of hartlware
oltvhltes new tletectlon
tlevlces
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
-
•
;0
~SSHE/Hlgh 'r-essure Fuel Turlto,um,
- "~lJe
FftEQUENCY LIFE "UM~"Y PlEACT DETECTION FAILUPIE POTENTIAL
FAILUPIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUPIE FAILUPIE TYPE 0" CftlTICALITY METHOD PPlEDICTAIILlTYFAILU"E. TIME MEASUIIANDS
"
SECONDAIlV USED AND METHOD
"
FAILUfte
,. Cr.-eke. Turltlne .1 ..tles ,f Thes••ccurrence! were HI,h-enerlJY ,rImil ry 5 e. NIA '.st test Fltlgue5' ~'I ".tectetl1 tlurln, ,",st- trans1 ents ,.tentll) ilntl/.r ferney. IC<ilusetl lIy thermal s,lkes test .r fernev.1 I I"s,eet len Temperature. Trlnsient
.urln, en,ine su:rt/cut.ff
'""eetle" ami corrective P'r!ssurC!. Trlns1enttransients with resultant action taken t. ,revent "Foreign Object Ollllll,e5'illlln, .f ,rotective recurrence. IIr.,illJat I.n Vlbrltion
c.ati"" Inti 1.C111Ize" of these fid lures wfth- Acoustics
meltin, .f turllline ,arts. aut tletectlon coul. "Fltl,ueAh. «Iue te lIIeliris antl/.r result In severe ••male ..lance
centilminatlen '""actin, en te ,um, IIn~ "55fllly te
nezzle er ether turiline en,lne.
,.,.ts.
"'e4es I In ef har~w.re
eltv fates new lIIIetect len
~ev'ces.
"Are Det.ctlble
letw.en Flight Only
VI.....LE IN-FLIGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES PlEMAPlI<S/COMMENTS
'ressure Sensors Ultrlsonlc FlawQUlrtz, 01,1t11 Isotope Thermometry
Flberoptlc Isetope Tracers
llser, Dlgltll Remnlnt MofnetlZlti.nS.A.W., Dlgltll Opticil Ho o,raphy
'yremeter hrescI,ln,
Vibration Exo-electren Emhslon
Hydrophone Positron Annlhlhtlon
Flberoptlc lelrlng Detector Electric Current Injecti.n
Exo-electron Det.ctor •E4dy Current
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT
f-'
o
......,
I-'
o
00
SYSTEM/COMPONENT SSHE/Hi!lh fl'ressure Fuel Tur~ttum,-'ellows & Shlehl PI!e ;>
F,.EQUeNCY LIFE 'PUMA"" IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oil CftlTICAlITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIiLiTYFAILUIIE.
"
SECQNDA"V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FA1LUlle
7. Crack - Convelutions 5f Detecte4 tlur In, ,.st test Hi,h-eneqIlY II'rlmary 5 Ir N/A lII.st-test Temper.ture. Tr.ns1en
lei lows 2.n insttection anti c.rrectlve trans lenu ,.tent'a) 1nSlIJect fon-vi sua I I'ressure, Tnns 1ent
act len taken. I'ro,a!l_- I "Foreign Object Oall1llgeCausetl ~y hi,h cycle tien of this failure Acoustics
f.lt t,ue coult! resul t in hot ,as Vibration
leaka!le with ,.5slile , "Fatigue
en,l ne t1aTnille.
"Are Detectab Ie
letween Fll!ht Only
VIAiLE IN-FLIGHT MONITOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
Pressure Sensor Ultrasonic Flaw
Quartz, Di!itll Isoto,e The_metry
Filleroptic Remnant Ma!netlzatlon
laser, DIgital lorescopin!
S.A.II., DitHal Penetrants
RTD Thermometer Dptical Holotrophy
AcceIerometer Exo-electron Emission
Hydrophone Positron Annihilation
Electric Current Injection
E~dy Current
,
"t·..SSHE/Electric~1 Harnesses '~.e
FftEQUENCY LIFE PfllIMA"V ftEACT OETECTION FAILUftE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUPIE MODE ANO CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUPIE FAILUPIE TY~E Oft Cft'TICALITY METHOD ~PlEDICTAIILJTYFAlLUIlE.
"
SECONOAfllY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUPIANDS
"
FAILUfllE
•• Leose Electric•• 'f All .f these Inshnces Hf!h ener!y 'rlrqry 5 er NIA '.st--testC.nnectors 3.35' were ..etectelll .ur In! ,est transients: !tOte"tl.1 Ins,eet len. <High Temp. Transient
Assume cause. Ity Im,relller test ("slteet len en" Vlltretlon hea I, 2 er 3 Tor~ue. Relaxation
,errectlve i1ctien taken. aceust les Continuity, Intermit.t.r~ue cemltl"u wi th In h,.. Instilnces, FlO Separation
effects of vlltr.tl." tlurln!
.. , Sit lilYs were actull te" Itytest.
,."nector f. i 1ure.
~e"e5 ',n .f "'r~~re Oe,en.ent en the I.atlen
.aviates new llIetectl." .f the c."nector which
4ev lees. ceul. Itecome 10.se .r
til senSiisetl, any numlter .f
fai lures ceultl .ccur,
Inclutlln, en,ine cut.H.
This _ultl Ite catastro,hl
If .ccurrence was tlurln,
fll!ht.
<Are Detectable
letween fll,ht Only
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES PlEM"PlKS/COMMENTS
Isotope Th~nno...try
Continuity Ch~ckln,
Torquln,
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
~
o
\0
I-'
I-'
o
"
SSHE Hl~h ltressure Oxitlizer Turll,OM~'V"... ,'",
...."' ...,,''''
FREQUENCY LIFE '~IMA"Y IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E 0_ CPUTICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECOND,APtV TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
,.
'earin, Oilma,e of These occurrences were Katerlal ftrimary 5 e. N/A !lost-test Temp.• Excessive ~ace
2.23~ all t1etectetl "urin, "5t- ,etential i nSlIeet len Vibrotlen
Causetl Ity incl,lent 511all in! test InSllectien ami 1 Acoustics
anti/or sUlierficial wear cerr'ectlve act I." taken. Torque, ~Ipples
associate. with the 10at! I f net t1etectetl. ,ro,a'" Worn '"rtic1es
trilck-insufficlent "Millin! !I'ati." .f these conllilitions ~'M Tillott
of .earln! cale wra,. ceulll resul t in lIearin! Fltl,ue
fai lure wi th ,.sslille Contiml nlnt
severe t1ama!le to pu,. Illance
antl/.r en!line.
VIAILE,IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
Optical Tachometer Ul trasonic FlawIsotope Detector Isoto~ ThermometryFiberoptic Detector Isetepe TracersIlTD Thermometer
'article AnalysisAccel erometer lorescopi n,Hy4rophone Exo-electron Emiss1enFerromagnetic Torquemeter Positron Annihilation
. Exo-electron Detector Ed4y CurrentTunlble Dlodelaser Spectrometer Terqulng
'.
•
..
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
J-2 ENGINE DATA
f-'
f-'
N
ENGINE.SYSTEMICOM~ONENT J-2/Main Oxilllizer Valve
B-/
F"eoUENCY LtFE '''IMAfIIV IlE...CT DETECTION FAILUIlE ~OTENTIALF... ILUIlE MOOE "'ND C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUA.L EFFECT OF F.../LUIlE F...fLUIlE TY~E 0" C'UTICALlTY METHOO ~IlEOICTA"LlTYFAllUI'lE.
"
SECONOAfIIY TIME USED "'NDMETHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
fAILUfite
1. Iolt r.rllue I\ehl~tlon 3f I\esultell )n pilrtial Torlllue Pr imary 5 er H/A Post-test
~. Se~uence Va 1ve Internal .1'6' oltenin, .f GG untrol relaxation ,.tential check.lit
leaka,e valve ilt en,ine start. 2
'remature intro4uctlon
Cause" ~y low tertlue en of ,ro,ellants Int. GG
Il,seal retainer screws wi II cause llIetenOlltlon
allewin, leaka!le '1St the at start with lIosslltle
flante ,ert len .f the "ilma,. te GG.
I i,seal.
Vl....L!; IN-FLIGHT MONtTOlllNG SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES I'IEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
'.
•
It
j30z.
J-2 Se.ols
- - --_.-
FNEOUENCY liFE ""MARY
"EACT DETECTION FAILU"E I'OTENTIALFAILU"E MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILU"E FAILU"E TY~E ON CRITICALITY METHOD ~"EDICTAIIL1TYFAILURE. ,. SECONO..NY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUNANDS,. FAILURe
3. J.lnt le~ka,e 'f Twe .f these f.ll ures 'I.st Ie 'rhMlry 3 - (2f) I"st. Oltserver c;:uteff
a. Hot Ga. .5'0' resul tell In ,remature tlef.rmlt fon an~ when fl retest c:uteff _ue te fl re 5 - (7f) .etectlon ·Tem,
Cause" ,1'" imar i Iy illy In en,lne area-.nly er exceetletl re"li ne
t1ama!letl/tlefec:tive seals. mln.r eam.,e eccurretl. IIate"tlill
Teflen extrusien .f seal Wh i Ie human err.1'" anti I
antl .ff-center lostallatt." '.1'" lI'IiI.nufacturln, .loti
are als. centrlltutlnt hanill J", ,r.ee.ures
factors. centrfltute wreiltly tethe incftlence .f this
C.rrec:tlve measures have ty,e .f hi II ure. the
lteen fnltlatell te centre' ,.tent lal censellllluences
these ,rellliems. ef het 'iiS le.killes
manti.te .11 ,essflllie
eff.rt fer thel r centre I
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITO"ING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES "EMA"KSICOMMENTS
Ul trasonic Extens lometer
Ultrasonic leak
leak Tlpe/Coltln,
Opticil leak
laser Interferometry
OHferentl11 kl410metry
Holognphlc lelk
kesist1vlty Monltorln,
HIlo,en leak
Flow lelk
Mass S,ectrometry
Thel"lllll lelk
Torquing
lelk Fluid
'ressure DeclY
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
f-'
f-'
W
I-'
I-'
.r:-
ENGINE_SYSTEM/COM~ONENT J·210xillizer Turlto,umlt - First Stlige Wheel 3- 5
FftEQUENCY LIFE PftlMAftV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE roTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE DF DESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E D~ CftlTICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED ANDMETHDD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
,. Cr.eke. Tur'dne ililfles 7f These fa i 1ures were Structur~1 Itr imary 5 er H/A Pre/,ost test
Cilused by whee 1 rull due to .435; detectell lIurin~ ,re/ltOst on. ,.tent Jill i OS," t i entes t i ns,ect len inti vi~riltion 4
..xi.! villr.tion.
corrective .ctlon uken.
Design ch.n!e initiilte.4 t. Pro,i1!,ation .f thisfiii lure couhl resul t in
correct th i $ ,r.ltl em. adllllitionill lIlilmi!e to
turlli ne i1reil wi th
,erform.i1lnce lIetnlllat ion
almost certain.
-
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCDMMENTS
Pressure Sensors UltrlSonic flAw _QUirtz. Digitll Isotope Thermometry
Fiberoptic Isotope Trlcers
Llser. Digitil Rellllint "'rnetiZitilnS.A.W•• Digitll OptiCil Ho otnphyPyro~ter loresclpingVibrlt ion Exo-electron EmissionHydrophone ~ositron Annihilation
Fiberoptic lei ring Detector Electric Current Injection
Exo-el ectron Detector Eddy Current
•
a f
., ..
(3- 'I
J-2/Fue:1 TurMllumltEM/COMPONE
-
'"
FREQUENCY LIFE '''IMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oil CftlTICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILU"E.
"
SECONDAf'tY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANOS
"
FAILUIIE
,. Ie.,. i0' Ollimi,e If Detected ,est test turfO! Strueturil' "Imary 5 or N/.. Post-test
.Oi2t lIIisiissemltly. Ie.. , in! petentJill ,recetlures.
UO f.illilure ..n.. lysis is reuiner ilInlll lIleilrin!l 2
ilvilil .. ltle for this hilure SUIIl,ert .ere ill so t1i1tr1a!letl
Itut con.ition coul. 'e .5 ill result of this
cilusetl Ity cenumin.tien in fili lure. Unlletectelll
Ite.ilr i"!II or ltV t1alllit!le te ,r.'CI'<iltien of this
lIeilring pouts lIIue to hilure c.uhl result in
imllroller lultriciltion .r lIum, seizure ..n. ,essiltle
hillnllllin, .urin! instilililltion t1i1m.i1!1e te ,urn, .nli en! ine.
Jr servicin!l.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
Opticol Tochometer Ultruonic FllwIsotope Oetector Isotope ThennometryFiberoptic Detector Isotope Trlcers~TD Thermometer Pirticle AnllysisAce!! 1erolT\@ter lorescopi n,Hydrophone Exo-electron Emissi.nFerromignetic Torquemeter Positron AnnihilotionExc-electron Detector Eddy CurrentTunoble Oiodehser Spectrometer TOrquing
i-'
i-'
lJl
f-'
f-'
0\
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT J-2/ASI Fuel Injectlen Hese/Fuel Line
{::s r;-
FREQUENCY LIfE PfUMAfty ftEACT DETECTION FAILUftE POTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN'''CTU''l.. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE all C"lT1CA1..ITY METHOD PIIEDICTAlllITYFAILUftE.
"
SECONO"IIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
10. Tuile Fr.cture 4f One .f these hi lures Le.k~!e lint! Primary 3 or I... Vehicle 1.,lc
Externill fuel leilkil!e .24,; resu I tetl In ,remuure htl!lue ,etentlal cuteff ••vlce.
cuteff ef ane en!ine u 2
Due toASI fuel Iinarujlture 2'1 sec.nlls i nee SA-S02
mi S5 ien i1nll i1nether j n
cilusetl i1y iniltle~uilte I ioe fili lure .f en!ine te
stren!th in vilcuum environ- i1chieve ~in5til!e
ment. AI S. ill ,.r•• lem .f vtry
little c1e,Jrilnc.e lIIIurln! .,er.tien it secentl Iturn
insulliltf." i1nd removill tlurlnt silm. mlsslen, with
,rocetlures contriltutin! te cense'lIIuent cuteff IV
venlcl. 1.,lc when IMln-4i1lM!e to hose.
su!e Itressure switch tit.
Oesi!n CNn!eS hilve .een not i1ctuilte. Consitleril.lethrust chameer i1n4initiiltetl fer centr.1 of
,.ssiiJle en!line 4.uTIiI!ethis ,ro.lem.
ceuhl f.ll ... ilS a resu't
of this fili lure.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
UltrlS.nlc Fl.w
Acoustic EIIissi.n
X-ray fti.lolr.phy
Penetrants
Liser Interfero"",try
Exo-electron Emission
Positron Annihilation
Electric Current Injectl.n
~ •
~73'(0
J-2 ASt Oxltllzer Line~I"UII"~_'" ,.., I ~'.'J""""'Y1'- v,."," I
FREQUENCY LIFE P"IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE POTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE 011 eft ITICAlITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONOAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Tuite FrOicture Cant inuelll 13f One i nst,ance resu I tell in Structural Pr imary 2 (2f) I.... Hillnst.il!Je O.K.
.10'; ,re.milture cuteff .f test anti viltroiltlen • n~ cut.tf moni ter •
C.use. ,rilJli,rily Ity tlue te 1.55 .f JoIIS O.K. f.iltl!ue 5 (lit)
oiccumul.iltJon .f tolennces sl!n.. I, i1lse fire
.n. te inst.ililiitien ,r.- lIlatacti.n system an.
celures resul tint in II're- oltserver netell fi re in
louin! of line. Vi .rilt ion iireii. Eleven .f the 13
intlucelll fOilti!ue lIIurin, het occurrences were tletectetl
fire cast in! then lelll te ,re/,est test lut
fracture .f line. Feur ,otential h.llure OilS
insunces .f i1ttilchin! cl~mll natet! ~.eve woult! result
fer ASI oxilillizer 1 ine-ta- frem unlilletectetl ,re'i1!i1-
HOV fliln,e areilkin! .ue te t len ef the ,reltlem.
Silme ciluses i1re inclulillelll in
these [en fiI i) ures.
New inSUlliltJon procellllures
hilve lteen initiUellll to
minimize ,re.Jems .f ,re- .
IOilltlin!!l.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
f-'
f-'
-...J
.....
.....
00
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM'ONENT J-2!ASI Oxidizer Volve
~. 7
FftEQUENCY LIFE 'PUMAftV IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE ~TENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILUIlE TY'E Oft CftlTlCALITY METHOD 'ftEDICTAIILlTYFAILUPIE.
"
SECONDAPlY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUftANDS
.. FAILUftE
13. '1.1 lie Fid Is te Perform If Test ~Itort since failure C.nt~in.ti.n fir hnary 3 I.... Visu.iIIl -
Moisture, Ice .o,a resu Its in LiCk .f (mei sture) n. stlillrto. itnition .lue t. lick .f
'fVal .... e f.ilellll to o,en.
.37t oxitUzer 5uIIPly te ASIilssemllly. l"re-test
Ciillused Ity icio! c.n"ition in checks lIIIeteete. villve
i1re. of ,o'llet anti ,o"et failure.
!uitle resultin!l from
lTJ)i sture enterin! v.. lve
lIIIurin, cam,.nent test.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MDNITOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
Pressor Sensors
QUlrtz. Digital Ultrasonic Leak
Fiberoptlc Acoustic Holo,raphy
Laser, DltHal Isotope Tracers
S.A.W., Dl,Hal 'entoxi ~e 'ollrometry
Isotope Wear Spectrometer Hygf"Olleter
TunAble Diode LAser Spectrometer 'lrtlcle MAlysis
- Laser Scatterln,
OptiCAl Leak
lorescopi n,
Olfferentlll llll~lometry
OptiCAl Hllography
~ ,l
•ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT
'"
J-2/Stoilrt Toink Vent .nlll Aellef Valve
"
,'3' )~
f-J
f-J
\.0
FREQUENCY LIFE PIIIM..IIY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE Of OESIGN/..CTU..... EFFECT OF FAlLUIIE FA/LUliE TYPE 011 CJlITICAlITY METHOD PIlEDICTAlfLiTYfAfLUfte.
"
SECONOAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
f"'LUIIE
Viii ve Fa i 15 te 'erform Cont. H ftesultsin lIIecilY iJntl '-5 Centilminiltien fir I millry 5 or Inst. Test cilncellelll
.373~ likely less ef stort ton~ (nwi sture) ,etentl .. ) lIy ••server en
C..use. -v freezin! .f ,ressure. Two of these .n~ 3 lIIec<illY .f stilrt
moisture in centr.1 ,ertf." f.allures Cilusetl ~ncel- freezin! tilnk ,res5ure-
of "Olive .actuator with l.atlen .f ,I ..onelll tests. ViSUill.
resultil"t lIintllnt or seizure others t1etecteill lIre/,est
.f Yillve i1nlll correct Ive iIIct Ion
In;tiilcion of im,rove. tilken.L.ss .f start tilnkIIIry i"t pr.celllure hils lIeen
,ressure weultl result Inmale te .. ttem,e to Inallil i ty te start enllne<illlevlilte this c.an4iti.n.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
f-'
N
o
1'5' i
SYSTEM/COM~ONENT._-_. J-' UXlIlZCr .!e~g V"jlye
FfteQUENCY LIFE "'UMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTIALFAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILUIIE TY~E 011 CftlTlCALITY METHDD ~IIEDICTAIILlTYFAILUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
13. v~ I \Ie Fil i 1st. Perf.em Sf No si!lni ficiI"C effect in Structur~I II,. iffiilry 5 or N/A 'est-test
II. Contaminiltion/Friction 3U thi 5 cilse exec,t fer .n. lIotentLilIl ins,ectien
some continue.. flow of over,ressure 3
Valve fili Iell to close tfuring oxitl i zec. Sullsequent restillrt
t.ink ~ur!e5 follewin! test. en!line o,eriltion, if n.t only
Cilused by Itc.ken '.''Iet llIetectetl, coul. rcsul tin cellucCi.os in thrust,retilinin!l •• It t1ue te
M/ft ••M. GG temller.. ture,excessive IIcessure lIui'''UII
from [(.. "e. oxitlizer In with ,ossi~i1ity of
inner bellows. ,remil[ure en!llne shut-
dewn Illy t1ropout of ~in-
Design chiln!le initiiltetl sU!le O~K. pressure
for contrel of this swi t(;h~
,roblem.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
fi
'. •
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
.. t
J-2!P.U. V.lve (H~C V.lve-2 P.sltl..,s)
It
i3
I-'
N
I-'
FREQUENCY LIFE ,,.IMAIIIY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
FAIlUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAIlUIIE FAlLUIIE TY~E Oft CRITICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILiTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Valve FliT 15 t. Perf.rm
C.ntinue~
'erfermance t1e,r.t1at len If Resultetl In shift In terr.s 'en P'rlmary 4 lnst. Test
.O'Z~ ens I ne ,erf.rmance .f Instrumentiltien.
Cause .f ,erf.rmance shIft a,.rexlmately 2400 11.5
c.uhf net lie lIetennlnM Ity thrust on" 0.05 M/ft
test. Ceul til lie causetl Ity units.
c..err.sion resultln, In
IIlntUn, .f tntern•• ,arts.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOII,NG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
~
N
N
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT J-2/0xitlizer Turltine 'Y"~5S V.lve
"
FflleOUENCY LIFE
""'M.A.""" ~EACT DETECTION FAILU~E POTENTIALFAILU~E MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FArLU~E FAILU~E TYPE 0" CflllTICALlTY METHOD r~EDrCTAaILITYFAILUfI'E.
"
SECONOA"V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU~ANDS
"
FAILUflle
14. Internal V~lve Leak~,e
~. ConUmjn~ti.n
Siew-closin, valve tlees net 24f All .f these occurrenceS HliterfaJ anlll I'ri mary 5 or N/A Itre/lllost test
c lose com, Ietel y. 1.5~ were lIIetecteti lI!urin, Interference potentiill inspection ointl
Causetl lIy 9<111 in! .f !,ate Itre/,.st test inSllec.t len 3 checkeutilntl checkout IIlrocettures IIr.cetiures.
ri "!Is anI! !late hous I", anti cerrective c::ctien
which increaselll valve tilken. Failure .f valvefrict ion force tlurlnlJ last to c I.se tlur I", stllrt
,ertion .f valve travel. se~uence f f not tletectetlSome !Iii II in! al s. ,resent In
anti cerrecte" weultli!rei! .f IIrive shilft anti
result In ,remature
retil iner. Hetal cenUmlna-
en!llne cuteff attion £rem turltlne exhllust
ex,intlon of s,arks
,as m;y a Iso hilve Iteen iI tleener,ize" timer since
contriltutin, filcter. low exitllzer ,ressure
~e.esi,n has Iteen Inltlatetf woultl ,revent Injecti.n
te retfuce fri ct len antf ,ressure switch ,icku,.
,revent ,a II in, te Im,rove
ilCtUilt len chafilcterl st les.
VIAaLE IN-FLIGHT MONITO~ING SYSTEMS aETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTION TECHNIQUES ~EMA~KSlCOMMENTS
Ul trlsonic The_ter Ultrlsonic LOik
Accelerometers Isotope Tncers
Isotope Detecter \ Pntlcle AnllyslsHydrophone
. Laser SCltterlng
Tunlble Diode Llser Spectrometer O,tlcll Leak
loresco,inl
Differential Rldlometry
Optic.l Hololrlphy
Optic.l Proximity
Halol"" Lelk
Flow Lelk
Mass Spectrometry
Thentllll Leak
Torqulnl
'ressure DeelY
-
•
il .,
.,
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
f
J-2 'ressure-Acutatelll Itur,e Centrel Valve
~~- ~.
,....
N
Lv
FREQUENcY LIFE PPUM...PlV IlEACT DETECTION FAILURE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILURE TY~E OR CPI,TICALITY METHOD ~REDICTAIiLlTYFAllUPlE.
"
SECONO"'''Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILURe
Internaf Valve Leaka,e
Cont Inuetl
Internal leak.a!e lIast valve IIf These failures were all Centaminatlen 'r"lmary 5 er N/" "re/~st test
seat ".~ Ifetectelf tlurln, "re/,.st anti ,.111 n, lIotent i a 1 checkout
Cause" Ity extens lve Iy che.ckeut IIrecefures anti 3 II recetiures.
tlama,e" inJet seal t1ue t. cerrect Ive lIet len taken.
centaminants, mest likely I'rol.n,etl er extensiveleakil!le .f this nilture
self-!Ieneratetl tlurln, test, (J .f these fa II ures
which resul tell in lellka,e In"lcatell !lre55 leaka!le)
,ast seal to valve vent IIOrt.
ceuhl result In
Correct Ive ties I,n sufficient 1.55 of helium
me~sures h~ve !teen te ,reclutle rest~rt .f
jniti~tetl for contr.J en!llne •
• f this ,ro!tlem.
.
VIA.LE IN-FLIGHT MONITORING SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES REMARKs/COMMENTS
......
N
.po.
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT J ..2/\La.r.Jaus hs~U~s - C.hl".dc v::alv,.o;.
FftEOUENCY LIFE "UM""V ftE ...CT OETECTION FAILUftE ~OTENTI"LF... ILUIIE MOOE "'NO C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF F... ,LUftE F... ILUIIE TY~E Oft CftlTICAtlTY METHOO ' ~ftEDICT""'lITYF"'~UftE.
"
SECQNOA"Y TIME USEO "NO METHOO MEASUft"NOS
"
FAILUftE
Intern~1 V~lve leakil,e "f These occur renees were a II Interference IIrlmary 5 er N/" flre/~ost test
Cont i nuetl I.I'Z~ t1etectetl t1urint Itre/lt0st (toteMt I a' lnslltectlon.
Pt.everse flew internal leakate test Itrocetlu..es ami 3
remetllal action taken.
Causetl "y frett 1n, of 1K'"et Failure analyses nete
anti 'ill 1i 0' "etween ,.1I,et that any reverse leilka,e
ant' seat i1ssem"ly au,mentetl throuth valve woullll .e
Ity ,resence .f centaminatie" v,entell thr~u,h IJur!le
in 1tO"et/seat area. This centr•• vent I ine, which
results in ,artlally alten IIr.vitles ill certain .mount
ItOsltle" t1urin, en!line of rellunllancy f.r this
o,erilt I.n. Seill 4i1ma,e was fililure me4e. 'r.len,ell or
~ls. a centrfltutin! fact.r ,ress leilkil,es (some of
te seme ef these fa f lures. these were note4 .s Iteyonll
the r~n!le ef the flew
Des 1!1n moll! fleat fens te rater). hewever. ceulll
valve h~ve Iteen Inttlatell result in sufficient loss
fer contrel ef this of hellu;n an4/er exi4izerl
-
,r.ltlern. fuel te result in
VI....LE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEM... ftKS/COMMENTS
~ '-
ENGINESYSTEM/COM~ONENT
•
J-2/V~rloU5 Assemitlles - Check Valve
"
......
N
i..n
FREQUENCY LIFE ,,,IMAftV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTI"LFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECTOF FAILUIIE FAILUIIETnE Oil C"JTICAlITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILiTYFAILUIIE.
"
SECONO""Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
F"ILUIIE
Internal Valve lNkl!le tle!rall.t len of GG/TC anti
Cont i nuetl conse~uent Jyen, fne
lIerforlnilnce with the
,.ss lit i' tty of Itremature
en, foe shutllewn.
Extensive 1.55 .f hel h,n
Itr-essurant ceul" .1 se
result In failure t.
restart en,lne when
re~uiretl.
-
VIAILE IN-FliGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
t-'
N
0'
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT J-2/G.G. Cont,..1 V~'ve
~ 1'-
F..EQUENCY LIFE '''IMAftY ~EACT DETECTION FAILU~E
FAILUl'IE MODE AND CAUSE OF OES1GN/"CTU"L EFFECT OF F...ILUftE FAILU~ETY~E Oft CI\n\CAUTY METHOD ~~EDICTAIILlTV
I'OTENTIAL
FAILU"E.
"
SECONO...fty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU~ANCS
"
FAILUfte
Internal Va Ive l.e.b,e
Centlnuelll
I"terna 1 Ieak.1!,e ,.1St 4f These incililents were Material Itrlmary 5 .r N/A fre/,ost test
,o"et/sut .24,~ "eteete" ,re/..est test ,.tent 1.1. ins,ectlen.
anti remet11al act fen take 2
Causelll Ity lIIa~,e t. ,o"et Untletectetl le.kate woullll
sea 1 from reverse flow ,ast result in un,la"""
the fuel ItOll,et at en,ine lIIe11very of .ne er _th
start ... t1ama,e t. ,Iastie ,r.,ellants te GG with
seat Illy tfe-wrall wH,etl IMss11lie tletenatien at
Itetween ,o"et an" seat. s tart In. tIl.mate te ,.5
,enenu.,. antl/er turllines
.
VI....LE IN-FLIGHT MONITO~INGSYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES ~EMA~KS/COMMENTS
•
Ii •l
"
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
H-l ENGINE DATA
I-'
N
ex>
ENGINESYSTEM/COM~ONENT
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE
H-I Thrust Chamller
FPleOUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FA1LUPlE. '4
"
EFFECT OF FAILUftE
I"UMA,"V
FAILUftE TY~E I Oft I C",T'CAUTV
SECONOA.fn
FAILUftE
PlEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUPIE
~PlEDICTA.ILlTY
AND METHOD
c· r
~OTENTIAL
MEASUPIANDS
2. C.. lant 'assa,e Leaka,e
Due te cracks .r rUittures
(mostly ,In-l1olo ty,o) In
tuiles. causetl Ity overheat In!
as. the resu 1t of .tama,e to
tulles .r tI Jsturllance .f the
exh~ust stre~m fr.m
irre!lul.rfties In TIC wall.
Overhe.t In!l of tultes has
ills. Iteen c.use4 Ity restric-
tion of free cool.nt flow Ity
f1 ush-meuntetll ,h.tocen
"sses en the TIC. Ahe
cilusellll Ity crilcks I n ex i t
manifell111 Itrilze j.int .r In
tultes j ust u~streiln1 .f Itr.ze
Joint lIIIue t••verheatfn!l ...
• ne cause .f the. .verheatin!
In this .re. is the
J'F AII .f these hi i lures
were tleteete" lIIurl"!! ,est
test checkeut .011I '""ee-
tl.n ,recelllures anti
c.rrective aeti." taken.
Extern.' fue I Ielute
lIIurl"! en,ine o,eratlen,
hewever. ~..oultl a Iw.ys
,resent the ,roillem .f
the IMSS illi I i ty .f fl re
in the ,rese.nce of ,n
I,nitlon source, with
c.nse~uent lMsslltility of
severe t1amll!le t. en, i ne
Overtern"
Structura I
Hater! a 1
Primary 5
IIatentlal
2, J
N/A '.st-test
checl<.eut anti
I"s,eet len
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS
"'essure
Qulrtl, DI,ltll
Flberoptlc
LIS... Dlglt.l
S.A.W., Df,ltll
Ultrasonic The"""l1Il!ter (Fl ....)
UltrlSonlc Flo....t .. (Nezzle)
Polaro... t ..
Tun.blo Dl04e LIS.. Spectl'Oll1Ot.. (Mixture ~.tlo)
IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES
UltrlSonlc Le.k
Acoustic Holo,r.phy
X-r.y ~.4Iegraphy
G..... R.4Ie,raphy
'entexlde 'olar try
lIydro,en 'ol try
IInr_ter
Dptlc.l 'yrometry
Holegraphlc Le.k
MIlllmeter-w.ve Interfero...try
ftEMAPlKSlCOMMENTS
,.
·1 t
NGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
.;
H-1 /Thrust Cham~er
~- .~
t-'
IV
I.Q
FPleOUENCY LIFE "PlIMARY ~E"CT OETECTION FAILU~E ~OTENTIALF"'LU~E MODE "NO CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILU~E F"'LU~E TY~E D" CPltTICAlITY METHOD ~~EDICTAIllITYFAILUftE.
"
SECONDAPlV TIME USED AND METHOD MEII.SU~ANDS
"
FAILU.E
Coolant ftassiI!le Leaka!e
Centintle.
extens ten .f the manffol ..
int. the het !las stream.
H-I thrust c:hamlter "esl,"
ch~n,e has j,een mo.; fiN 50
that exit manifo'" will ~e
move" further outManl frem
,the rna in flilme stream to
correct this latter ,reltlem.
.
VI"ILE IN-FLIGHT MONITO~INGSYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES ~EMA~KS/COMMENTS
I-'
W
o
EM/COMI'ONENT 1.1-1/ Turlto.um.-Thrust Ch.am~~,.-Gas G~nl!!rat.r_~~v
I: • ~
- ._ .. --.-
FREQUENCY LIFE ",UMAPlY REACT DETECTION FAILURE I'OTENTIAL
fAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/"CTU"L effECT Of fAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE 0" c,UTICAltTY METHOD PRED1CTAliLiTYF.AllU..E.
"
SeCONO...ptV TIME USED AND METHOD MEASURANCS
"
FAILUPle
3. Jeint Leaka,e 5,F T•• f these fallures Structural P'rimary 3. 5 Inst. O~server cut.ff
.. Het Gas 2F resu I telll In "remeture ~terial (It.tent i ill I
Causetl lIy therlTlJcou,le IIilown termination .f test lIy r.rllue I, 2
eut of "55; cracks in GG 011server 4Iue to fl re 1n relaXiitlen
comllust.r Itollly ant' turlt I Me turltlne area ..ntl het ,as
manifellll; .efectlve lIIama!lelll lea~!e at G.G. Nearly
.r .roken sea Is/,askets; all these folt lures were
unlllerterlluetl HIts .r relaxa t1etectelll anlll correct Ive
tlen of torllue on Mlts i1ctlen taken lIurTn, ,reI
4urin, en,ine .,eriltion. The 1I05tte5t ,r.ce.ures~
maj.rityof these fililures Hot 'iiS leaka,e lIurin,
(40 .f the 5') were le.k.,e en! fne .,erilt Ion .r f 1Ith
,ilst the Sell I iletween the Ciln result In fire In
G.G. an4 turillne ilssemilly ent1ne .re. with con'"
fli1ntes. setlluent ,.ssiilility of
ex,'.,'.n .n4/er maJer
Su"est I.n malle te lIama,e te en, fne an.fer
Inc.r,.rate N.. flex seals In vehicle.
j.lnts usin, sltir.. l-weulll -
(flexitall ie) , .. skets.
VIAILE IN-fLIGHT MONITORING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES REMARKs/COMMENTS
Ultruonlc Extenslllllleter
Ultruonlc Leak
Leak Tape/Coatln,
o,tlcal Leak·
Laser Interferometry
Differential Rdlometry
Holt,raphlc Leak
Resistivity Monitorin,
Ka1"en Leak
Flew Leak
Mass Spectrometry
The.....l Leak
Terquln,
Leak Flul4
'ressure Decay
'" ·1
..
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT H-I/G~s Generater .& Pro,ellant Feet! System Seals. Fittin!s, lines & Ducts-TIC Dome
~- .,
FAILU~E MODE AND CAUSE
F"EOUENCY! LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAllUftE. ,.
"
EFFECT OF FAILU~E
"UMAltY
FAILU~ETY~E I 0" I C"ITICAUTY
SECQNDAfty
FAILUfte
~EACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILU~E
~~EDlCTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
~OTENTIAL
MEASU.ANDS
3. Joint leakage
II. 'ro,ellant ilnll Lulie
External fue I Ieaka!le cilusetl
~y t1alna!letl 01" t1efect I ve
seal 51 f 1iI"!les. untlerterllllluetl
",Its .r I"'elilxatlon .f torllU
on 1I0its t1urin!l en!line
o,era t ion, loose or t1alTlil!letl
IMI ts/l-nuts. cracketl .1'"
4i1ma!letl I1nes/t1ucts, braze
amI/or welt! ,or.sity
I,F
4F
Three.f these failures
resul tell in ,remature
terminat ien .f tests by
ollservers, two for fuel
I eaka!le anti one for fire
nete., In t~ ether
instances ,.st-test
I"s,eetlo" reveille. it fir
hat! eccurretl tlurln!J maln-
sta!e fi rin!J tests. The
.ther 1.3 f~ i Jures were
tletecte4 tlur I n!J Itre/ltost
test InsllJectlon " checkout'
anti remetlf~1 act I." taken.
The entl resu It ef fue 1
Je~k;o,e C~n ~JkQ'Ys Ite fire
in the presence of ..n
i!ln I tien source. wi th
,ossllllie ex, los ion antl/or
sulllstantial en!ine tlam"!Ie.
Structurotl
"'ilterial
rerlllllue
relaxiltlen
"ri~ry 3. 5
,.tentl .. 1
1. 2
lnst. Oltserver cuteff
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ENGINESYSTEMICOMI'()NENT H-'''•• Conero'_ • Pr_ on' ..... 'v••_ ... I.~ ."tln.' LIne•• D""U-T!C _ P_ C-S
F"£OO£t«:y lift ",*Jl.'W IIEACT DETECTION 'A'LUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF ~E$IGN/ACTU"" EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE O· cft""CAUTY METHOD PIIEDICTA.'UTYfAILURE. 10 SECONDA"Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS10 FAILURE
Jeln' lMk.,. (C_tln..~)
bterne I lex ' ••b,. cause4 25f All .f these failures Structural ,,.I..,y 5 MIA Pr./~, ,.ot '
hy 4II.....,.d••feetl" er .D'rl ware ".tecte4 "urln, ,reI Meted.' ,.'en,I.1 chackeut an"
cent... lnat." s.. t • ..41.r ,.st ta,t chec....t an4 T.r~.. 2, 3 '"',edlen_
, •• ,In, surfac.,_ '_,e er IntlNCtlen ,recHur•• -.4 rel.utl.n
on4arte,...uelII _hs/fltt'"!', cet'rectlve actl.. taken
or rel.qt'''' .f ter... te return ~tt te
4ur1n, ~,IMI ,,-"8t'..,. eec:e,t.IIt•• centlltlen. LaIC
crack" I fna.14uc:t'. faul t)' 1..... Int. the ",'M1
braze J.lnu. c.....rt....t centrllMltes t
tM ,...I~I \Ity .f .u~-
.,an,I•• _ ••ne 4_... ,
fire Is ,rasent••r eeuhf
result In fr"lln, .f
aillJKeftt ~"U with
,..tul tent '.II..e .,
, these~..tlt.
.,.rate as r...ul re4.
V'A.LE IN·FLIGHT MONITDII'NG SYSTEMS .£TWEEN FUGitT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES .. IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
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FftEOUENCY LIFE "UMAPW PlE...CT DETECTION FAILUPIE ~OTENTIAL
F...ILUPIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUPIE FAILUPIE TY~E 0" CftlTlCALlTY METHOD ~PlEDICTA'ILlTYFAILUfte.
"
SECONDA"V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU"ANDS
"
FAllUftE
Jet"t Leoikate Continuetl
External Lex leilk"!Ie causetl 25f All .f these fid lures Structural It,. fmary 5 NtA !'re/,o!t test
Ity t1ama!lell, t1efectlve or were 4etectetl tlur in, ,rei Material ,atentlal checkout OInt!
'."tamlnatet! se.1ls and lor ,est test checkout anll Tor~ue 2, 3 1nsltectlon.
seallnt surfaces, loese.r tns,ectl." ,r.cetlures anti relaxiltl."
untlert.r'luetl HI ts/fl ttlnts. correct lye .ct Ie" taken
or relaxation of t.r~ue t. return com,onents to
"urint en!line .lteratie", accelttaiIJ'e ,.".itlon. Lox I
,r"eke. I ines/_ucts, faul ty leakate inte the en!line
~raze j.lnts. com,artment centr i "utes t
the ,.55 ill ill ty of sull-
stllntlal en,lne lIamate If
fire 15 IItresent, or couhf
resul t In freezl"t of
alllljilcent com,onents with
resultant failure of
these c.m,onen ts to
.~er.te liS rellllui rell.
VI....LE IN·FLIGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES PlEMAPlKS/COMMENTS
f-'
W
~
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COMrONENT H-LIurlooIuIllll
c ../
FftEQUENCY LIFE ""MARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUftE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYrE Oft C.. ITIC.... lITY METHOD rllEDICTAIILlTYFAILUftE.
"
SECQNoAftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILUftE
i. Cr.eke" Turllfne .rHes 24f Three .f these f~llures Qverte.,. flrlmllry 3. 5 I.... ftCC cu,t.ff3f resul tetil In ,remllture' Er.s ien lIotentla' tlevre•.
Due t. excessive Lex leatl test cut.ff Ity Ret llIevlce C.ntllminat len 2 lnst. O~5erver cut.H.
frem GG cause" Ity tleJayeti anti Ity failure te achieve
.,enin~ of fuel ,."et .r lteetstrilll· Other 21foil 1ures were tleteetetlIty ,remature .,en In, .r tlurln, ,re/,.st testleaka~e .f Lex ,."et, wi th I""eet I.., anti checkeut.
cense.uent excessively hfth
tem,erature lint! resu1 tant anti cerrectlve .etien
.r.slen. AI s. can lie causetl taken. En,lne _,er.tlen
lIy Im,act .f f.reft" eltJects with the level .f eros I."n_tell 1n mest .f these
.n the ~1~i'es, .r ~y ru~~1n, f.11 ures weu 14 Itreven tIf ~I.~es.
en,ln. fr-.n IItt.fnln,
mal nstll,e .lter.Uen .r,
'f Itr.,..,ate4 eur In,
en,IMe e,eratl.n, ceulll
resu Itin severe i',ma,e
.
t. ,um, lin" ,r.iNlllly t.
en,ln•.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITDIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
Pressure Se~sors Ultrastnic FlawQuartz. Digit,l Into,. ThenntmetryFiberoptic hott,. TracersLaser. Digital Kemant Ma,netizatltnS.A.W•• Digital Dpt I cal Ho o!raphyPyrometer
"resctpin!Vi~ratlon Exo-eIectron Eml 55 I onHy~rophone Ptsitrtn AnnihilationFlberoptlc learln! Detector Electric Current InjectitnEXI-elect...n Detector E44y Current
~
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,ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT H-1/Turlto,umll
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F"EQUENCY LIFE Pfl:IMAfty
"EACT OETECTION F"'ILU"E POTENTI...L
FAILU"E MODE AND C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF F"'ILU"E FAILU"E TYPE 0" C'UTICAltTY METHOD P"EDICTA.ILlTYFAILU"E.
"
SECOND."V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU""'NDS
"
FAILU"E
,. lear i"! Oama!e 'f Four of these fai lures 1nterference "rlmary 3. 5 I"",. HIS O. K.man I tor
4f resul tell in ,rem.tture (Centami nat len ,.tentlal Oltserver cutoff
Due t. rult. In! .f r.llers test cut.ff Ity .herver I, 2
anti Inner/outer race with 011''111 Ity hi1ure te achieve
resu'tant scadn, arnl malnsta'!e. One of the
eventual Itin"l"! of !turln!s; feur was iI launch en!Jine
contamin<iltien In Itearin!ls .r cut.ff I".' Sec after
1..ck 9 .r restrlctien .f lulte liftoff. The other 4
te ilearin!J5 coullII result In f<1 i I ures were t1etectell
same fili lure .f !tearTn!s t. lIurin, ,..st-test analysis
funet Jon. anti checkout. Cont lnuell
.,er.tlen wi th lIIamJI!llelll or
fa i I e« lIe.r In,s ceu hi
resul t In severe 4i1ma!le
an4 ,o551111y eX(IIIl.slon .f
(IIIump, with resultilnt ITIiIje
4ama,e to en,lne.
VI....LE IN·FLIGHT MONITO"ING SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES "EM..." KSiCOM MENTS
Opt fell Toeho"",t@r
UltrlSonle FlowIsotopo (J@t@etor
Fiberoptle Dot.etor Isotop@ Thenno"",try
RTD Thormometer I sotop@ Trle@rs
Acc!1!romet!r Plrtlc1@ Anolysls
Hydrophone hr@scoplng
Ferromign!t1c Torqu!meter Exo-@]@etron Emission
Exo-@l.etron D.t.etor Positron Annlhnltlon
Tunoble Dlodellser SpoetromOt@r Ed4y Curr@nt
Torquing
......
w
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NE.SYSTEM/COM~ONENT H IlTur"',u".
c:: • 'J
FftEQUENCY LIFE ,,.IMA"V ftEACT DETECTION FAILUftE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUftE MODE AND CAUSE QF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUftE TY~E Oft C"ITICALlTY METHOD 'ftEDICTAIILlTYFAllUftEw
"
SECQNOA"V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUftANDS
"
FAILURE
II. Tur"',um, 5...1 L...""!e 21f These failures were Haterla' 'rfmary 5 N/A I're·test
Ifeteetelf lire-test .n4 Centamlnatlen ,.tentl. , check.ut
Internal teak.,. lint c.rrectlve actl." taken. I, 2
,rimary fuel sui This leaka,. can ie
tlischar,elf froem the IUH:
everM.rtl tlr~ln line an"
I n the ,resenee .f an
1,nitlo" source clul4
r.sult In trre antl/.r
ex,l.sl.", .r su"stantl.t
en, ine ".ma,•.
-
VIAllE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS,ECTION TECHNIQUES ftEMAftKS/COMMENTS
F-ll Is.t.,e Thennometry
UD Thermometer Is.t.pe Tncers
Opt! c.l Tlchomoter 'ertlcle An.lysls
Acce1erometers Ioresco,ln,
Isotope Seal Detector Optlc.l 'roxlmlty
Tun.ble Dl0'e LlSer Spectrometer Tor~uln,
~
'.
.1 ·f
"~ONENT H-I/Lull. Oil FIlter
<: .. If,
~
W
-....J
FREQUENCY LIFE ,,.IMA'IV
"EACT DETECTION FAILU"E ~OTENTIALFAILU"E MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILU"E FAILU"E TY~E D" CRITICALITY METHOD ~"EDICTAIllITYFAILURE.
"
SECONO."'V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU"ANDS
"
FAILuRe
12. lulte Pressure Anemill1 es 37f One .f these fa I' ures C.nt~mln.tlon 'r1nwry 3. 5 lmm. Lulie ,II
resul tetl In ,remature re"ll ne men I tel"
Cl.!!Ieti ff! tel" causetl Ity terminiltlen" .f test tlue t cut.ff t1evi ce
contaminiltien .f the filter Julte ,ressure t1ro"dn!
element Ity forei!" INIterlill Itelew retlline value. Th.
in Julie oi I system t. the ethers were t1etectetl
extent that flow thr.u!h the -flurln, !lOst test ins,ec-
filter Is sultsuntlally tlen .ntl c.rrectfve
im,ai retl. action tilken.
I
I
. I
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITO"ING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT rNS~ECTION TECHNIQUES "EMA"KSICOMMENTS
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ENGI NE.SYSTE M/COM'ON ENT H-l/Hain Oxitllzer Valve
c- (/
FREQUENCY LIFE '"IMA"Y IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE 'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL • EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY'E DR C.UTICAlITY METHOD 'IIEDICTAIllITYFAILU"E.
"
SECONDAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
13. Valve Falls t. Perform 13f N. ,relNture cutoffs Structural Primary 4, 5 N/A fI.st-test
~. C."tam inat i."/fr let fen reSU I tetl frem these Centilminatfen ,.tentla) oltser".tfenfat lures; hewever, ene Tem,erature 2, 3 an" checkeut.
Fast, 51 .... or erratic test resuhelll In interferencetlestructlon .f thrust
.,enin,/c1.sin, time cause.
chamlter anti Injecte,. in aIty !all in, .f a actuate,.
,.st-cut.ff lex fire.heusin, Mre anti ,tsten, Other fa i I ures were
varfatiens in s,riO! tletectetl tlurl"! checkeutcenstant .ntl/.r seal
friction, cracketl .r tlama!lH anll lICit-test Invest i !la-tl.n- of Iterfermanee tlata11, seillinterferin! with an~ cerrectlve .ctlen
valve _vernent, .earl", t~ken. The eccurrenc. of
mal function, heater till lure. this f.llur. ~urin, en,in
start ceul~ result In the
Inltl.tIen ef lferferm.nce
...... lIes with ,noloa~le
test cuteff an~ possl~le
.
en,Jne ~all1llle. L""iul,.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IElWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
Pressor Senstrs Ultnstnlc lelkQuartz, Dl,ltal Acoustic HologrlphyFlbl!rtptlc
LlSer, Dl,ltll Isotope Tncers
S.A.V•• Dl,ltal Pentoxl_e 'ollr_try
Isotope Velr Spectrometer ·Hy,rometer
Tuna~le Diode laser S,ectrometer 'artlcle Analysisllser Scatterln,
D,tlcal- lelk
10resco,ln,
Dlfferentl11 KI_l_try
Optlcol Htlt,ra,hy
..t ,4 ,j
ENGINE_SYSTEMICOMPONENT
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FIIEQlJEIICY LIFE ...- IlEACT DETt:CTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF EFFECT OF FAlLUIIE FAILUIlE TYPE 011 CIIII1CALJTY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILITYFAILUIIE.
.. SHDDUIY nME USED ANDMETItDD MEASUIlANIlS.. FAILIRE
V.lwe fails te 'erf.... at test cuteff tIue t.
Centinue4 51_ cl.s'n, ceul" _,,_
ater... ' lex lu~ f ....
TIC with resultant
pessl.lllty.f -te te
_"oe.
-
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
~
-l:'-
o
e'· /"3H-I Check Valves
'STEM/COMPONENT
"--.- .
FREQUENCY DESIG~~A~UAL '''IMAfI'V IIE"CT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALF"ILUIIE MODE "NO C"USE OF EFFECT OF F"ILUIIE F"ILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICT"IILlTYFAILUIIE. ,. SECONOA"V TIME USED "NO METHOD ME...sUII"NCS,. FAILUIIE
Valve Fails te 'erf.rm 13f Ef,ht .f these t.tlures C.ntaminatl." I'rIme ry 5 NIA Checkeut .n~
Centinue4 were en the !earCoise fnterference petent fa. foslll.etien
,resSure check valve, the 2, 3
Fai Is te close-reverse ethers were en the lult.
leaka,. causell ,rimarlly Ity 4I1r.afn check valve. All
cent.mlnatl.n IMI,ell II.tween .f these fa I Jures were
,.'lMt anti seat ,reventln, .etectetll 4I1urlo, check.ut
valve frem cl.sln, ,re,erly. anti Ins,eetlen ,recelllur.,
4a..,e4 or scratch" ,."etl ilntl ~rrectlve .eti.,
seat; Itintltn, er stlckln, taken. Occurrences .f
.f VII ve ,."et lIue t. these fallures 4urln,
Ituf 14u, .f cent.min.tlen en en'!llne e,eratien ceultl
stem .n4/er Mre, er te result In re4uctfen .ro
41 ..n.I ..._1 __lleo. 4e,Ietien ef !e.rc.,.
,renure wi th c:enl~uent
pre~a~111 ty .f teot
cut.ff an4 ,.ssl~llIty .f
~.IMI. te !e.rc:.se/,lJ". -
VI"ILE IN.FLIGHT MONITOlliNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES IIEM""KSICOMMENTS
ENG
:f !4 :. '·t
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COM'ONENT H-llHaLr, Fuel--'l.iJve/Check Valves
•
c. . r l(
f-'
~
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F~EOUEHCY LIFE '''IMA''V IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE 'OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGNIACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TY'E O~ C'UTICALITY METHOD '"EDICTA.1L1TYFAILU~E.
"
SECONO."V TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANCS
"
FAILU~E
14. Internal Valve leaka,e 2'f All .f these failures wer H.terla) ftrlfMry 5 NIl. !'re/,ost test
.eteete. tlur in, Jlre/,.st C.ntaml nat ion IMtenthll1 ins,ectlen anti
Fuel leflka!le cause" Ity test insJlection anti 2. 3 checkout.
severely tlama,etl shaft seals checkeut Jlrocetlures. anllll
scratchet! anti centilmlnatetl corrective iletl.n taken.
seal in! surfaces .f sate anti The occurrence of th I 5
I i, sea I. failure tlurln, en,ine
start ceuhl result in fuel
leak to TIC with ,ossi~lo
lIeteniition when exltllzer
enters TIC. leolka,e at
test cut.ff ceuJt! resul t
in fuel leaka,e frem TIC
with ,.ssl~illty of fire
anlll c.''lSe~uent en,ine
t1i1lM!le.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
Ultroson!c Th"l1IIOIIIl!t..r Ultrlsonic L...kAcc..l .. rollll!t ..rs Isotop.. Trlc..rs!sotop.. o..tector
'"rt!cle AnllysisHydrophone Llser SClttor!n!Tunlble Diode LlSer S,.ctl'1lllll!ter Opticil L... k
lorescopin!
Differ.nthl Aldiometry
Opticil Holo!rlphy
Opticil 'roximity
HIlog.n L.lk
Flow L...k
Mass Sp.ctromotry
Th"l"IlllIl L..lk
Torquing
'r..ssur.. D..clY
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
F-l ENGINE DATA
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT F-I/Thrust~
•
;--
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE
FftEQUENCY I LIfe
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILUftE. %
..
EFFECT OF FAILUIIE PfUMAfIlY I I fltEACTFAILUIIE TYPE I 0. C.'T'CALITY TIME
SECONDAfty
FAILUfilE
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUIIE
PIIEDICTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
~OTENTIAL
MEASUIIANDS
2. Cool.o( P'ass.ilge leilKage
I "Cerna I fue I le.k"!Ie caused
by .raze .ond .efec ts
augmented by therrn.oll .nd
vibration stresse~.
if These fiilures were all
detectetl durin!! IIre/liest
tes [ procedures ill".
corrective action t.ken.
En!ine oper.tien with
siynjfjcant jntern.lJ fuel
I eak"!le, hOwever-, coultl
result in retluction of
retutn fuel fJow te TIC
i oj ector an .. im, i "!lernen t
of fuel iO[Q com.ust ion
flow throU<J" the TIC
nozzle. If these cen-
d i t ions were severe
enoLJ!lh. thrust OLJtput
could be atfectetl .ntl
prem.il[ure en!! joe cutoff
t r i 9geretl.
Structural
Viltf'"oiIt ion
Temperilture
flr-imilry 5
potent iill
3
N/A P're/ltOst test
pr.cellures
)
I
f-'
~
W
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS
lI'ressure
QUirtz, 01!iUl
Fi beropt i c
lilser t Di~iu1
S.A.w .• 01giul
Ultrisonlc Tnermometer (Fl.me)
Ul trisonic Flowmeter (flozzle)
fl'ohrometer
Tun.ble Oiode LiSer Spectrometer (Mixture ~ltlo)
IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
Ultrisonic look
Acoustic Hologriphy
X-riy ~idlogriphy
Gilll11i Ridlogriphy
~entoKlde ~olir."'.try
Hydrogen Pohrometry
Hygrometer
Opticil ~yro...try
Hologriphlc leik
Hi 11 ;meter-Wilve Interferometry
IIEMAIIKSlCQMMENTS
i-'
.j::-
.j::-
YSTEM/COM~ONENT F-I/Ih.r..ust Chilmltec__ , EJl.tension---.Nozzle
y- ~
FReQUENCY LIFE r.IlMAftV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/"C,U"L EfFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E Oft CftmCALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONO"fty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILUftE
3. Joint Leilkil,e 22f All .f these failures were Structunl IIrimry 3. 5 ".st test
.. Hec GilS .eFecte. "uri"! ,re/II.st J'1i1teriill ,.tentl.1 check"ut ian.
test II'r.celllures line T.r~u. I Ins,eeti.n.
Externil) hot gils leil~ge c.rrective ilctien taken. relautien
Cilusetl Ity wilrpee/d.1mil!e. TIe Leilkilte ef het !loiS Int.
te-nozzle extcnsien flilo!lts ent ioe/venicle co...rtment
lIIue ,rimari Iy to wel.in, lIIurin, entine _,erltien
heilt lIIur int instill lilt Ion af ,resents the ,ess ibi Ii ty
Curlll;"e exhilust ffiilnifeltl. ef severe fire <l.oli/er
A1so .tue te 1Ii1~,e. seill s. ex,toslen .r .l.[ "st.
.ilm..,. te .iiuljacent hartl-
New seilt tlesl,n is ~re.
inceqtoratetl at the T/(-te-
nezzle extension flan,es
IIIreclutlin, IUkil,e if miner
fli1n,e Wilrl'iI,e exists.
.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
"'
UltrlsonicExtens iOllleter
Ultrlsonic lelk
Luk Tipe/Caltin,
Dptiul Luk
, llSer Interferallletry
Different ill ~ldiOllllttry
Hologriphic lelk
~esistivity Monitoring
Hilosen Lu k
Flow Luk
MISS Spectrometry
Thel'lllll Luk
Torquing
l.lk Flui~
Pressure DeelY
l 4 .~
ENGINE_SYSTEM/CDM~DNENT F-I/Thrust Ch~mlter. Seills. Atli1,ters. DiscennecU & Fuel Ducts. Lines ilntl Fluln,s
II i
V·S-
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE
FfteaUENCYI liFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILUftE. ,.
"
EFFECT OF FAILUftE
P"IMA'W
FAILUftE TY~E I DR I CRITICALITY
SeCONDARY
FAILUftE
ftEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUftE
~ftEDICTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
~DTENTlAL
MEASUftANDS
3. Joine Leakil,e
to Pro,ellilnc iln. Lulie
Externill Fue I Leilkil!le
Ci;use .f the leoikil!e vilries
llIe,enlllent on cem,onent in4111
lociltion in ensine. For
thrust chamaer externill fuel
letlks. the ,rirnary Ciluses
were c:uc/lllilfn.il!ei 'ilckin!1
seills/fittln!s. oiln. er.51.o/
holes in TIC tultes resultin,
frem contilminilnc on tu.e
surface .urin, furnilce
IIirilzin!. For suls. the
main Ciluses were low tor~ue
on fasteners. imperfecti.ns
in /f'IiIting 5urfi1CeS of
niln,es. cenuminilnt Ie-tween
431 AII of these filii ures
were tie-tee tet! ,reI'as t
test. ,rel~unch••r 4urin
Je~k tests (~inJy thrust
chamlter I e~ks). C.rrec-
ti .... e ~ctl.n w~s tilken in
.11 cases ,.rlor t.
sultsellluent ollerilt len.
En!tne 0lleriltion with
these con.U t lens exl stent
however, woultl holVe ....ilrle
effects 4eJleneent en
comllenent ~n. lociltle" in
en!ine. For thrust
chilmlters, si!nificilnt
externil1 leilk"!le of fuel
caul. ilffect IIro,elliint
mixture riltio with
cen setl;uen t Lox-r i ch
Moterl.1 I ~r1...ry
Er.s ien
Un4er torlllue
~elilx~t;en
Structur.1
Centaminiltien
5
,etenti.1
2, 3
N/A Pr.lilunch
Pre/,.s t US t
checkout iln.
ins,ectl."
,recetlures.
.....
+:'-
\Jl
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES ftEMAftKSlCOMMENTS
......
~.
'" Y-~J
F-J/ThrY5t (bim_c, SCi!s 44iDters Disconnects, Fuel pllets lines inti FlulnesYSTEM/COM~_.._...- UI".t:NI
FREQUENCY LifE "UMAfty IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFA'LUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/"CTU"L EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE 0" Cl\tTlCALITY METHOD PIIEDICTA"LITYFA1LUftE.
.. SECONDAfIlY TIME USED AND METHOD MEI-SUIIANDS.. FAILURE
Joint Leabte: Continue. !turnl"t in thrust chanWer
seill .anti flan,e, .041.r ::~e:~~:~It~:"::~:~r:~~m
t1amate te cult.er seill inl AIse, external fuel
surfaces. Fer ..4.,[er5, I eilkilte from thrust
leakill' WillS lIIue te weltl c~mlter woultl hilve ..
failure. anti the most <oormen effect with le.ko!.
IIrevillent cause WilS the use fCHI any .f the ether
of sef t cO'ller !askets wh i ch com,.nen t s. In that
ililewe4 toclIIue relaxilt len en 1eakil,. of fuel ,resents
fasteners fell.win! hat fire til fi r. h.Jzilr. In the
iln4ll, if fasteners were net ,resence .f i1n i!ln i t i on
reter~uelll ,r Jer te sullse~....., t seurce, with result~nt
a,er~tian. leak~!le resultetl. fire which ceullll cause
Welllletll in ,Iilce i14~pters lIIi1l1lale te en, ioe ~nlll/.r
were allle," en later ather en!line c.....nents,
en!lines to eliminate the the severi ty lIIe,eMlllent an
,raltlem of soft ca"er the IniIlnitullle of the leak .
!lilskets. i1nlll the locilt ion in the
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
.
.,
,
-
·1
•j
.. •
•ENGINE.SYSTEM/COMfl'ONENT E-llTbc!!sr ChamPer Seals A.allters Piscoonecrs---.& fuel Ducts. lines oiInti Fittin.s
y~F
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE
Joint Lukiige Continue.
For disconnects (entine hillf
only). main Cau:ies of
leilkil!e were tlefor~tjon of
selic ane/or "op"et, and
conuminu ion Itetween poppet
.0411I seilt. For fuel t1ucts.
lines, <iIInli fittin!s. the
IIrimuy Ciluses .f leakilge
.il;re uMlertor~ue. '·nuts.
mater iii I defects resul tin!
Frem cilstin! ilntl Ilrocessing
deficiencies, crilcks resul t-
in! from filtisue fili lure.
FREQUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
fAILUIl£. ~
"
EFFECT OF FAILUIIE
en!ine or in the vehicle
com,artment. One other
effect, where leak<ill!e is
from Jines t1irectint
hydr,juJ ic (fuel) ,ressure
for o,eriilt ion .f c.om-
ponents I woul4 Ite the
lIossiltiJity.f sufficient
loss of ,ressure to result
in f~ilure .f these
com,.nents te o,er~te,
wi th censequent JIlremilture
cutoff of en! ine opent ial
or 4II~fIliI!e to en~ i ne i1n"/o
cOffiJllonents.
P.. IMAIIY
FAILUIIE TYPE I 011 I CIIITICALITY
SECQNOAfty
FAILURE
IIEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUIIE
PIIEDICTAIILlTY
ANO METHOD
POTENTIAL
MEASUIIANDS
I-~
~
'-J
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
I--'
.p-
oe
ENGINESYSTEMICOM~ONENT F-I/TurboPl.Imo
?-c:a
fftEOUENCY LIFE ,rUMAIIY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIIE TY~E Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAaILiTYFAllUftE.
.. SECONDAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
.. FAILUftE
II. TIP Se~ I Leik..,e 2f Fill lures lIIIetectetil 4urlnl
1~i1k test Inti cerrective
Ciluse. Ity .i5cre,~t ,11rimiry ietlen [oilien. En!line
fuel sell internill a-rin! ellerat ion wi th this
resu I t i"!1 in LiCk 0 f ,roller con.ltlon. however. ceulllll
O-r i"! silueeze In. con- ...esul t in retluet len .f
sellluen t Iy lew ,ressure fuel flow trem , ..... with
seiltin!l cil'i1~ility. consellluent Imaill."c•• f
,rollellilnt filties In4
effect en eosine etteratier
with ,essiltle tlilffii!le te
en! ine. This fuel Ie."",
is iirectellll te fuel t1rilin
NO i f.14 .inti then te ever
lIe.r. fuel IIIr.ln. Thl s
,resents iii "55 i lila f Jr.
hilz.,tI with consellluent
,essillilfty .f dilJllile te .
en§ine <in.lor ether
c.om,enents.
VIAaLE IN-FLIGHT MONITDIIING SYSTEMS aETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
RTO Thermometer I soto~ Thermometry
Optical Tachometer Isotope Trlcers
Accelerometers Particle Analysis
Isotope S..l Detector .orescoping
Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer Dptiul Proxillity
Torquing
-
l
,
'.
"
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
F...ILURE MODE "'ND C"'USE
F-I Turbopu@
FftEOUENCYI LIFE
Of DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILUfte. %
..
EFFECT OF F...ILUPIE
'ftlM"ftY
F...ILUPIE TnE I Oft I CftlTICALITY
SECONOAfty
FAILUftE
IIEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
•
F...ILUPIE
~PlEDICT"'.ILlTY
"'ND METHOD
--c;/- 7
I'OTENTI...L
MEASUPI...NOS
12. Lulte 'ressure Anomal ies
Lox ltumlll .e~r i oS Jet 'ressl.r
Excess ive
C.use4 ~y restriction of one
or mere lIeilr in! jet holes
with conseljuent relllluction in
beOlrin!l lulle f)owr.te .anti
i ncrelise j n IIIreS5ure .5 notell~.
~estriction WoiloS due te
contaminiltion clo!l!lin!l jet
heJes.
S,eciill c)eilnin!l IIIrecelures
hilve ~en insti!liltellll fer
ens i nes F20'a .an. sulls.
to centrol the incidence
of conuminiltian in this
tire.
4/ One i os titnce resu I tetl in
(IIIremature test cut.ff
w~en Lex ,um, lIei1r int jet
,ressure exceel1ell1 the
rnilximum re.1 ioe villue.
Others detecte. aurin!
review of test ailt .. IiInlll
corrective ilctien Uken.
Preltlliil!latien ef this cen-
lIIIIition ceu)tI result in
Iillck of lulle te lI~rin!ls
wi th resul Unt dil,q,!e te
lIearin!ls i1na mest likely
te ,umlt. Potentiill en,in
shuttl..,n.
ft.estrictetl
flew
Centilminilt ien
Prlffiilry 3. 5
,.tential
2
Inn. Lex ,~ !turin!
jet ,ressure
retll i ne cuteff
lIIIIevice.
f-'
.p..
1.0
VI....LE IN-FLIGHT MONITOPIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES PlEM...PlKSlCOMMENTS
......
VI
o
ENG INE SYSTEM/COMPONE NT F-I/Turltollum, Ic.rln! C~I.nt V.. lve/~In Oxhllzer V.lv&
'P - 'S'
F"EOUENCY LIFE '''IMAftV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIEFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/AClUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTY POTENTIALFAILUfte,
..
SECONOAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS.. fAlLUftE
13. Villve F.i Is to flerform H These fa i 1ures were line in! Pr imary 5 MIA fI,..a-l.aunch
~. Contilmi nilt i.o/Fr iet ion 4etectetl i1ntl c.rrective Contilminoatien ,otent'.1 checkeutactien t.Jken ,rior te 2.3 ,r.cctlures.
F.. ilure to .,en i1t reliluirelll Iilunch. En,ine a,enti."
ap,1 ielll cr.ckin! ,ressure with cleseotl villve. hewcYer
'''used Ity mul ti,le strioition Wl:ullII resul t in loss .f
on the ,o"et i1ssemllly _n. lulle te Itcillrints with
the ,resenc.e .f f inc-Itart \c.1 .\most certain hilure of
contamin.it ion on IM'ltee OInt! lIeilrin!s .n4111 seizure or
gui4e. excessive lIintlin! of lIurnli.
D~miI,e te ,urn, ~na mest
I ikel,;, te ether en,rne
~re~s weuhl ensue.
Hy.r~ul ic "ressur~nt (Fuel) H All of these failures wer
le~ka,e frem O,en Se~uence aetectea durin, ,reLaunch
Villve Aru. checkeut ..na/or leak test
Le.kil,e caul••e cilused .y an. cerrective ..ction .
• amil!!je. , ..rts/seals, tiilken . Sufficient Jeilk..1,
-
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES ~EMAIIKSICOMMENTS
--
'res$or Sensors Ultrlsonic LeakQuartz. Digital Acoustic Hololraphy
F1beroptic Isotope Tracers
Laser, Digitll Pentoxide 'ollrometry
5.A.W., Digita' Hygrometer
Isotope Weir 5pectrometer 'article Analysis
Tunable Diode Ltser Spectrometer Laser Scatterinl
Optical Leak
lorescoping
Differential Radiometry
Opt' cal Holography
-
J ..
,
ENGINE.SYSTEMICOMl'ONENT
lJ
F-I/Tur.,um, learins Coolant Villve/Hilln OxhliJzer Villv.
"
"1)-'
f-'
lJ1
f-'
FftEOUENCY LIFE "'UMAltY ftEACT DETECTION FAILUftE l'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MOOE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUftE TYl'E 011 CIIITICALlTY METHOD l'IIEDICTAIILITYFAILu"e.
"
. SECONOAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUftANDS
"
FAILUIIE
Hylllrilul ic Pressurilnt (Fuel) in thiS .re. , hewever.
Leilu!le from O,en S~uence cOIJltI1 resul t in fili lure tc:
V.. lve Area Continue-' tnnsmit a"e~Wl:te level .t
hytllr<iul ic ,reSSUrillnt te
dimensionill t1lscre,.ncies. GG centr.l villve f.r
conuminuion ••r imttr.,er olferat len when setluence
seill tiln" ret,iiner instilla- y.lve is ilct~te"~
tlon. Wren! size O-rlnt Fililure .f GG te ilctu.ate
seills is ills. ill centriltutlns Ilue te thi 5 lack .f
fact.r te this leakille. hytlnullc ,ressure ..1.11.
,reclulllie further ensine
,remillture cutaff.
Extern.. ) fuel leause illSil
,resents a fire haz,u" In
the ,resence et iIIn
i5nitien seurce with
'055 i It i 1 i ty et lIil1t1i1le te
en5ine. .
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOftlNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSl'ECTION TECHNIOUES ftEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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~_IC
OM~ONENT t-IIMa,n ".Iflue valYe
fPtEOuENCY lifE PfUMAf'lV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILlTYFAILU"E.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
14. Internal Valve Le.kiige 'f These i nei _enees were r·'lIue Pri filii ry 5 N/A 'fe/,l.it test
It. Cemllression .f Sprin! detectetl Itre/(ltOst test relilxtltion ,otent Iill ,.r.ceeures
..04 cerrective icti." M.ter iill 2, 3
Internill .xi.lizer le<iilk.ate uken. Le<il~se .f
fli!S[ the '.'(let ciluse. Ity .iii oxi.izer '''5t the ,."etl
loose lto"et skirt sui se.t. hewever. couhl
.. ssemid y, anti by iI resul t in itO i1ccumuliltlen
lIerfllilnent I y d i stenee com- of exit! izer in the thrust
,ressor r i oS on the ,."e:t chilmlter with conseollJuent
skirt seal. ,essiltility of eet.niltie"
On !,iter en!lines, oil III0'ltet .r severe fire 'It time of
ret.ilt len test was ~lIIIIllell to i!nition.
the v~IYe Ilrilw'nt i1n. iI
vente. seal retainer was
incerporiltetl to control
this ,roltlem.
.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
Ultrasonic Thennometer Ul trasoni c Leak
Accelerometers Isotope Tracers
Isotope Detec tor 'article Analysis
Hydrophone LlSer Scatterin,
Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer , Optical Leak
lorescopin,
Differential Ra'iometry
Optical Holo,raphy
Optical 'r4ximity
Halogen Leak
Flow Leak
Miss Spectrometry
The_I Leak
Torquing
'ressure Decay
-
., .. i
ENGI NESYSTE M/COM~ONENT f~lJ/'1.. in FuellJ.il.hle
y.1 1
~
V1
W
FPlEOuENCY lifE '''IM''ftV REACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MOOE ANO CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILURE TnE Oft CftlTICAllTV METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILlTYfAILUftE.
..
SECONO... ftV TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
.. FAILUftE
14. Internal Valve Leoilk.qe 'f Thi 50 f. i lure mM:e Woil5o 'lil5otic 'ri~ry 5 N/A Itre-test le~k
c. V iltr... tion-$e.it lIietectea _urin! le...k 4eforlnilt ion ,.tent i~ I check ,roceillures
check .iIOd cerrective Vi "rilt i on 2, 3
Intern... l fuel leakilge .ue to .ct ion taken. leillkil!le of
5eoil t mi Soil 1 i !nmen t c.us.e' by fuel It... st the seillt,
particle in i1re. Itetween the however, cou 14 resu I tin
~eat and the 50eillt reuiner. the i1ccumuliltion of fuel
En~ine viltr.tion .ntl fuel in the thrust -chillmlter
flow oilggrilvilte_ the originill areoil with "essi"i1ity of
condition to .Jlow se.l .nd severe fire.t i!lnltion
seilt contilct to .ecelllC: oilnlll diitTlilge to thrust
lI.r9 in. I . cnlilllber ..nlll/er en!Jine.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCQMMENTS
-
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
RS-27 ENGINE DATA
•t - I
f1tS-27/G,.s G~n.e,..~to.r ..---.IjJf"~mI!STEM/COM~ONENT
---_ ..
ffteQuENCY LIFE ''''MAIIY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTlAl
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FA/LUliE FAILUIIE TY~E 0" CRITICALITY METHOD ~RED'CTA.'LITYfAILURE. \< SECONDMY TIME 'USED "'NDMETHOD MEASUIIANDS.. FAILUfte
J. Joint Le<ilk..ilge 21f All of these f.i lures Torljue ftrill'\i)ry 5 N/... En! i ne check.ut
were 4IIetectetl 4IIurin, re 100Xiillt ion I'Otentl~1 ,roce411.ures
a. Hot GoiS I.unch ,re,ar,;)ti.n anti/or Unlllller t.rlllue I, 2, 3
other en!ine checkout H<ilteriill
C<ilused tJy d<ilm.ged/4IIefect Ive ,rocellllures iln" corrective
seOlls, gOilsket$ an.l.r ilc:t ion uken. Hot-YilS
seilling surf<ilces. un4er- leilk_ge lIIurin! en!line
t.rllue••• 1ts or corllue: o,er.tion <illwilys ,resents
rel.xatien on ~Its.. the '055 i1ti I i ty of seve ...e
fire .ntl/.r eXlllos ion. or
ilt "esc. d"~ge [0
OIdjacent hoinllw<ilre.
.
VI....LE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
Ultrasonic Extensiometer
Ultrlsonic Lelk
Luk T~pe/Colting
Opticil Luk
Llser Interfer...try
Different1>1 RldiOlllttry
Ho logrlphic Lelk
Resistivity Monitorln,
Hilogen Luk
Flow Luk
HIss Spectrometry
Thel'lllil Lelk
Tor~uing
lelk Fluid
Pressure DeclY
~
V1
V1
t-'
\Jl
0\
kS-27 Ttlrust Chamlter Tur~ M.~ln Fuel lJalve Fuel Start Tank Fuel lIS Check V.Jlve.
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COMPONENT ,..,el .ant Feet! System Lines, Fittfn!ls, F iRtes " Connectiens
E <:.
FAILU~E MODE AND CAUSE
FReOUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILUftE. "
"
EFFECT OF FA1LUIIE
"UMARY
FAILUIIE TYPE I OR I CRITICALITY
SECONDARY
FAILURE
IIEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILU~E
P~EDICTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
POTENTIAL
MEASU~ANDS
3. Joint le.ilkil,e
II. ,,..,ell ..ot £ lulle
Exteroill fuel leilkil!le
These filii ures were lIIue te
vilrious CilU5e~. tI.,entlent
en the camINoeot ilOt!
lec.Jtion in the en!llne. The
rt,. i mary ciluses CiiO lie
,reu,e. illS f.llows:
Thrust Chilmll.er - T., a-rio!
i1t T/C-te-injel:tor interfilee
f.unt! cut in ewe ,Iilces.
Tur.opump - Scratchetl fJan!e
on inlet el!tow, ,.rosity
threugh .utrent met,,1 .i.t ,Iul
in fuel inlet el~ew.
21f. All .f these f.il i lures wer
tletee telll lIIur I n!J ,re-
launch an" ether entlne
checkout ,rece.ures an.
corrective action taken.
Entine e,eratien ~Ith
external fuel luka!e,
hewever. ,resents a fire
hazar" In the ,resenee ef
an i!"itien seuru. with
resultant fire which
ceul" cause .ama!e te the
ensine an"'er ether en!i".
ce,.enenu. the sever i ty
4le,en"ent en the lIli!ni tu.
of the leak an. the
I.cation in the entlne er
In the vehicle c...art-
ment.
Haterial
"amite
Hilteritill
Contilminatlon
Torollue
relilx.iltJen
Un"e.r terollue
fl'rlmary 5
,.tential
2, 3
N/A Enl i ne checkaut
,r.ceifures.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITO~ING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
...
~EMA"KSICOMMENTS
'.
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
~
fl.S-27/~in Oxi4izer V.. lve. St~rt System '_tr_,ell<ii1nt Fee. System - Ffttlnts , Connectlens
,
c -.:;.
f-'
V1
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FItEOUENCY lIfE ""'MAlty IIEACT DETECTION FAILUlle I'OTENTIALFAILUlle MODE AND CAUSe Of DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E OR CftlTICALITY METHOD ~lIeDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
.. SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
.. FAILURE
3. Joint Leilkilse Centlnuetl 12f All .f these foiilures T.r~ue Prll1Wlry 5 N/A Enl i na checkaut
were aetectelll aur in, relilx<itien ,.tenti.' ,ro,etlures.
EXU.rnill Oxi4izer Le.ki!e en, ioe checkeut Untler ter.. ue 2, 3
(IlIrocetiures <iilntl correct i ve ~terLill
Fill i I ures were aue to act ion [oil ken • Externa I t1i1~,e
scriltchetl/4atnilte4/t1efect i 'lie exitlizer lukil,e aurin,
se<iill s, (IlIilckin, lin./.r en,in. ollerilti." ceu1.
sui iog surface ••r te un4lller result In lIessilile fire
torfllue or t.rque relilXiltion hilzartl iIIn. lIII~,e to
on .elts ~nll/or fittin!ls. en!ine ~ntl/er ether
en!ine cem,enents.
Possilile t1~ITliilI!le to
a.j~cent ~r.are alse
ex i sts 4ue te the
extremely lew tem,ertlture
ef the leilkint exillizer.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
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c·l(
TurNllum,PO, l...eNI
FREQUENCY UFE "UMl\ftV REACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OnNTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE 0" efltlTICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILUIIE.
"
SECONOA"Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILUlle
II. Turilo,uffill Seal Le.k.il!e 12f Fai lures tleteetel "e/"5 TorllllJe 'r imary 5 N/A En! i ne check.ut
iIIn. c..Hective ilcthm WillS relaXiitien ,otentLal ,r.c••urasC.used Ity lew or relilxelll tilken. CenUmin.ation 2
seal belt t.rques f lII.miI!•• In i.tllti." te tne serieu Hilterlalsea 15 i1ntl/or mat in! r In! tlilllli1ge
surfaces. seal riO! net eo,loe/vehicle .~,e.
seate4- ,r.,erly. forei!o which cault! .ccur lIue te
miltertal Itreven.t:'in~ c.r"on excess I ve leilkil,e,
nase seiltint flush. ceulllll .1II]ilcent h.utlwilre ,.ulll
• 15. result from inltlill ills. It. Mrmetl •
,ressur. sur!e ..ollll/or stilrt
trilnsients t1isplilcin! cilr""
oose.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IElWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTIONnCHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
RTD Thel'll1Olll<!ter Isoto,e ThennometryOpticil Tichometer Isotope TncersAcceleromet!rs Pirticle AnllysisIsotope Seil Detector loresclpi n,
Tunible Diode Liser Spectrometer Optical 'roxilllity
Tor4luin,
,;
~
"
;
C :.-
"-5-21 Turbo,um,. FAIU l,Luick-Discennect
~nUII"~~ I.., I ~'''''''',""I.II ....,.~"'I
FReQUENCY LIFE 'RIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E 011 CIIITICALlTY METHOD ~IIEDICTAll L1TYFAILURE.
"
SECONDAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANCS
"
FAILUIIE
12. luile 0 i sc:re,anc i es 2f loth of these fill I ures we Tertl u• Primary 5 N/A (fi! Jne check.ut
were tleteete" "uri"! re I~xati.n ,.tent 1.1 ,r.ce~ures
External lulte lea~ge cause. en!ine check.ut IIrocelkJre I'liIterLillI 2, 3
Ity unller tortllue or tertlue ana c.rrective action l<i1ma!lIC
re I aXil t i on on i-nut. <in. Ity uken. Since the lulle
thl~!e. se.l/sea 1in! surface for the 1l5-27 is ill
mi xture of fue I anti a
lultrlcant i111t1itive
(contilinetl in the FAiU)
the effects af externill
lulte leilkil!IC woul" lie the
silme as f.r fuel, wi th
the ,.sslltiIi ty .f fire
In the ,resence .t lin
i!ln i t ion source anti con-
seflluent ,.ssillillty.f
dilma!e te en!ine ~n~/or
other en! i ne cem,enen t s.
.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
f-'
V1
\0
......
0-
o
ENGINESYSTEM/COMitONENT 1\5-2] M.. in Oxitlizer Valve, St,art System anllll P'r••elli1nt Feet! System - Fittln.s 'Connections
c:- G
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE
FftEQUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILU"E. %
...
EFFECT OF FAILUftE ,ftl....fty I I ftEACTFAILUftE TY,E I Oft CftITlC"L1TY TiMESECOND..fty
FAilUfte
DETECTiON
METHOD
USED
FAILUftE
,ftEDICTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
'OTENTI..L
MEASUftANDS
14. Internill Valve leilk.i,e
iI. Canuminilti."
Internoill Oxilllizer leilkii,e
Six of the hi I ures were
HOVor fuel lilt seoill l~kilge!
llIlue te leQl izetl '!OIte seal
Ii, weilr resultins frem
rou!h finish cantliti." en
!late sea I ilnlll/or untlers i ze
.r eccentric Ii, seill 1.0.
The other fil i lures eccurrell
en tlrain f1juick t1isc.ennect
villves as .. resul t of
centoilminiltlon trappe•
• e tween po"e t .loll .Seill t.
8f All of these f.ililures
wc:re t1etectetl t1urlnl
en!line checkout ,r.celliure
~ntl GerreGtive ~cti.n
uken. InterniJl oxillifzer
or fuel leilkiJ!e tlurin!
en!line .,eriltion ceuilli
resul t in lMS5 ilile fi re
h.z..re ilne UmiJ,e te the
en,ine iJnlli/er ether ensin
comjtOnents. Possilile
t1iJtrliJte to iJ_U.acent hiJri-
WiJre iJ I sa exi sts iue ta
the extremely lew
tempenture af the leiJk-
in, oxilliizer.
Terflue
re I oiIXoiIt len
Untier tartlu.
",.. tarLil
llIloimase
fir Jll'lillry 5
,.tentiiJl
2, 3
NIl. En! i ne. check.eut"
,r.celliures
VIAILE tN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS
Ultnsonic Thennometer
Accelero~ters
Isotope Detector
lIydrophone
Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer
ot
IETWEEN FLIGHT INS,ECTION TECHNIOUES
Ultrason; c Leak
Isotop. Tncers
hrticle Analysis
Laser Scatterin,
Optical Leak
lorescoping
Differential lIl~iDmetry
Optical Holo,raphy
Optical ,roximity
lIalo,on Leak
Flow Leak
Mass Spectrometry
Thennal Leak
Torquing
Pressure Decay
••
ftEMAIIKSlCDMMENTS
'i
•e-/
o~""I:NI
FfteOUENCY LIFE PftlMAftY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUftE POTENTIALFAILUftE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUftE FAILUftE TYPE Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD PftEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECQNOAfilY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUftANDS
"
fAllUftE
14. I n Cern~ I V.I 'lie le~k.ge 2f I.th ef these h 11 ures Hiiteri.1 P, imilry 5 HI.. Entine checkeut
c. Viltriltion Seat were tletce-tet! .urin, ltre- Viltriltlen ,etent Iii I ,rece4llures.
test il04/or ether COline G.llln! 2
Leak4!!1c Past Oxil1izer PO'lict checkout ,rece.ures I OInt! Contilminilt ien
.nll/or IcllONS corrective action Uken.
Lc.k4te ,i1st iIIellows (it Eo,ine 0lleriltlen ilt these
u"er Lox iIIe 11 OINS en. II ieee ccntlltions cculll result
iIIn. ltellows sCill welt! jaine) in excessive axitllzer
C.use. illy lecalizellll ,ear Itui 14u, in system !trier
Ijuill icy weJ4 weilkenetl tv te ilni tlen ilnllll entry .f
COline viltriltion i1otl/or fuel. <in./or possiille
therm<il sheck. comlltin<itien ef Lex <ind
Lejlkoilge Itilst lJolJlJet tlue to fuet Cn GG centre' v.lve
lJ0ltlJet hun!l olJen from ,rior heus i n!l, ei ther of which
test tlue to !I<ilil i n!l of Lex ceul~ ciluse severe tlilmie!le
p0ltlliet <ind IT'IiiIItin!l botly .ere, to GG ilntl/or en!line.
lJr..... 1Y cilusee by meta II i c
centillrlinilt ion lotl!lin!l
aetween ,elJllet ilntl lItore.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOftlNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES ftEMAftKSlCOMMENTS
f-'
(j\
f-'
I-'
0\
N
I!:.£
ICO VJr"UNCNI ';:a-U 'SolarioD lneels Va'ves
FfteOuENCY LIFE 'ftIMAPlY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE I'OTENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF OfSIGNIAC,UAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAILU"E,
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANOS
"
FAILUftE
14. Intern~J Valve leilka.e Ilf AII of these h II ures wer Centilminiltien Pri mil ry 5 N/A Entine checkou~
d. Tril~,et1 Pressure tlqtecteli "urin, ,re- Dynimi c jtOtent lal ,r.ce.lureslaunch count.~n/chec.k.ut I, 2, 3
lI.everse Leilkil!!le Thr.ugh intl/.r ether check.ut
fte.untlilnt Check VOilves ,roce.ures, ilInti correctivl
Due te the effect .f i1ction tiken. The effect
surhce lIi1lna!e cilusellll ltv. .f this failure ciln Ite
in. the unseat in! ten.eney ~ui te vilriilltle. tle,entlent
chancteristics .f. en the mil!ni tutle .f the
con tim i nilo t5 emae.detl in leoilkilge <inti the time .f
the Teflon a-rin! seills ef occurrence.
aoth v.ill ves. Oilmil!e mast
I
likely from self-!eneriltetl
fr"ett int weilr tlue te
cNlUerln! or unstil_le
olllcrilt;on 4Iurin! lew-flew
I
Iller i.tls. In seme instilnces
it 15 _eJieveti thilt the .
hilure WilS cilusetl .y low
VIAIU IN-FLIGHT MONrrOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKs/CDMMENTS
,
-
t
'.
~ENGINESYSTEM/COM~ONENT ~S-27 !.Qlotloo Check V.lve.
•
E-']
~
(j\
(.,.;>
fReOUENCY LIFE PftlMAftV IlEACT DETECT!ON FAILUIlE ~OTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUftE FAILUIlE TY~E OR CRITICALITY METHOD ~ftEDICTAIiLiTYFAllU"E.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILURE
Internill Villve luk~e
Cent i nuetl
I
,res5ure seille. lie tween the
lIo"et anll the 5,r i"!II
retainer 4urln, the
,revious 0lteration. kee,in!
the sprin! cem,resselll anll
oiIllowin!ll reverse leilb,e.
Trans,iriltien .f fuel va,lor
,accross the check valve
INIPpet from trall,lellll fuel
i 5 lie I i eve" te h..ve lIeen
also noted in same inst.anC2
"ue to ex,.sure to fue' fer
extentletl Iter i••5 .t time.
.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITORING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIONTECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
..
,
-
......
0-
,j::-
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COMPONENT ~S-27 fJneuITliltic ItI!!.ul.atnl'"
6/0
FftEOUENCY LIFE '''IMAfty IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE DR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
15. fte,u Iiltar 0 Iscrep~nc i es 5f One of these hi II ures Contilmin'ltlon II'r ilnilry 3. 5 Inst. Chart ollserver
fte!luliltar-out fJressure re~ul tell in IIre~ture oimens ionill potent Lill cut.ff
test cutoff when re!ulue 3Hi,h/Erriitic
IIressure s,iketl in excess
Coiusell Ity centaminilnt of retll ine cuteff. Th_
('i1rtieles) tril"e. lie tween other faur instilnces were
the lIilll iiln. reuiner seoit 0 tletectetl t1ur in! ,re""test
the IOiltler i1ssemllly (,rollilill ,neum.tltic control system
tlue ta i niltle"uiI te c I un i"!1 checkeuts OlIn. ,.rrective
anti conuminilt ian contrel) iletian tilken. It is
antl/.r Ity 51 ivers tem,.road I unl ikely Chilt i1ny
wetl!etl ~etween lo~lIIIer se~t cense~uence woul tI eccur
anllll bere of housin! ret~rdin ~s the resuJ t of thi s
IIi ston movement turin! tYlle .f ftll Jure .f iI .r.
lIIIyn~mic Olleration. On_ criticoilll noillture th~n
inst.ince w~s the result .f a ensine cutoff.
com~ination of II tiscreltant
(overs i ze) , i sten anllll unllller-
.t.r~uet screw .ilnllll ,ralle of
the re!ul~tar valve creatin!
a lellk 'i1th ilround the pack-
in! anllll thru the threads.
VIAIU IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
"
Tunob1e Diode Loser Spectrometer U1 trlSonf c Leok
Isotope Weor Detector '"rticle Anl1ysis
Opticl1 'Leik
Differ_nth1 Ridfometry
Hl1o!en Leik
Flow Leok
MiSS Spectrometry
Thel'lllll Luk
'r_ssure DeclY
-
'. •
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
THOR ENGINE DATA
t-'
'"
'"
ENGINESYSTEM/COM~ONENT Thor/Thrust Chamiller Assemltlv
[= -
FReaUENCY LIFE '''IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE ~TENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUftE FAILUftE TY~E Oft CRITICALITY METHOD ~ftEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUftANDS
"
FAILURE
Z. Coolilnt Pilssilge leilkil,e 7'f Locilllze" fire in ene Haterial IIrlmlry 3 Inst. Oills.rver cut.f.t.
7.'~ c'l'se, en .utshle .f thrl.5 Structunl ,etentl.l Pre/,.st test
Leilkill!e CilUSd illy tulle ch.ilmiller cilusin, ,remature Stress Z checkeut
ru,tures i15 resu) t .f cutoff anti leilkilles corr.sien ".callures
1oeil) i zetl everhe.ilt in" t1etectetl t1urin, ,re/,.st Hl!h
tletoniltion .antl/.r teU checkeut ,r.cellllures. tem,erilture
insufficient .rilze ,enetn- EOlioe .,encien with
tion ilt tuills-ce-en" rint external fuel ISilkate
jaint, inter,r.anulilr presents iI fi re hilzilnl
cerr.sien iII"tI em.ritt)ement iIIn" '.55 i.le llIlecruse 1n
t1ue t. the ,resence of hi!h per f.rfl'lillnce. The
su I ,hur c.m,eun.s in cem- ffiiI!nitutle .f the Jeilk wil
lIioiltion with hi!h eperiltin! tIIetermine the severity .f
teffijleriltures with resultilnt the ,erfel"milnce less ilnll
tulle crilck5. splits iln. the 1l~le t. enl i ne
,inholes. hiirtlwilre.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKS/COMMENTS
'ressure Ultrasonic LeAkQUirtz, DI,itAI
Flberoptlc Acoustic Holo,rAphy
liser. 0; r1 ti1 X-rAY RAdie,rophy
S.A.W., 0 gitil 'AlIII1i RA4i ogrophy
UltrAsonic Thermometer (Flime) Pen tox i de Poli.......try
UltrAsonic Flowmeter (Nozzle) Hydrogen Pohrometry
Pohrometer Hygrometer
TunAble Diode Laser Spectrometer (Mixture RAtio) OptiCAl Pyrometry
Hologrophlc Luk
Mi lllmeter-wAve InterferOl\1l!try
o.
e
~ &
- -z-
A,.lv/Ct Ch.ilm~er AThor ITITEM/COM~O"1:;1'1' • , ....... 11 U:J :J:JCIII.IY/U.~ uellC' a\,ur o"\~:JY
f'UaU£NCY lifE ,,,IMAfII;Y IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE Of DESIGN/ACTUAl.., EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E Oft C.UTICALITY METHOD ~IIED1CTAIILlTYfAllU'\f.•
..
SECONOAI'IY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANOS
'"
FAILUftE
J. Jo i ot Le.kagc 27f One .f these h,i lures (en H.teri.) Pr Imilry 3 lost. Oltserver cut.ff.
Hat GilS 2 .il t the thrust choifUier) Structur.1 jtOtenthlil Pre/,ast tcst..
resul tetl In ,remilture Hi9~ I, 2 check.ut an4
Thru:;t Chama.er leilkoigCl due en!ine terminiltion, while tem,cuture insltectlen.
to damil!etl or d i sere,ilnt the lIlill.nce WilS detecte4
."sket ina/or ,ort. "ur i"!I Itre/,.st test
insufficient .roize .Iloy check.ut ,roce.urcs.
penetriltion oit exit rin!l-to- Hot .oiS I ukil!lc ill wilyS
tube joint resul tin!! in presents the IIiossiltii ity
SUbsequent ,r~,ks er tuae ef severe fire ~n1i/or
sep.rllitions. explos ien ~zilrli lind
GilS generilter le.kilge is Ii.ffillige to ..lijilcent
C~used Ity dillTlil,etl seill s. ~rliwilre.
gilskets er fliln,es. tortll.le
rel.xatien of 1t01[5.
.
VIAILE IN FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
Ultrisonlc Extenslometer
Ultr.sonlc Leok
Leok T.pe/Coitln,
Optlc.l Le.k
Liser Interferometry
Dlfferenthl R.41ometry
Hologriphlc Le.k
Resistivity Monltorln,
Hilogen Leik
Fl .... Leik
MiSS Spectrometry
Thenl\ill Leok
Torquing
Leok Flu14
Pressure Deely
-
ENG
......
'"-....J
.....
0-
(Xl
,=. B
tN(jiNt .~T~ I t:M/l.UMrUNtN I 'tyacrYic!o"S tn.tOe >".systems ! InC!! ttttlo9S & Seals
FPlEOUENCY LIFE "UMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OES'GN!ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oil CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIIUTYfAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS.. FAILUIIE
3. Joint Leilka,e 43f five of these fililures Lew tartlue Primilry 3 Inst. Oltserver cut.ff.
~. Pro,e J I iIInt , Lulte 4.47~ re~u I tetll1 in IIremiture Milterial ,otentJid Check ".ut oiiIntl
termlnilt ien .f test Ity C.ntami nat ian 2 I "Sileet fan.External Ox hi i zer leiiitok.i~e f rent Itunker a.server when Fati!ue
These hi I \.Ires were .ue to si!nificilnt Lax leilkoil!e Structurill
var ioys causes, tlellemlent on eccurretl~ TIttlO instances
the c.,..nent i1ntll1 location were in the Lax hl!lh
in the en! ioe. The ,rl... ry ,ressure .uct area. twe In
the ilrea af the lniIin laxcauseS c.an lie trouliH .ilS
v.ilJve, .anlll the other infel Jows:
Thrust Chamller - Inner lIIome the TIC Lex _me ire.il.
.04 inlet eJ'ow-te-lIIIome Mit In .illIItUtien, one test W.il5
unlllertertluelll. III i screll.ilnt tleJ.ye" tlue te Lox luk.1se
w.ilshers "revent in, ,rOller lit the Lex stilrt tilnk vent
se.ill ins lit Lox lII....e inner vlilve. A seventh inst.ilnce
aolts, in.a.e~u.ilte finish en .. illl not result In ill
se.ilIII1S surf.ace of inner lIIeme ,remliiture cuteff. lIIut 14
1001 ts. secenlll 5 Ii ft.r II Iannelli .
en,lne cuteff II Lex-rich
VIAILE IN·FL.IGHT MONITOII'NG SYSTEMS IElWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
-
"
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"
..
ENGINE.SYSTEM/COMPONENT Tiler/V.. , jous En~ ioe Sullsystems, L fnes, f i u I "!IS , Sea 15
•
,~ • l{
.....
'"\0
fl'-EaUENCY LIFE '''IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE POTENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE QF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIIE TYPE D~ CftlTICAllTY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAllUftE.
"
SECOND"ftY TIME USED ANDMETHDD MEASUIlANDS
.. F"'ILU~E
Joint Lea"'-!e Continued fire was nete. in the
Tur-bo,urn! - Excess rernev.. 1 cur.loe exhuast .uet are..
.iIIn. uneven .ui I.-u, .f 'ry The refOil in i"! h j lures
film lulle lIetween inlet were _eteete. !re/tluring/
...iqlter .el t he.tls an. lIost test anti lIIIur in! ether
~Sl1er5 resul tint ;n checkout iln. test
in..lIlelluilte seal in! .f O-ring ,r.ce.ures anti c.rrectlve
due [0 ITIiIrred surface .iIIn. actien taken. External
oen-uniform con.ition it oxiiizer leilkilte .urin,
seiill in! surf.ace, inlet enline o!efacien ceultl
i1l1l..,ter-co-e IHW 9i1sket result in ,ossi.le fire
t1~ma!ed/t1efec:.tlvel un t1er- hilurtl iln" 1IIIII~",!e to en!in
t."fluellllll .0Its. i1o"/or other en!ine
c:.om,onen t s.
G.G. Il.llllllle V~lve - DalMte4
seil ..od/o,. seill in, surfilce
of Lox-side villve C:.ver
IIhte. .
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOlllNG SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKS/COMMENTS
-
f-J
--.J
o
ENGINe.sVSTEM/COMitONENT Ther/Vilrious En~ine Sulitsystems, '-Joes. fl!~_!~-'5 , Sul5
F· '1
FfteOUENCY LIFE PftlMAftY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
fAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE Of DESIGN/ACTUAL EffECT Of FAILUIIE FAILUIIETnE Oft Cft,TICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILUIlE.
"
SECONO...ftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Joint Le~k"ge C.ntiouell
Start T.nk - Untlert.rtlueli ,
fittin!s ilntl/or 1a.1ts.
a-rint lIilffia,elllll .r im,r.,eriy
installetl, lIIIilmil!etl pilckin,l
imlllro,er lulle i1p,1 icatlon i1t
fi II heatl-te-atla,ter coonee'"
tien, t1efective seillln,
surfilce i1n1U.r 'i1ckin!l at
tank heo1l1-te·orlfice fittln!
aefective Iilsket/fl..n,e
ailma!le iletween Iitollly anll tlink
heil". scriltcheli seili/sealin!l
surface at It.ttam CiI,-tO'"
Iitotly matin, surfaces••r.ken
Ii, seill at vent ,ert seal.
.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN fLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
-
.. "
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~NENT
..
J.int Le~k"4e Contlnu~
..
r- {;
~
-...J
.....
FfteOUE,NCY LIFE PRIMARY IlEACT OETECTION FAILUIlE ~TENTIALFAILUIlE MOOE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAJLUftE.
"
SECONOARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANOS.. FAILURE
Jeint Leilkil,e Centlnuetl
Hilin OXidizer Villve -
Cr..ckell/s~lit seill ilt villve
inlet illl./or eutlet c:antilllj ..
n.ition at villve sh.1ft seals
i1llewin! leilkate lIetween
heusin!ls. A15. Cilusef. Ity
cracketl/slIJ it/c..fniI!le. seills
ilnll/or Iilskets. untlert.r~uellll
aolts/l"nuts. scrilltchellll
dillTloil!etl! seill in, surhces.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKs/COMMENTS
f-'
-...J
N
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/lox StirJ: Tank 'QPtstr~---.l.,inl!~l:inlllS& Check Valves
f- -1
F...ILUIIE MODE "'ND C"'USE
FReQUENCYI LIFE
OF OESIGNJACTUAL
FAILURE. "
..
EFFECT OF F...ILUIIE
PIIIMAIIY
F...ILUIIE TYPE I 011 , CIIITICALITY
SECONOAIIY
~AILUIIE
IIE...CT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
F...ILUIIE
PIIEDICT....ILlTY
"'NDMETHDD
I'OTENTI L
MEASUII NDS
Extern.. I Oxi"izer Leilkil!e
Cont i nuellll
Cause. Ity C.ilst in! flaw in
surhce of fittin!. unllller-
tor~ue relaxation lIIIurin!
0lleriltion en fitt'n!ls/•• Its
"-nuts, excessive illtpl iCiI-
t ion of Lox IUle on Q-rioss
,"Ickin!, faulty a-rin! or
improlter insulliltien ill:
flex hose-to-~nif.14
cennecti.n, 5criltchu/
.iI~le. seals iln./or S~ Ii rw
5urfilces, use .f rulilier
a-rin! iiln" iI suntlartl 11055
it ultstreilm en• • t check
villve.misill isnment .f ItOS5
center line.
121 f
12. 5i~
These fil i lures ilre
pecu I tilr te the ties i tn .f
the Lex ...tsuillI system
i1ntl may not lie iI,,1 icaltle
te the eng i ne un_er
eVlilulitlen. lIlut ~re
Inclu.e4 4ue te the un-
IIreee~ente. numlller of
hi lures lintl the lIetentilil
c.onse~uenees involve...
AI I ef these flillures wert!
tleteete4 4urin! jlre/,ost
tes t anti other checkout
an4 Ins,ectlen ,roce4ur.s
an~ cerrectlve act ion
Uken. Externli I Ieab!e
of exl4Jzer tlur In! en!ine
ejleratfon, hewever, iillwilYS
,.resents the jlessillli I ity
of fire ~ziilr~ iilnlll lII.amage
Hater I iii I
T.r~ue
rel.ilxat ion
Oimensieniill
Pr lmiilry 5
tJetent Iiii I
2, 3
N/A Checkeut an4
Ins,eetIe"
jIlrece4ures
VI....LE IN-FLiGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS
..
'ETWEEN FLiGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES
•
IIEM...IIKSICOMMENTS
..
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM'ONENT Thor/Lox St~rt r.ok Ioetstriil, Are., Lines, Fi ttlQ'~ & Check Viillves/Turllo,utnp Assy
tJ;
~-g
;-'
-.J
W
fRE~UENCY OES1G~:A~UAL ""MARY "EACT DETECTION F... ILU"E I'OTENTI...LFAILU.. E MODE AND CAUSE OF EFFECT OF F...ILU..E FAILU..E TYPE 011 CIIITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICT....ILlTY MEASUIIANDSFAILURE. % SECONDAIIY TIME USED AND METHODto FAILUIIE
Externt11 Oxi4 i zer Leiilki!e te en!line ii1nll/or other l1aterlal ~r1mory 5 HI'" 'elltOst tastCont inuell cem,enen ts. Oimenslonill ,.tentl.1 ,recetlures
2, 3
Externill Lulie leilkiil!le If AJI .f these failures wer
0.13a deteetell lIIur in, ,re/,.st
C..uselll by scriiltches/sllght tes t ,recellures iilnll
lnocnut ion ilcreSS sullo! cerrective iilctr.n taken.
f<ice of crush w<ilsher. sn..,- 5 ince the I uille f.r the
rin! lIIimensionill error Thor ,um, teiilrs iilntl llei1r-
resul [int in seill Jeilkige, intS is iii mixture .f fuel
5cr.tcne. seill in, surfice, iIIn. ~ lu.rlc~nt •••Utive
".m.,etl Iii sket. (cent.ine. in the FAIU).
the effects ef extern. I
Julie leiilk.,e _u14 lie the
Silme i1S fer fuel with the
,ossillility of fire in th
,resence.f tiln i,nitlen
source iiln. cense..uent
.
,055 i Ili 1i ty .f tI~ma!le. t.
en,ine iln./or .ther en~in
VIA.LE IN·FLlGHT MONITO"ING SYSTEMS 'ETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES ..EM.....KS/COMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/Vari.ous En.ine Sultsvstems. Lines. fittln.s " S~ids
f -1
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE
FIIEQUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAl...
FAILURE. %,.
EFFECT OF FAILUIIE
PIlIMAllY
FAILUIIE TYPE I 011 I ClIlTICAllTY
SECONDAIIY
FAllUIIE
/lEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUIIE
PIIEDICTAIILITY
AND METHOD
I'OTENTIAL
MEASUIIANOS
3. Joint LeaQ!le
Irli. 'r.,ellirlnt' Lull.
External Fuel Leak.a,e
These fall ures were lIIlue to
vilrieu5 causes, tlellentlent en
the COffiltenent anti I.catien
in the en!line. The Illrimilry
causes can lie ,rou,etl illS
f.llews:
Thrust Chamlter .. O-rinl at
thrust chamber-t.-inject.r
jeint eut .f ,r••ve f.r ..
1II1sunce of 12 11 lIIue te
impr.,er insulloatlen ,r."
celliure, .am.~etl/ilefective
O-r i",.
Turbo!ump " ltiIln Fuel Valve'"
uefective/.ama!le. seills.
4]f4."" Two .f these fill luresresu I tee In Itremature tesr:
cut.ff lIy ._server lone
.ue te fire on euui.e of
thrust ch~mlter ilnd the
ether te sultsUntLil fuel
leilkil!le ilt the 'lnjec:.ter-
te thrust chilmlter inter-
filce. The ether 45
filflures (the milj.rity ef
which were in the thrust
ehilmlter il reil) were
lIIeteetelll lIurin!l ,re/,.st
test Ins,eetlen ilnlll check
eut ,recelllures itntl
eerrective itctien t ..ken.
Ensine e,erilt len wi th
externill fuel leilkil!le,
however, ,resents il fire
hilzilrlll in the ,resence ef
Hilterial
Structural
Terttua
relaxiltion
Primary 3
,ot.nt 1111
2
Inst. Oltserver cut.ff I
checkeut an.
ins,ectle"
VI"ILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS
.,
IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
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IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMflONENT Ther/V~r ious En!dne SU.5Y5te~~!.-lInes. Fitt In!5 , Seills
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FREQUENCY LIfE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAliSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE DR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Joi nt Le~k.a,e Cont Inuellll itO i!nitien seurce. with
Lines, Fittin!s , Seals - resultant fire which ceul.Ciuse lloi11lU!. te en, iReSeven I puntures Ity shar,
otnlll/er other en!line cem-
ents of dillnil,ea ·lInl. in
,enents. the severi tyinner surh:ce .f flex he5., 4e,enllent en the ma,ni tUllllei""re,er mat In! .f flex hils.
.f the leilk ilnll thein oi"te. Als. CillJse411 Ity IOGilti." in the en!line erlow tor~ue er relilxilltion .f in the vehi de compilrt-
terlllue aurin! .,erat ion en
ment •
..its/l-nuts, ...m..!efl'
lIIIefective seills anti/or
!askees.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Th.,,/TurltnnulM a" .."'mltlv
f. 'I
FREQUENCY LIFE P11IMARY II£ACT DETECTION FA/LUliE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONOARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
5. Hi!lh Tar..ue. T/Pi Ilf All of these fa II ures Iln4ln, Prlmory 5 N/A Pr.II••5 t teU
C.use4 ~v ~in4In! ef sui 1.143' were lIetectelli .url"! ,reI T.'4IIu• petent'.' Inspectl." InllilIost test inSllectfon ~nll rel~XiIti.n 3 checkeutc~rHn lIIIue te com'-ust Ion
checkeut ,r.cetlures .ntl Oyntlndc IIr.cetlures.
,ro.uets in .retl. ruitlllin!l of
c.rrective i1ctlen uken.Iilltyrinth se.I, 51"ht Enl ioe .,.rilt len it these
shIftln! .f 2n. st_le nazzle
canliltl.ns caul4 resultdurin, operation eue te In ,,..,tlstltlen of the
untlert.r ..ue .r torlilue
reltlutlen en nazzle reuln" ,r.ltlerl te ill stl,e where
Inl screws. retlucetl ,~ eut,ut caultl
.ffect thrust eut,ut or
ether .-oi tare. It.r.meter
with resultilnt Itremature
termin.ltlen .f en,ln•
• ,1erilt ien.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
liTO Themometer Isottpe ThennemetryOptic.l T.chometer
Accelerometer Isltepe TrAcers
Isotope We.r Detector '"rticle An.lysis
Hydrophone lorescop! n,
Ferromognetic Torquemeter Opticil 'roximity
Tun.ble Diede LlSer Spectrometer Te~uin,
~
'. '.
•ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thorl0xidi~ tliqh Press.ure Oue-t
..
FAILUIIE MOOE AND CAUSE
FftEQUENCYI LJFE
Of DESIGN/A.CTUAL
FAllUfIliE. %
"
EFfeCT OF FAILUIIE PlllAAAIIV I I IIEACTFAILUIIE TYPE I 011 CIIITICAL,TY TIME
SECONDARY
FAILURe
OETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUIIE
PIIEDICTAIiLiTY
AND METHOD
I'OTENTIAL
MEASUIIANDS
7. Cr.ck, Convolutiens
leI lows
CraCKS in convolutions .f
oxilllizer high pressure lIIuC[
due to fati!ue, coltl
won.. in"ltrililll .ltrilsion, iIInlll
mi stl'licch of eJllow-to-hose
joint.
IIf
.lIn
Si!niflcilot lox leOilkil~e
cilusea in seme instances
in ,relJ'ijl[ure termin.tion
of engine 0llJer.tien.
Extern.1 oxilllizer leilk.oig
coul. result in lIJossiltle
fire h.urd iIIn. lIIi1mil!e t
en!ine iAn./or components
It coullll i1lso Ciluse
freezin!l of control. tub
or fuel 'ines leiilli'in! te
IIiremillture shutlllown of
the eo,ine.
~teriill I llrimary
filt i gue
Con tilm i nilt i 01'1
3
potential
I
lost. Oltserver cutoff I
,re/,est test
ins,ectien ..n.
checkout
,rece.ures.
t-'
-...J
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'.'IAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS
Pressure Sensor
Quortz, Oigitll
Fiberoptic
l.,er, Oigitll
S.A.W., Oigitil
~TO Thermometer
Acceleromet~r
Hydrophone
IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
Ultrasonic Flow
Isotope Thennometry
~emn.nt Mosnetiutlon
Iorescopi ns
'enetrants
Optical Holography
£xo-electron £..Isslon
'osltron Annlhlhtfon
flectrlc Current Injection
£ddy Current
IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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ThorfEn~A5~emb1vSTEM/COM~ONENT
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FReQUENCY LIFE "UMAfIIY /lEACT DETECTION FAILU/IE POTENTIALFAILU/IE MODE AND CAUSE OF OES'GN/"CTU"L. EFFECT OF FAILU/IE FAILU/IE TY~E O. C.'T'c..lITY METHOD ~/I EDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
.. SECOND".Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASU/IANDS.. FAIU.fIIE
9. .e~r i"t D~ma,e 'f Two of these foa i lures Interference "rifTlilry 2, 3. 5 Inst. Thrust •• server
Due te lIetiring mal functian O. '2~. resu I teli in jIIremiture Conumimu:ien ,etentlal cut.ff
cuteff of test Ity the Dimensien.l Iresultint in excessive thrust eltsenler 41.1.e t.tor4llue an" cense4lluent decily in en!ine thrustre.yet ian in Itum, eutput. level, with dlilM!le te the
las generator an. curltin
In the .thar instances,
thrust lIIIecay was noteli
'ur in! test an" IIOst-test
corrective actien taken
t. reme.y the .1 sere,ant
cenllli t lens. Cent inuetl
o,.rAt fen wi th tletillY in!
thrus t. however. Cell 1.
result in ciitiistrelllhic
dillM!je te eng Ine i1nlf/er
vehicle.
.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MDNITO/IING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES /lEMA/lKSlCDMMENTS
Optical Tichometer UltrlSonic FlawIsotope Detector Isotope The_tryFiberoptic Detector 1sotope TracersRTD Thermometer Particle AnalysisAcce1erometer Iorestopi "'Hydrophone Exo-electron EIIis51.nFerromagnetic Torquemeter Positron Annlh1htl.nExo-electron Detector E~~y CurrentTunable Diodeliser Spectrometer T.r~uin9
.. ..
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT
..
Thor/TUfkl,UI11Jt A5Setll~ly
'"
r . l'l
~
-...J
1.0
ffteOUENCY LIfE PIUMAIIV IlEACT DETECTION FA/LUliE POTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAILURe,
"
5ECONDAftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILUlle
11. Turlto!ump Seiil F~ilure "f Four of these f~i Jures T.'ljlJe Itr Irrlilry I, 3 Inst. Chilrt ••server1.97t resul ted in ,relhoitur. rel~Qt 'en ~.tent iill cutoff
Pri~ry oxi4izer 5ei11 test cutoff lIy c.h.n Cent..minilti. 2
hi fure cOiused ay lewor ehserver when primilry Oynilmic
rel.xed ~eill 1101 t torques. Lox se.a I tem,eroiture
sl!jll shim crim,ed or ether- trop,e. Itelew real ine liS
wi:ie .ilmii!e~. llI.ll'IiI!etl Lex evidence411 tty Lox se,al
seiil _nd/or miltin! ring. c.iivity linin line temp-
mit j"9 surhces of carNo erilture .el.w iieee,c•• le
sui an. seill rin! net I imi ts. One ether
se.t.et lJrOjJer iy, foreign inst~nce resu'te_ in
~ter j~ I lodge_ lie tween '.ncell~tion .f test ~t
carillon flan!!e ';10_ ffioiIting the control center for
rin, ,reventin!! carlton nose the s~me re~s.ns. None
from seiltin!! flush with of these five f~ilures
Olilt in!! riO!!. Coul_ also resulte4 iii ;Jny en!!line
result from initi.1 ,ressur d.mil!!le, hewever ,one
surge .nd/ar st.rt other insunce of lIelew-
.
tr.nsients in Lox Itump narmill Lox seal .,.ain
iispLilcing carlton nose ef temperilture _id not
VIAlLE IN·fLlGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
~TO Th~rmomet~r Isotope Th~nnometry
Opt Ic.l Tichometor Isotope Tnc~rs
Accelerom~ters 'articlo An.lysis
Isotop~ Se.l Oetoctor !oroscoping
Tun~ble Diode lis~r Spectrometer Optic.l 'roximity
Torquing
f-'
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/Turlle,u.., Assemltly
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FREQUENCY LIFE Pf..MARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE DR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURe
Priffiilry Oxillllizer Sea) vi.late relil ioe ~ut. ene
F<ili lure C.ntinue~ sec.n. after ,lanne.
eosine cut.ff. the
seal from ~tin, rio,. turtao,um, ex,lo4llelll
cilusin!l extensive lIIIamale
te the r.cket en,in.
assemlllly. The ether 5
instilnces were «etectetl
IIre/,ost test .011
carreceive actien taken.
In athHtien te the
serious eosine/vehicle
tlama,e which ceuld eccur
t1ue t. this cent'iti.n,
..4jacent \ ines/h.r.....are
cou I tI ~e rentlered
ino,erat Ive ltV freez in,
t1ue to the extremely
.
coltl tem,erilture .f the
leakln, oxililizer.
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FREOUENCY LIFE ,,,IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DeSIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE OR CftlTICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIJlITYFAILUftE,
"
SECONOAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILURe
12. Lu~e Pressure Anoll'lil ies If Some til i screpilnc i es Con tim i n.. t i en PrImary 3 I .... leilrint tem,-
. 13~ resuL te. in ,relM[ure ,.tentlill eril[ure .mtl lulte
Ex.cess i ve temlter.ture .ntll terminiltion of en,ioe I ,ressure mon i tef
increilsed ,ressure reeor.e. operation illS oil result .f relll ioe cutoff.
coiuselli by res tr i ct ion of either moo i corell te,.-
lullle flow to one or more erilture or ,res5ure
luae jets resultin, in excee" i 0' rellli i oe
increilse in rec.rded conti i t ions. Cont inue"
,ressure .ntl/or oearin!l operlicion ii' these levels
temperature wi II iIIffect tur.opu..
h~r.ware and per forn1iince
..nd will le..d to gear
~n./.r ae.ring f.i lure.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMI'ONENT Thc'lr ITucbnuumn
~
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/Turlto,um,
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FREQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE Of DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
.. SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD ME~UIlANDS
.. FAILUIIE
Lulie Itressure AnOlJ'li lies if DecilY .r less .f 1ullie Contoiminiltlon 'rllnilry 3 tnst. Olts.rver cut.tf
Cont i "uet .ia flew, if of sufficient Structur.1 petenti<il
tluriltien, will lei. te I
OecilY or less of Julie h,i lure ef !le.rs. lteilrin!J
pressure ciluselllll Ity .ltstruc-
.an./., unceu,d In! .f 'Lmll'
tlon in the "etective tlue te curltioe shift
screen .are••r Ity shurln, f.flure, with sultsequent
af the I ulte ,um, tlr lve shaft ciltilstr.,hic f.d lure .f
the en,lne. Aelliine
cen.itl.os ciluse ,remil""·
termination of en!ine
operiltien en test stilntl
with miniffiill tlillI'IiI!e.
.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIl"S/COMMENTS
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FREOUENCY LIFE ,,.IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE ~TENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TY'E Oft CRITICALITY METHOD '11 EDICTA.I LITYFAILURe.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILUftE
14. Internal V~lve le.ikil,e 50f This f.ailure is ill s,eclill Dynami c fl'ritr\illry 5 MIA Check.ut i1nlllll
.. Conumin.t len 5.I"t cilse, ,eculiilr to the Cent.min.-tion ,ecential ins,ecci."tlesig" of the G.G. 1ll1.i4le Milteri.1 I, 2, 3 IIr.ce.ures
Fuel leoilka~e ,<ilst G.G. villvc ••ut is inclullllle4 fll.l.5tic;
Itl.lie villve sCill (jue te due [0 the I.rge numa.1'" Def.r~tien
carINo III ew-a.ck f rem com- of f .. i lures ilntl the
.usc ion ch.maer ilt terminil- ,.tenti .. ) conse~uences
tion of ,revious test involve•• All of these
resuJ tint in conUmin.itjen fili lures were tletecte4
ef seill/se.J in! $UrfilCe, eur in! lire/post tcst or
scr.itche./lIIIIilmil!elllll fuel Itlilt1e other checkout/ ins~ect ion
linll/or SoCIiJ. low spots in IIrece.ures oiIn. correct ive
seliJ resultin!! fram surge i1ction t.ken. If
,reSSLJre anll dyn.mic IOildin!! si!!nificilnt leilkil!!e
of ~Ilille at en!ine cutoff. occurre. in thi s ilreil
lIiscrc'ilnt sIIrin! resulting .urin!l en!line stilrt
in insufficient lo•• in!l .f se..uence. i1ccumulilti.n of
.liI.e agilinst seill. fuel in GG com~ustor
.
caul. result in cx,losion
i1ntl severe .i1ffiilge iit the
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS aeTWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
Ultrosonic leok -Ultrosonic Thermometer Isotope TricersAccelerometers
- '"rticle AnolysisIsotope Detector llser ScotteringHydrophone Opticil lukTunlble Diode llser Spectrometer
aorescopin!
Differenthl Ridiometry
Opticil Holognphy
Optlcil 'roxlmlty
HII_gen lelk
Flow Luk
Miss Spectrometry
Thel'lllil luk
Torquing
"'Pressure DeelY
f-l
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ENGINE SYSTEMICOMrONENT Ther/Gi1Is Generiltor Ililtle Villve
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FReQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE roTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAl. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TyrE OR CRITICALITY METHOD rllEDICTAIILlTYFAllUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED ANDMETHDD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Intern. I Villve leilka,e introtluction of Lex ilIn.
Continue. inithtien .f GG i!lnltien
Alse, since the ,rimilry
R'IiInifestiltion .f this
hilure is fuel leilkil!l.
trem the 4Ilulck I1lscennect
i1It _attorn .f GG, exteroill
fuel leilkil,e ceullll result
In fir. i1ntl pessiil'a
dilffiil!le to en!line ilIn..l.r
ether cOffillienen ts.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITDIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTIDN TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
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•ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/flressure Re.ul ... tnr
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FREQUENCY LIFE '1IIMAIIY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE I'OTENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE all CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILITYFAllU"E.
"
SECONDAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILUIIE
Internal V~lve le~k.a!Je If Five .f these hi lur-es Interference rr imary 3 Inst. Chart ••serverCont ioued o.ln resultell in "emacure Contilmin.atien cutoff
cuteff .f test lIy chut Villratlon
<• Vi.ration ollserver. It is unlikely
Al so cause. fly ~n!l-ujIJ of th,iI( .any cooseflue-nee
lex check Viii ve t1ue te would accur OilS the result
rull.er a-riO! cilicchin, of this ty,e hilure.f
iletween It0IJPct shouleer ilIn. iii oore critical nature
SCiit anti tem'.f.ari Iy hohlitl! chilo en, ine cut.ff.
,o,pet e,e.n, initiiJtelllllly
villriltion from en!line
a,e-utian.
A. series-retluntl.ant check
Vii I ve Will 5 a.tle. to the
Lox check villve t.
aJ levi.ce this '1I".~'e1I
effective En,. 4822 &
Subs.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITORING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKs/COMMENTS
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!rocHn,loe ,sserollV
FftEQUENCY LIFE PftlMAftY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TyrE Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD rllEDICTAIILlTYFAILUI'IE, SECONDARY TIME MEASUIIANDS
"
USED AND METHOD
"
FAILUftE
I ntern,,1 Viii ve Leoilui,e 4f This cenumlniltlen is .. CentamJniltl.n Prlmilry 2, 3. 5 Inst. OIIS.rver cut.ff
Continuetl O.4IU systems ,r.~lem with Overllres5ure ,etentlal
<II. Trilll'IIetl Pressl;Jre ,,<;r;rious jtessiale effects. IT~ of these f.i lures
Fuel centilmination .f resul tett in ,remature
,neumilt Ie system oint! Lex test terminiltlen, ene Ity
sUrt tank Cillusellll ltV fuel the et\!IIine re!Uliit.r
flow ,ast retlunlllloint fuel ,ressure chart altserver
sUrt tilnk ,ressure check when retul.illt.r out
villves. This reverse flow ,ressure exceetletl ru II ne
~5 .ue to lew ,ressur. the other when i10
lIei"! tril"etl in check valve ex,losion occurrellll In the
s,rint cilvity. helllllint tile ilrea af the Lex start
check villve IN"et in the tank. The ether twe
.,en ,es it ien. Fuel then instances resuitellll in
hilllll i reverse flow ,ath to sitnificilnt increilse in
contaminate the ,neumatic the fIIneumiltic system
system ilnllll the Lox start ,ressure lIIIurint test.
tank thr.u!h the. re!uh,tcr. fol h~"int whic.h carrec.tivi
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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FReQUENCV LIFE PftlMAfty IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUftE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oft CftlTICALlTY METHOD plIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
'"
SECONDAfty TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
'"
FAILUftE
Intern~1 V~lve lC.i1kate .icC '.n WAS tiken te
Cont inuell return the iny.lve~
systems te re_ui rell
A sultsequent fix te 0lleriltienilI uiln.,nfls.
,revent [hi 5 fuel The cenSclIIluortces .• f Chi 5
cont.i1minil·tion was malic cen.itle" .f .a fuel-
Illy dri II in! iI 1/4" hele contamin.JCelil system ..nll/.
in the llownStream enll c.emp.nents teul4 Ite
• f the S!lr i n! CiiSC. extremely hazar••us •
whic.h resultelll in
etllua I i u [ ion • f Itrcssure
lt~tw~en the s,r int clivi ty
anll the I j nos .nd ill lowell
the spr i"9 te return the
,oppet te the cl.sc4
,.sicien oIS rClIluire4.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSpECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Thor/Pneumo,ic Control Assy
f ?c
fftEQUENCY LIfE ' .. IMAltY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE O~ CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIiLiTYFAILUftE.
..
SEeONDA~Y TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
.. FAILUt\f
15. fteauloilt.r Discre• .ancies Bf All .f these foI i lures C.ntilmi n.at ien "ri~ry 5 N/A Check.ut oiIn.
Foililure of oxidizer stoilrt 3.43% were .eleete••urin! pre- Plilst Ie ,atent iill ins,ectien
tilok pressurizin! Yillve to lilunch checkout ;jollier lIeformiitien 3 ,roce"ures.
close c..use. Ity forei!ln other ins,ectien -.n.
checkout ,racetluus ilnd~.rticle5 in centr.1 ,art
corrective action tilken •
• re. Itetween voilive iln«ll Effect .f this f.allure Is
orifice. plu!!in! or restrlc- to .allow Itleetl .own .f
tin! control ,.rt orifice
vehicle/missi Ie IIottleilnd pre\lentin, valve fr.m
,ressure ,ilst the villvefully reclos"in! followin!
which ~5 net reclese.lox st~rt [~nk vent in!. followin, vent in, of theCau hi ill so lie ciluselllll lIy
oxil1izer sUrt tilnk. If
a-rio!! deformiltioo in thi s eccurrel1 te i1ny sull-
Viii ve.
stlint iill l1e,ree followin,
en'!line lIlootstril' epentier
insufficient Itottle
,ressure ceu 111 resu Itin
hi lure t. ,r.,erly
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
Tunoble Diode Loser Spectrometer Ultrasonic Leok
Isotope We.. Detector Porticle Anllysls
Dpticil 'Lelk
Differenthl RI~iometry
HIlo,en Lelk
Flow Lelk
Hiss Spectrometry
Thel'Dlll Lelk
Pressure DeelY
i. '. ...
•ENGINE SYSTEMJCOM'ONENT Thorl'n~~t Jc Control .lssv_
'"
r.::: ,(
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FREOUENCY LIFE r'''MARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF OES'GN/ACTUAC. EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAllUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS.. FAILURE
~egul~cor uiscrep.ncies c.ncre' m.in ,ro,el'.nc
Centinuetl "illves .n. GG contre'
valve .. Premo.ture
terminiltion .f en,ine
.,ene ion ceuhl resul t.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKSlCOMMENTS
FAILURE SUMMARY SHEETS
ATLAS ENGINE DATA
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT AtLas MA-] & I'1A S/Thrust ChiltUer
'"
G .1
FAILUPIE MODE AND CAUSE
ffteQUENCY\ LIFE
OF DESIGN/A.CTUAL
FAILURE. "
"
EFFECT OF FAILUPIE
'''fMAftV
FAILUPIE TY~E I Oft I CPlITlCALITY
SECONDARY
FAILUftE
PlEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILUIlE
~PlEDICTAIILITY
AND METHOD
~TENTIAL
MEASUPIAN DS
2. Coolant Itassilye lCilikilge
Fuel leakil9c ciluscli ltV tulle
ru~tures (,roitilbly the
result of lacill izea explo-
sions within the tulles).
insuff icient penetrilltien of
br.ze .Iloy i1t tuae-Ce-r i"!1
joints .in. lie tween tutes.
inter!lf.nular c.rrosien i1nd
emllr i tt lement aue te
presence of hi!lh sul,hur
cem,ounds (,resumilltly from
the fuel) in comain.tion
with hi!lh .,erilein! temp-
eratures with resultant
tube cr.iI,cks. 5,1 its .nlllll
,inhales.
105f All of these fili lures
were tie t~c tetl .ur i"!1 ,reI
jlost tesc chec~uc <iIIn«
ins,ection proce4ures .nllll
c.orrective .cti.n uken.
En!ine o,eriltlon with fue
leilka!e ,resents Ii fire
hil:l.ar. in the ,resence .f
an i!nitioo source, with
resultant fire which
cOlJld Ciluse 4i1m;)ge te
en! ioe an410r other
en! ioe com,onents. Sua-
SUntiill retluctl.n in
fuel flow !lack to TIC
i nj ec t.r cou IIlII CilUSe H/R
imilillance with ,ossillilit
of premature cuteff.
Mitteri.1
Inter!C"4'nuIOlr
c.rros ion
Hi!lh Tern,.
Pr ltniry 5
,.tent i ... 1
2. J
H/A Pre/llOst test
,race.ures
......
'"......
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITORING SYSTEMS
Pressure
QUlrtz, D1!iUI
FiberopUc
LiSer. Digitll
S.A.W •• Digi til
Ultrlsonic Thermometer (Flame)
UltriSonic Flo_ter (Nozzle)
Poh.rometer
Tunable Diode Llser Spectrometer (Mixture ~Itio)
IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTIQNTECHNIQUES
UltriSonic Leak
Acous ti c HoI o!rlphy
X-ray ~ld1ogrlphy
GIII1l1i ~Idiogrlphy
'entlxide 'ollremetry
Hydrogen ~ollrometry
Hygrometer
Optical 'yrometry
Holographic leak
Mi 11 inleter-wa.e Interferometry
PlEMAPlKSICOMMENTS
l-'
\0
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT At 1~5 liA"'3 , KA-S/Thrust Chilmlter. GiS Generil ter t ExhilU5t Systems
FREQUENCY lifE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANOS
"
FAILURE
3. Joint Leiki,e 7,f fai lur.5 were "eu~tellll T.r~u. Prl ... ry 3. 5 Inst. O.s.rver cut.'f
.. Het Gas .urln, ,re/,.st test relauti.n petent 1.1
,r.ce4ures an" checkluts Materh.. I. 2
Due te under-t.r~uetl M Its antll c..rrective actien ""miI,e
.r tortlue relax.-tJon en tilken. "'t !il5 leilu,e Viltratien
"'1 ts. 4i1mase.414ef&tlve f1uri", en,ine .,eriltfen I'laterf.1II
seil Js. !Ii1skets I i1ntl/.r illwilYS ,resents the
seal in, surfaces. ,o5siltllity.f severefire IIntll.r ex,leslon .r
at lIest .alUsa te lillljilcen
h.lIrllwilre.
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
UltrlSonlc ExtensiQlll!ter
UltrAsonic Luk
LeAk Tape/CoAtln,
Optical Leak
LlSer Interfel"Ollletry
Differential RA.iometry
Holographic LeAk
Resistivity Monitorin.
HAlt,en Lea k
Flow Leak
Mass Spectrometry
Thennal Luk
Torquing
Look Fluid
Pressure DeCAY
III
'"'
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT At I~s .-.A-I _&---.M.=5L Se.'ierj J £01 i De SuisY.5.1..em.S.
..
,-- . "",
.....~ -
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE
FREQUENCYI LIFE
OF DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILURE. "-
l'
EFFECT OF FAILUIIE
PRIMARY
FAILUIIE TY~E I OR I CRITICALITY
SECONDARY
FAILURE
IIEACT
TIME
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
FAILURE
~IIEDICTAIILlTY
AND METHOD
POTENTIAL
MEASURANDS
3. Joint Leilkilge
It. 'r.,ell.nt & Lulie
Hydraul iC$
Ox i. i zer Ieilk.,e eue to
scriltchee/tl~getl/"efectI ve
seills. Itiu:kin, i1ntl/er seoilol-
in, surhces. or t.
ina.e.. ~.ate tor~ue or tor.. ue
relilxiltien on 1I01t$ ..nlll/or
fi tt in!s.
51 f These failures resulte.
in Itremature en,ine cut-
.ft lIy .lIserver lIlue t.
oxillizer leilkil,e. The
other f iI i I ures were
lIetecte. lurin, ltre/ltost
test checkout ilntl ltro-
celiures i1nll ,.rrective
ilctien tilken. Externill
.xitlizer lelikil!e lurin,
en!ine .,eriiltion ,.uld
result in ,assilile fire
hilzilrtl anti t1i1ma!e te
en! i ne ilntl/or other en, inl!
comlt.nents. Possil.le
• .am.ag« t. iI.jilcent hilrl-
w.re ill so exists tlue t.
extremely low tem,erilture
of the leilkin! oxitlizer.
r.r..ue
relilQtlon
Untlert.r .. ue
Stress
corr.sien
Filtl!ue
Contilminitl.n
Hilteri.)
lIIII"ulliI!e
Primary 3. 5
,.tentlol
2
Inst. Ollserver cuteff.
I-'
'"W
VIAILE IN· FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IElWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
t-'
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At I 011<;; 11A-~ & MA-·i1S~verill En. ine Su~sv~item~EM/COMro,
'''''.''.
FftEQUENCY LIFE '''IMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE rDTENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TyrE DR CRITICALITY METHOD rllEDICTAII LITYFAILUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANllS
"
FAILURE
Jeint Leilkil!le Centlnuetll 31f 20 .f these hd lures Untllert.r~ue Prlm.ary 3 Inst. a_server cut.ff.
~. Pr.,el hnt I; Lulte. result9 in ,remature TOfflue ,.tenti .. )
en! Ino cut.ff Ity elaser-ver relaXiitlen 2Hytlraul ies
aue te fuel leilks i1t "0- Hilteriill
Fue I Ieilk..,e caus i"! cutoff ,ellilnt line finin!s. tllilffiiI!le
foil i I ures were the resu I t .f The ether til i 1ures were Hilter iill
I..se line fittin!s. mest tletectetl.lIIIurln!l ,(e/~st
likely lIIue te untlert.fflue .r test check.ut ilntl .. r ....
terllue relilxiltlon. Other cellllures. iIIn. c.rrective
fili lures tlue te sen.echetl. ;Ie t Ion [.ken. En,ine
t1i1mi1te4 i1n./.r lIIIefectlve .,er.. t ion wi th extern. I
seills. , .. skets. ,ackin!ls fuel leilk.i!le ,resents.
iln./or seal in! surhces. fire h.z.rtl in the
,.r.sity le.ks threu!h pilrent ,resence et iI" i,nit Ion
metil) in fli1n!les, tenlue seurce. wi th resulu,nt
relilxilti.n er unlllertor4llJue on tire which cou Ilit e-use
nuts ••• Its anlll/or flttln!s. ....1l'IiI ,e to en! i ne ~n4/.r
ether en! ine ce,..nents.
.
the sever i ty lIIe,enlitent on
the ll'IiI!lnitu4e ef the leilk
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKs/COMMENTS
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crU~INC O)T;:)I t::M'\"U...,rUN~""1 ITIaS [14-1 lj M'piOe"era' Enlioe '>".sysrems
FREOUENCY LIfE '''IMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF F... ,LUIIE F"',LUIIE TY'E 011 CIIITlCAL'TY METHOD 'IIEDICT.... ILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FA'lUIIE
Joint Le~k~!e C.ntinuetl anti the lecatien in the
en!jline .r in the vehicle
corn,tartment
.
VIA.LE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INS'ECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
f-'
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT At/.s 11A-3 , 11A-51 Turbep..." Lu~e 011 P...,. Lines' Flttln,s
G --
FREQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
... FAILURE
3- Joint Le~k.ile C.ntinue. 41f All of these f<ililures r.rtlue PrlNry 5 N/A Pre/,est test
were tletectell t1ur 1"!1 ,rei relix.atfen ,,",tent/.I ,ree••ures
~. 'r.,ellint '" Lulle ,est test checkeut intl/.r Untlertef41UC It 2, 3
Hytlr.aul ies ins,eetlen ,r.cetlures iiln. ~teriill
carrective icti.n uken. .i~le
Lulie I e..killes CilUSH Ity lew The ,re.ltest lIan!er in
torlllue .r tarlllue relaxition en,ine .,.ratien with
en lulle 1 ine fittio!s i1ntl/.r leilkale .f lulte oi I is
ser ews ane Ito 1t 5 t lIi1mi11tetl/ the ••ssiltflity .f
lIIefective seills antl/.r sufficient less .f lu••
seoil inl surfllce5 in lulle all .i I to affect ,r.,er
,um, .r turlto,um,. lIIIilmiI!elllll lultrf':;i1tien ef !ears an4
4efe.:;tive 'i1sket i1t therm.o. ltearin!5 in the tur~um,
cou,le in5t~1 lilt iens. Sheu 14 this hil"en •
• ffects ceullll lie
cilUstre,hfc.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
'," - ...
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Atlils rtA-3 & MAo-51 Severill En,ine Subsystems
•
G· "I'
f--'
\0
'-J
FReQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE I'OTENTIALFAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
'"
SECONDARY TIME USED ANDMETHDD MEASUIlANDS.. FAILURE
3. Joint Le.koi!e Continue. 25f All .f these failures were ~terilil PrilUry 5 NIA lire/post test
II. Prallell.int " lulte, tletectetl .ur in, (ltre/,.st t1~,e potentiill ,r.cetlures
Hytlrilu lies test ,recetlures iIIn. Tor~ue 3ins,ect ions, oint! corree" relilxilt ion
Hytlrilul ic le<illkilges Gause. Ity rive iletic" taken. Contilminiltjon
tlilmil!elll/tlefec.t jve aoorio,s. SI,nlficilnt hytlrilul ie
seills ilmUor seillin, surfiM;e , leilkilte ceult! .ffeet the
untlertor~ue or tor~ue eper<iltion of one or more
relilxiltion on screws, ~Its centrel villves (e.,.iII".I.,.. fittin!ls, contaminil- servo vOilves) with vilriou
tion Itetween ,o"et oin.tl seoit effects depen.ent on the
of hy.uul ic ,oickilte rei jef milltn i tu.e of the Ieilk oiIn.
"illve. In .ne C41se. the the lociltion in the entin~
mount h.les were to. shoilll.w system.
to ,ermi t mount screws to
,u II servovill ve ••wn on f oice
of hy.lr.iul ic ,.ick.i!e to
.i1ttillin ,ro,er a-ring seoil in,
oiction.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT _M 1.>-1!A-3 • !1A-5/I=iIoJIumo
c.:; ~-
fREQUENCY LIFE P'UIolARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OES'GN/A.CTUAl.,; EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CllrrlClILITY METHOD PIIEDICTAtiLITYFAILURE.
"
SECONOARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANOS
"
FAILURE
S. HI,h Tor!ue IOf AII .f thas. filii lures I nterf.renca Primary 5 NIA It,e/,est test
were t1etectelllll "e/,est rer_u. ,etentl.1 ,recelllllures.
CiUS•• Ity 5eill rulll.'n! shaft test lin4 carrective r.lilutJen 3
of the •• Iilnce ..ssem.ly 4ue .ict Jon t<ilkeo. Enl ine tcot.minic'."
te shift .f 5e.. 1 i1nll nazzle
_lIerilti." .at these c.n-
wi th ,es,eet te shiife anti .titians ~ul" result In
rNInif.14. turlline nozzl. ".,,,,ation .f the
loese (t1ue te t.rl(ue relilxa- ,r.lliela te Ii ,..int where
tlen on reuinin, screws) rellucetl ,urn, out,ut ceul4
iln•• in.in, en turlline wheel i1ffect en,ln. thrust
secon. stille nezzle level .041.r .ther
hltyrinth se~1 rultltin, the IOIIn i toretll ,~rilmeter5 wi th
se~ I Ianti of the secontll resul tant ,remature
5 til,e whee I • Coultll ills. Ite terminiltlen .t test.
Cilusea Ity Itlntllin, .f seill
Cil r".n t1ue t. comaus t I.n
,r.tIIuct$ in oiIreil.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
RTD Thermometer Isotope Thel'lllOllletry
Opt le.l hchometer Is.tope Tracers
Accelerometer P.rt1cle An.lysis
Isotope Weir Detector lorescop1nl
Hydrophone Opt1,,1 Prex1mity
Ferromignetlc Torquemeter Torqu1nl
Tun.ble Diode Luer Spectrollleter
o. ...
~ 01
c;·9
tlils HA-l/HA-l)/O.lti4Izer Hiah ttressure DuctEM/COM~ONENT
"
FREOUENCY LIFE PRIMAPlY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFAILURE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E 011 CRITICALITY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIiLiTYFAllUfte.
'I SECONOAfity TIME USED AND METHOD _MEASUIIANOS
.. FAILUfte
7. Crack-Con".lut ions 12f Externill exillizer leilk- Fati!lue PrilDilry 3 Inst. O~server cuteff ..
iellows ilge .urln, en!ine Viltntien ,otent Iill
o,erillti." c.uld result "oiterLilI I
Extern,,1 exillllizer leil~!Ie in- ,ossiflle fi re hilzilrllll lIIIe!lriulilc ien
WilS _ue to crilck in the wi th liIIilrM!le te the
oxidizer hi!lh ,ressure ensine ilnllll ,.ssillli I ity
Itellows. The hi Iures were .f freezin!l contrel ilnd
aue to filtigue <iiln_ werk. sensin, 'ioes with
hilr4llen i"!1 i nllucelll ily flow resu I t i"!1 ,relDilcure
.... i.rilt ion. termintltlen .f engine
.,eriltion. Dellen.in! en
the m.i1!10 i tutle .f the
leilk. en!line mixture
r,atio shift mi!ht result
le•• in!l to en!ine ,er-
formance t1e!ludillt ion.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
Pres5ure Sensor UltrASonic FlowQUirt,. Digitil Isotope Thermometry
Flberoptic Remnant Ko!netlntlon
Loser. Digital Iorescopin!
S.A.W •• Digiul Penetnnts
RTD Thermometer Optical Holo!rlphy
Accelerometer Exo-electron Emission
Hydrophone ~ositron AnnihIlation
Electric Current Injection
Eddy Current
I-'
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NE SYSTEM/COMPONENT 1:\tliiS MI-3 & M'~"'",,"lQp!lmp
FPlEQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY
"e"'CT DETECTION F"'ILU"E POTENTI...LF"'ILU"E MODE "'ND C"'USE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF F"'ILU"E F""LU"E TYPE Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD P"EDICT....ILlTYFAILURE.
"
SECONDAfty TIME USED "'NDMETHOD MEASU .....NDS
"
FAILURe
,. leitri", D~mi,e 2f teth ef these f.llures Cent.amlnittlen Primary 5 H/A Chart ells.rvittie"
were tletectelll lIIurln! test Hilteri .. 1 ,.tentJal Visuitl
Coiuselll ltv inci,ient 511.d lin 010111 c.rrect Ive ..ctlen I r 2, 3
OIolll/.r sUllerficial we.. , [ ..ken ,.st test. Entin.
i1ssoc:iiltellll with the I • .alll .,entl." wi th hith lIIur-
track, insufficient MOllllo! in! tem,erilture ceuhl
.f itearint cOIle wr.a,. result tn 1I.5Silllil1ty.f
lIeilrin!l/teilr lIIi1tn1te iIInlll
cense..uent ".amate te ,una,
i1ntl/or ether en, ioe
cem,onen t 5.
.
VI....LE IN-FLIGHT MON'TO"'NG SYSTEMS .ETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES "EM"'''KS/COMMENTS
Opticll T.cho~ter Ul trlsonic FlowIsotope Oetector Isotope Thel'lllOmetryFiberoptic Detector Isotope TncersRTD Thermometer Plrticle AnllyslsAce!1erometer
"rescopin,Hydrophone Exo-el ectron Enlfss ionFerromognetic Torque~ter
'ositron AnnihilltionExo-electron Detector E44y CurrentTunlble Oiodeliser 5pectro~ter Tor~uin,
<.
..
- .
"
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SubIE-At las HA-3 & HA-5/S_"''"'''''~ ~ '''' I ... ,.." ........'.,..-V."~I" I ... v ..... _ ..," • _ ____ r_~_.....
FfteQUeNCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAl. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE Oft CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILlJ..E.
..
SECONDAftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
.. FAILURE
II. Tur bOllum" Se~ I Le.illk..ge 'Sf 30 .f these f.11 ures r.rlllue Prilury 3. 5 Inst. Oaserver cut.tf
Ox i 411 i zer leoilk."!Ie resulte~ In ,.rem.ture rel.illXiltlen ,atent'a'
eosine cut.tf Illy .lIserve, Untlertorllllue 2
Seill dr.in le.k.il!e is from t1ue to oxitllzer le.k"!Ie. Stress
the r/~ ,rimary lox se.illi. The .ther fall ures OJ .f carr.sien
inti is the result .flow which were TIP Lox sui Filti!lue
or relilxetl s~.iII1 ••1t tor4lluc .ril in c.illvi ty leilu!le) wer Cent.mlmlcl.n
foreign ffiiltcrLiIll letl!letl .eteete. tlurin, jlre/,lost Hilterl.l
'etween cilraon fJ.an!le .iIIn. test checkeut .n. IIro- ".rule
m.iilltin!l rin!. matin! surtoicc cctlures. ,anti corrective
of c,arlton sc,a I lin. se,a I r in oiction t,akcn. Oxitlizer
not scate. proltcrly. Othcr lc,akii!c within the turlto-
--f.ai111res t1uc to scr.atchclil Itwnlt ceultl resul tin
4amill!!le./dcfective se.als. possilltlc mixin! with lulle
piickin!!l ,an./or se.. 1in! ,anllll cou ItI ferm .an
sllrhccs. exit I0$ i ve !e I. O,afna!e
coulllll occur te en!ine ,an.'
or cn! Ine compenents iiS a .
result of lIIIeton,ati.n.
Pass illtle TIP .erf.rm,ance
de!!lr,a.~tion.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
ATD Thermometer Isotope Thel'1l1Ollletry
Opt i c.l Tochometer Isotope Trlcers
Ace!!1erometers 'article Anllysls
Isotope S•• l Detector lorescoping
Tunable Diode Laser Spectrometer Optical 'roxillity
Torquing
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMrONENT At I.s HA-3 , HA-S/Tu."'''''
G . Ie.
FReQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE roTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAl EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILUIIE TyrE OR CRITICALITY METHOD rllEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONOARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
12. Lu~e Pressure Anemalies 21 f 3 of these f. i lures Centi;minl.tien Primary 3 Inst. Oltserver cut.ff.
resulte. in ,remature M.ilteri .. I ,.tenth"
Lulie ,ressure var i iIt Ion test cut.ff IIV olls.rver I, 2
ciJuselli ~y contiJminoitien in when lulle manif.l.t an41.r
Iulle jet .ri f Ices iJoli/or lIear in, jet ,ressure
,ressure retlucer fittin,. .".,I,eli .clew retllline.
ernt i c eut,ut of 1ulte 0 i 1 The ether tid lures were
punt, 4ue te ru,turelll rurt.er tletectell 4urint/!N'st test
se,aJ. i1nlll ,.rrectlve iJctien
t ..ken llri.r te 5ullSe~uent
test in,. O,er.t Ion at
low lulle pressure ceul"
'''''iI,i1te int. turN,u"
fil i 1ure .tue t. inil.~uilte
lull,.fc.. ti." .f ,eilnt
~e<ir i ntS wi th c:.nse~uent
f<iilure <in. extensive
4i1IUte t. en, ine an4ter .
components.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSrECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
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t1~s MA-3 & NA-5/0ll:illllizer lDotstr.... Ch~clc. v... lv~...~.................... '." .................... ,.. ~
FReaUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYfAILUftE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANOS
"
FAILURE
13. Voir",C fOlils to ".rform 2f One .f these hi lures loterterence 'rimary 3 11I1ll. KiIIinsu!e
o. ,..isture, Ice resulte. in ,relUture test "'~t.ri~1 Ilmi ter cuteff[ermiotlcl." ltV the rqin- I lIIIevlc••
Fai 15 to fully open tAue to Still'8 limiter tIIIurin! stillr
Interference It.tween late tnnsient. Ot her fold Iur.
i1n. 5e.[ resultio! frem resu I tet! in .. ltn.rma II y
..ttverse cen.itions (meisture slow !lui IdUll .f thrust
ice) ••n. cilusint !Ii1te Assy Itut not sufficient t.
to hint-ult in iI ',iIrtiillly i1ct; Yilte cutoff. It is
o,en ,osition. Fili lure .f net likely th,u the effec
v,alve to o,.en fully .Is. .f this hilure would Ite
utriltutelll te stiff sprin!o of,a more critic.i11 nilture
thilo IIremiiture en! ioe
cuteff i1S n.te4.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSlCOMMENTS
P'rl!ssor Sl!nsors Ultruonic Leak
QUlrtz. Digital Acoustic Holography
Fiberoptlc Isotope Trocers
Laser. Di,1uI Pento.ide Polarometry
S.A.W•• Dt!lta' Hygrometer
Isotope We.. Spectrometer Pirtiele Anilysh
Tunible Diode Laser Spectrometer Lisor Scottering
Dpticil Leik
lorescoping
Differential Ri~iometry
Dpticil Holography
N
o
w
N
o
~
G- ):(
Atl .. IIA-) , IIA-S/He•• Suppression (H.s.l V.lvo
~1""III'''1I; ~I~'.''''''''''''''''''''V'''''''''
FREQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTIDN FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAl. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD ,IIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE. ,. SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS,. FAILURE
14. Intern.al VoiJve Le~k..,e H All .f these failures lin. In, Primary 5 N/A Pre/,.st test
were lIletectetil f1ur 1"1 ,reI Cant~in~tl.n ,.tentlal ,ree.lIlures.
iI. Contaminoiltien ,est test inSllectien ,r.- 2, )
ce~ures ilntl correct Ive
Itesults In stlckin! .r 11'0111- ilctlon taken. Filst .,eo-
in! of shaft an.l.r tate .•r int an.I., cl.sin, .r
hant-ulI .f .ther mevin!l hilure te .,en.r clese
,uts in i1ctuiltor assemilly. at re'lui relll time in the
en!llne sefluence ceu I II
resuJ t tn err.lieeus
oxlllllzer1fuel mixture
ratie which ceullil result
in ,rematur••otine cut-
eff. er ,es51~Illty ef
en,lne aolll/or ' ..anent
t1am.ate lIlellen.eot on timin
l1n~ severity .f f.i lure.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
Ultrasonic The_ter UltrasonIc Leak
Accelerometers Isotope Tracers
Isotope Detector
,artfcle Analysis
Hydrophone Laser Scatterfn,
Tunable Diode Laser S,ectrometer Optical Leak
lorescopfn,
Of fferentfll Ra4fometry
Optleal Holo!raphy
Optical 'roxfmity
Halo!en Leak
Flo. Leak
Mass Spectrometry
The....l Leak
Torquing
'reuure Decay
«
ENGINE SYSTEMlCOM'ONENT
..
AtliiS 1iA-3 & liA-S/Gil5 Gener<illtor
..
..
c~- II
N
o
VI
FREQuENCY LIFE '''IMAftV IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE ~TENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE O~ CftlTlCALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILlTYFAILUIlIE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILU~E
lit. I nternill ViiI ve Le.ilkilye 5f One of these f iI j lures Interference 'rilTlilry 3. 5 1II1II Hilinstilte
Conti nuetl resulted in ,re~ture J1i1teriill ItOtentiill I imi ter c;uteff
Contilminilt ion termin.tion of test by 4alllOl!e 2 eevice.. the mainstilge limiter
Oxi;izer !joice vil~ve IUk.-,e when the entine fili led te
cutoff WilS ciluse. by pieces i1tuin norrn.. 1 Itoetstril',
of Lox 'i1d (shilttere. lay The other ,. hi i I ures were
"eten.. [ ion in GG) 1.lIte. in .etectetl lIIur i"!!II ,05t-
injector iln. restrictetl Lox test inspect ion of
flow with resulunt fililure .sci llo!lrillllh ilnlll ether
to bootstrap. Oetonuion is test reconls. ~nlllll correc-
iJr i~r i I y Cliused by Ielik~!!e tive iiction Uken. 3 of
af Lox ,ast the ~.te wi th these It hilures intli'"
resulUnt cembustian oiIn. catclll IIrcS5ure Sltikes anlll
exltlosian when SlI'GG's .re lIIetanation in G.G. "urin!!
init iilcelll. Leilkage is t1ue t tr.nsi t ion. LCilk.a!le Poilst
hi lure af blade to ~ke the exilllizer gate seill
positive seill due ta IIresents 01 high .
SCriiltcr.eJ or aii/Toliged seal proltilltility.f exltlosion
anlll/or se<ilt,/or to misfit in GG durin!! trilnsitlon,
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IElWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
N
o
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT At 1.15 11A-) , ttA-S/GilS Generater
G I~
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"
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FAILUftE
Internil V.lye Le.k.!le hewever I resu It i"!II ••miI,_
Cont inuetl waul. tllest I ikelv lie
cenflnetl te G.G. interl.r
Gilused by I••se s,llnes.
.
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT
it
.& [1..il.5.- HA -1 t: HA - c;.lG..i..S-..£.e.ru!.J:...il..tut:
• I<
~ -.'
.....~ ,
N
o
.....,
f'U:OUEHCY LIFE .,,~..~"V IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MOOE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TY~E D. CfIIlTICALtTY METHOD ~IIEDICTAIILlTYfAllUftE.
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"
FAILU"E
Internill Voilve Leilk.ilge 7f All .f these fili lures Incede rence Pr imiiry 5 N/A liese-test
Cont inuelll were lIletectea durin! lIost Gilil in! lI·centi .. ) procetllures.
test ins"ecc ion .anti ~teriill 2, 3
lax pollpet leilkilge lIoiS! se.t investl!liltion of .sci 110· lIl.mil!e
ltin4llin! of lIolillet in ~re of Sfalth ilIn. other tesc
housin! .ue to !lalli"! of recer-Is ••nlll correct i ve
,a,-,ee <in./or conuminilcion i1ctien t.ilken lIrior te liny
of It0ltpet stem or to sultsequen tees t i"!. One
snisillisnment .11 sa cilused Ity of the fili lures inllicilte.
sc.riltche..I.~!edpo"et iI fire ilnd eXlllosion in
.o./or selit. cne G.G .. concrol villve/
injector i1reil Itut with
mini~1 lIII~ma,e te G.G.
exilllizer IUkil,e IIi1SC the
Lox pOPllet IIreSents the
lIossiltility of eXlllosion
.nd llI.mage to G.G .. llIurint
tr.nsiti.n. .
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INS~ECTION TECHNIOUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
N
o
00
G !j-
Atlo. /tA-} & /tA-S/H•• t Su"r••• len (H.S.) V.IYSTEM/COMI'ONENT
-_. ----
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FIIEOUENCY LIFE '1IIMAIIY IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE 011 CIIITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILUIIE.
"
SECONDAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILUIIE
Intern~1 V~)ve L.~k,a,. 3f AII .f thesa fa i 1ures wer lew t.rllue Primary 5 H/A 'rll,.'t test
Cent ioue. lIIeteetM lIIur I", ,r./pest I1lteri.1 patentlol ,r.celllures.
Viltriltlen. Sut test ,r.celllures, anlll C.ntaminlti." 2, 3c. cerreet Ive Ict len Uken. Vlltrulan
Ciluselll Ity I.... t.rllue .r Oxllllizer IUka,e '.1st I J,
caul. r.sul t In IccUQJI.-t.rllue relautien en retainer tlon .f Lex in TIC areaNits, resultln! in ,ieces
wi th '.55 iall i ty .f
.f Teflen fJakinl off seilt
eetanilti." anlll/.r IIIII"N,.an411 lIecomin, lotl,elll Itetween t. TIC, en! lne anlll/or
seill itntll selliint surfoice.
ether c....nents at time
.f isnlti.n.
.
VIAILE IN·FLlGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
,; ,.
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT
•
Atl~s J1A"'3 £ HA-5/Lex fte!ul~tor
•
G (')
N
o
\C
FftEQUENCY LIFE " ....ARy IlEACT DETECTION FAILUIlE POTENTIAL
FAILUIlE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIlE FAILUIlE TYPE Oft Cft ITICALITY METHOD PIlEDICTAIILlTYFAILURe,
"
SECONOAftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIlANDS
"
FAILURE
15. ~eCluliltor Discre.ilnc.ies ~~f 7 of these. h, i lures Contoilllinilti.n Prill1ilry 3. 5 I .... F.... I ....nlf.14
Fili Is to Proviae IIro,er resulted in ,remature teSi I1iIterlill ,otent 1.1 ,ressure 5wi teh,cutoff, ,. It')' fuel lTIiIflif.1 .ilN!e 2 ~in5til!.ftc!uhti.n .f Oxitliizer flow.
,ressure 5wi tch .anti/or Dimensienill limiter cutoff
Cilusee lIy mi sill ignment .f ffiilinstil!e I imiter when 'evlce
sleeve, moisture/c.ontilminil- INotstrilp WilS not Overs,eetl tri,
tien in retul .. t.r, lack of ilttilinefi, 2 Ity overs,ee. eevlce
.r iniltle"uiltc lultrico1.tlon, tri, 4evice when Lox Inst. Olaserver cut.ff
nicked/a"'rMtc. s,a.I, ,iste" re!ul~tl.n went eut .t
'iiOtl/er Itore. Coultl ~ Is. con tro I ~ntl I Ity e.server
Ite c~usetl Ity excess i ye lIIIue to "ressure osc i 111-
lIIIiilmetrill c1e.. rilnce result .. tions from malfunctlonint
in! in sillle loallls i1ntl hi!h re!ulilt.r. The other 37
friction causin! escillatie" • hi lures were CIIetectetl
Fer MA-S only - coultl i1lso tluri"! "re/"est test
lIle causetl Ity externill "rocetlures i1nllll i ns"ect len
leilk.iI!e of hel ium contrel i1ntl cerrect ive ilct ion
pressure. tilk.en. 2 .f these 37 .
hi lures !i1'o1'e ,est-test
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIlING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IlEMAIlKSICOMMENTS
TunAble Diode LAser Spectrometer UltrASonic LeAk
Isotope We.. Detector Porticle AnAlysis
OptiCAl "LeAk
Differentill RAdiometry
HAlo!en L..k
Flow LeAk
HiSS Spectrometry
Thel'll1ll LeAk
Pressure DeCAY
N
.....
o
ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Atlas Jd.-l ~lt&. C;/L.lt 1,fl!,C!ulatnr
G?r
FREQUENCY LIFE PIlIMAIIY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIAL
FAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE 011 CIIITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONOAIIY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILUIIE
Ilelu I. ter 0 Iscre,anc i es intllcilltJen- (frem run
Cont i Rue. recertls) .f chul,in,.
which ,resents ,otentLiIIl
,.ssilli1 Ity .f CONustien
inst.~lIlty. lilck of
,r.,er re,ulilltlen .f
oxitllzer fJew CilO hillv.
vilirle..1lII effects, mestly
relAte. te ,.s tenerilt.r
o,erilt I.n i1n4 eut,ut,
RDst .f whi ch ~ulllll
resul t ilt werst in ,re-
rra tur. en, i ne cut.tf ..
The p.ssl~lllty ef en!lne
iIIntl/.r cempenent .i1mate
is, however, ,.tentiilily
existent.
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MDNITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKs/COMMENTS
• •
..
ENGINE SYSTEM/COM~ONENT AtLas HA-) & MA-S/Kixture 'titie Contr.l Assemltly
<I
•
C 1'(
fAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE
fftEOUENCYI lifE
Of DESIGN/ACTUAL
FAILU"e. ~
..
EFFECT Df fAILUIIE PIIIMAIIY I IIIEACTfAILUIIE TY~E I 011 CIIITICALlTY TIME
SECONDAIIY
fAILUIIE
DETECTION
METHOD
USED
fAILUIIE
PIIEDICTAIILITY
AND METHOD
~TENTIAL
MEASUIIANDS
Ii_ C.nt~mjnition. Hydriul ic.
Contral Assembly
Excess i .... e deid~ind is COiIuse.
Ity contiminiltion in MAC 1IIo4y
,rollucin!l ill hi!lh {rieti."
iletween the pi sten .nll .ore
an. resul tin! in excessive
hysteresis, miSili!lnment
ana/or impro,er torque an
Itody Itoles, si.~ laallin! of
.. iscaM due co misilignment
of piston .and _iilphri!fll
oissemltl ie~.
14f All .f these failures
were lIetectell .ur in! ,reI
post test ,r.cetlur.s
oiInd/.r j ospeet ian. ina
cerrective ilction uken.
fn!line .jteratien ,it this
con.itian c.I.I111 result in
deliye. reslIOnse .f the
servo-pi ston CO Chin!eS
in Deltli ,ressure. which
coul~ cliuse cerres,.n~ln!
~eliY in H.S. vil!ve move'"
ment to correct the
existent "is(;.re,ancy.
De,en"ent on the time of
occurrence "ur in! en,ine
operatien an" the
n~!nitu"e of the hilure.
initliltion ef premature
entjine cuteff coul" reSJI t
Centamfn.t fen
Torllue
Interference
"r lmary 5
lIt. t entl.)
3
NIA flre/,.st test
,r.ce.ures.
N
......
......
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITO~ING SYSTEMS IETWEEN fLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
Ultrl,onlc Leok
Plrtlcl. Anlly,is
Opticil L.lk
Oifforontlil AI4lQlllOtry
FlOW L.lk
Pressure DeelY
IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Atlas 11A-3 , MA-S/Hixture ltatl. Centr.l Assemitly
c- ·c z:.
fReOUENCY OESIG~::'~UA'" PftlMAftY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FA/LUliE TYPE Oft CftlTICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAI",UftE. ,. SECDNOAftY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS,. FAILUftE
C.numin~tion, Hy4lllraul Ie 7f All .f these failures CantUlfniit .n Primary 5 N/A Pr./ltost test
Cantral Assemltly Centinuetl were "eteete. tlurint ,reI Tar"ue petentlal ,r.ce4ures.
,.st test IIr.cetluras Interference 3
Null shift Is causetl Ity iIIntl/.r Ins,eetiens, anll
c~n,e in settint illS the corrective ictl." taken.
result .f vlltratlon antl/.r Enllne .,entia" it this
sheCk "url"t ensine o,en- cantliel." caul4 result In
tien, lnc.rrect null settln, un,lannea movement .f the
ilt assemltly. Caul., als. Ite H.S. villve ,.ate .r
4Ilue te une4lluill spr i"1 cem- f.ilure .f the H.S. villve
,ression rilei.s, l1i1ma!le.' to res,.n4 Kf:Uriitel y te
i:efect ive .Ii.,hril!ms. liifferentiil in"ut
,ressures. This ~I..
ceu ..l result In ' ..re,.er
,ra,ellint utllizitian ar
4e,en4en t an time .f
eccurrence ~ntl sever Jty
af the mal functien .. ceulllll .
result in exitlizer-rich
VIAILE IN·FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKS/COMMENTS
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT
•
Atlas HA-3 , 1'1A-5/Hixture Ailele Centr.) Assemaly
• •
E1 or-!.
tv
....
l,,;.)
FREQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE I'OTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF OESIGN/ACTUAL EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE OR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILUIIE.
"
SECONOARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Conumin.tion, Hyllrilulic aurnint cenllitiens which
Control Assemaly Continuetll coul" trl!!er ,rem.ilture
en! ine cuto ff anti
,essialy result In lIIIilmiI!e
to entine ~n./or
c....nents.
-
.
VIAILE IN-FLIGHT MONITOIIING SYSTEMS IETWEEN FLIGHT INSPECTION TECHNIQUES IIEMAIIKSICOMMENTS
N
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ENGINE SYSTEM/COMPONENT Atl .. HA-) & HA-S/Hy4roullc Central V.lve (HOV Cantral Pooko,a)
G· ... "
---
~"""--~
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FREQUENCY LIFE PRIMARY IIEACT DETECTION FAILUIIE POTENTIALFAILUIIE MODE AND CAUSE OF DESIGN/ACTUAL. EFFECT OF FAILUIIE FAILUIIE TYPE QR CRITICALITY METHOD PIIEDICTAIILITYFAILURE.
"
SECONDARY TIME USED AND METHOD MEASUIIANDS
"
FAILURE
Out,ut Unst.altle/Erratic Sf All .f these f~ i 1ures Iln4ln, PrI_ry S NIA Durin, anti "5t-
..era 4etectH ~y ch.art CMtaJ1Jnatlen ,atentl•• test ,r.cHuras.
Causetl Ity internal leakA,e eltS.rvat ion lIlur ins test Interf.renc. 2, 3
in the c... tr.1 ,acka,e, amlt.r ,est test ins,ec:-
t imitetl travel of centr.1 tien ,recetlures, with
,isten t1ue t. overl entth anti e.rreet Ive acti.n taken
cantell s,rint. Itlntltnl .r ,r I.r te. any 5ultSetluent
5t ICkln, .f 5,..1, contamlna test Int. ... lfuncti.ns .f
tten In ,ickll!e affect In, the centr.l valve affect
mevement .t 5,..1 .r ether o,eriltt." .f the uin
roternal ,.rts. oxhlizer villye aolll,
tIle,entlent en t I..a af
acc:urr.nc••urln, en, Ina
....r.tl.n IIn4 _,nitu••
• f the f.Uure. c:euhl
resul t in ,rematur. en,in
cutaff ..I th pess lill i ty a
lI.ma,e te en, ine In4'.r .
c:....nents.
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APPENDIX C. FAILURE PROPAGATION
BLOCK DIAGRAMS
APPENDIX C
FAILURE PROPAGATION BLOCK DIAGRAMS
The Failure Propagation Block Diagrams were devised to obtain a better understand-
ing of the failure mechanism of each of the sixteen failure modes encountered in
the study.
Each diagram attempts to illustrate the events which lead to the failure as
described in the Failure Summary sheets (see Appendix B). It has been found that
by indicating symptoms and events preceding the outright failure, the determination
of appropriate monitoring devices is made easier. There is a Failure Propagation
Block diagram for each of the sixteen failure modes, regardless of engine system.
The events are shown as rectangles and the time sequence from left to right.
e80LT TO"OOE "ELAX~TION '''EM~TU''E
CUT·OFF
IVIIIR~TION
S~FETYI
.... VI."~TION ~
"ET~INING FIRE
C~VIT~TION 10- SCREW ----. FRETTING r----. EXPLOSION
LOOSENING
--
-------
4 ~COUSTICS I--
Main Oxidizer Valve
215
FAILU..E MOOE 1·•
• SOLT TO..QUE ..ELAXATION
SOURCE
·GASGENE..ATO.. CONTROLVALVE
SEQUENCE ....ESSU..ANT GGCV· DETONATION
VALVE SEAL LEAKS INTO ACTUATES IN GASGGCV· rRETAINE.. ACTUATO"
....EMATURELy GENERATOR
IGNITION_
Main Oxidizer Valve
FAILU..E MODE 2
• COOLANT 'ASSAGE LEAKAGE
METAL
EM...ITTLE· ~
MENT
'RESSU..E ~
SU..GES
~ TUIE LOIS OF
MIXTU..E RATIO TU..IINE
~ ~ SHIFT IN ~ TEMPERATURE
.LIT. FUEL TU"SINE Rlif
..ESTRICTION
(CONTAMINATION)
A. METAL
'""'
•• ICE
C. NON-METAL
D. DEFO..MATION
Nozzle-Combustor
216
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FAILUIU MODE 3·A
• JOINT LEAKAGE
SEALS
FLANGES
FASTENEfiS
FAILUfiE MODE 3·•
• JOINT LEAKAGE
IEALI
FLANGES
FASTENEfiS
DEFECTS IN
MAn'UAL
IMltfiOltEfi
INSTALLATION
SCflATCHES
WAflltlNG
DISTOflTION
TOfiooE
flELAXATION
Hot Gas Leakage
DEFECTS IN
MATEfllAL
IMltfiOltEfi
INSTALLATION ~~I-~
SCflATCHES
WAflltlNG
DISTOfiTION
TO"OUE
flELAXATION
LEAKltATH
FOfl
HOTGAIEI
COftftECTIVE ACTION
1. flEDESIGN
LEAKltATH
FOfl
ItflOltELLANT
CO....ECTIVE ACTION
1. "EDESIGN
FlfiE
FlfiE
Seals-Propellant Leakage
217
fAILURE MODE 4
• TRANSFER TUBE CRACKS
CRACKS
EXCESSIVE
... BURN
TRANSIENT .. FATIGUE THROUGHr
TEMPERATURE
CORRECTIVE ACTION
1. REDESIGN
URE MODE &
HIGH TORQUE EXCESSIVE
r TEM'ERATURE
PHVSICAL .. VIBRATION ... FAILUREINTERFERENCE
,
.~ EXCESSIVE
FRICTION
FAIL
•
Propellant Turbopump Labyrinth Seal
218
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FAILU..E MODE'
• CRACKED TU..IINE ILADES
ENE..GY ILADE
-
SEIIARATION
TRANSIENT· C..ACKING (UNBALANCE) FAILU..E
·TEMIIE..ATU..E
IIRESSURE
ACOUSTICS
MECHANICAL
Turbopump
FAILURE MODE 7
• CRACKED CONVOLUTION, IELLOWS. SHIELD
ENERGY BELLOWS
TRANSIENT· SHIELD FAILURECRACKS
·TEM'ERATURE
....ESSURE
ACOUSTICS
MECHANICAL
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
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FAILURE MODE'
• LOOSE ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS
..
HEAT
LOSIOF
~ ELECTRICAL ~CONTINUITY
HIGH CONNECTOR LOll OF
ENERGY TORQUE ~ ~ HARNEII
TRANSIENTS· RELAXATION FUNCTION
CONNECTOR
·VIIRATION ~ DISENGAGE- -MENT IACOUSTICS
Electrical Harnesses
FAILURE MODE'
• BALL IEARING DAMAGE
~ EXCESSIVE ~TEMPERATURE
.
EXCESSIVE VI.RATION WEAflOUT FAILURELOADING
~ EXCESSIVE I--
FRICTION
Turbopump
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FAILunE MODE 10
• TUBE FRACTURE
..
If AsfTUBE LINE (TUIE)
EXCESSIVE DEFLECTION FATIGUE CRACKS
VIBRATION (VIIRATION)
-AUGMENTED
·SPARK
-IGNITION
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
REDESIGN
ASI Propellant Line (Tube)
OIlUMP SEAL LEAKAGE
EXCESSIVE
TEMPERATUnE
PHYSICAL VIBnATION FAILUREINTERFERENCE
EXCESSIVE
FRICTION
fAILUnE MODE 11
• TURB
Primary Turbopump Seal
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FAlLU..E MODE 12
..
•
IES• LUIE I"RESSU"E ANOMAL
JET
...~ ftEST..,CTED
LACK~ OF I-
LUIE
DEC"EASED
CONTAMINATION~ I- FILTE.. ~ FLOW ANDOISTRUCTED
....ESSU..E
fo- Til"FAlLU"E
FILTE.. INCPlEASED OEAPlCASE
'- I- FLOW AND t-- FLOODEDCOLLAflSE
..PlESSU..E
Lube Pressure Anomalies
FAILUftE MODE 13·A
• VALVE FAILS TO IIEftFOftM
FRACTUftEOF VALVE FAILS ENGINEMOISTURE INTERNAL COM,. TO OPERATE FAILUREDUE TO ICE
-
Oxidizer Poppet Valve
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...
FAILURE MODE 13 I!I
• VALVE FAILS TO PERFORM
GALLINOOF CONTAMINATION SLOW OPERATIONACTUATOR lORE
ANDfllSTON AND SEAL OR
OR SEAL DAMAGE FAILS TO OPEN
Main Propellant Valve
FAILURE MODE '4·A
.,NTERNALLEAKAOE
FRETTING OF CONTAMiNATION VALVE
PO....ET.SEAL -..- AND SEAL FAILS TO
(WEAR) DAMAGE SEAL
Poppet Valve
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FAILURE MODE 14-•
• INTERNAL VALVE LEAKAGE
lEAL
(MOLDED)
DEFECTS IN
MATEftlAL
LEAKAGE
INCONT"OL
SYSTEM
I'''EMATU''E
G.G. VALVE
OI'ENING
ENGINE
FAILURE
..
SEAT
IMI'ROI'E"
~-----.t INSTALLATION
SC"ATCHES
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MOV Sequence Valve
FAILu"e MODE 14-e
• INTERNAL LEAKAGE
ENGINE
-
ftETAINING NUT~ LOOSE I'OI'I'ET
-VI.RATION RELAXATION SKlftT SEAL
MAIN OXIDIZE" ENGINE
-.- VALVE I--
LEAKAGE FAILUftE
DISTO"TED
COM'ftESSOft f-
RING
COft"ECTIVE ACTION:
1. "EDESIGN
Main Oxidizer Valve
...
..
FAILURE MODE 14-0
• INTERNAL LEAKAGE (TRAPPED PRESSURE)
po"p~tSTUcK FUEL ISOLATION
'iTOSPR~NG . VALVEDOES
RErAINE'R.:J'Nq!¢tiECK
(VACtJUM)", REV~RSE FLOW
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
REDESIGN
FUEL
CONTAMINATION ~--1
OF LOX START
SYSTEM
DETONATION
AND FIRE
..
Redundant Isolatiqn Valve
FAILURE MOVE 16
• REGULATOR DISCRePANCIES
~ONTAMINATION
:'.
SEAL DAMAGE REGULATOR ENOINE
(LEAKAGE) .. FAILS TO .. .. PERFORMANCEPERFORM ANOMALV
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
INCREASED
TID
FRICTION
Regulator Failure
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FAILURE MODE 18
• CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CONTAMINATION
HYDRAULIC ENGINESEAL CONTROL PERFORMANCELEAKAGE ASSEMBLY ANOMALY
DISCREPANCY
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
TBD
INCREASED
FRICTION
Hydraulic Control Assembly
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APPENDIX D
FLIGHT FAILURES
I, .•..• : .. ,
To support the study of failure modes, an analysis was ma~e of~~!~h~~fpilures of
the engine systems selected for the study.
Again, the same technique used to slice into the failure modes detected by the
analysis of VCR's was used in this assessment .
'-'"''---'-''''' ,. ·....------'1 C'''---''--'-'--~ ,--
No(~!ilrIiight faiJ-~reslhad exk.liis,tiV:~'ir'eports detailing the incident. The events
leading-itd th'e ~ngiri~;jTfai:l'~rekr~:;sh~wnas r~ctarigle and the passage of time is
shown :;from left ~to..:cighi:.J For'.pur~poses ~of itlus tration, the failure mechanism has
been greatly simplified but, in each case, has retained sufficient characteristics
to indicate how the incident developed.
The charts in ~~1:l;i;E>" C\PPS'!1d~.x do not show existing or possible tilonitoring devices.
Most of the depicted flights carried limited instrumentation with no means to
shut ;'aowit~the'jmKlfuric'tloril'ngengine because once the vehic're left ,the pad, theret,,,,, >,.J
was no way to recover the"'mission.
THOR ATLAS J-2 H-l
VEHICL~",\ 75 1-';,j
'; ~. '" • 11..1 rI
VEHICLEJ 9or-E
VEHICLE 180
llF
45F
3F
225E
304D
AS-502 SA-6
VEHICLE 537 149F 5503
..
r-' .~-- ··-----·1
, j
;~ \: : ;: :.~ .:
\
J
98F 5701
i
Failure Propagation Block \Diagram
i ! ;,,;: ':i'J; •
I " f\ -' i j i ~_; (J :. f i i
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MB3-1 TflOR
WTR
VEH. 175
8-3-59
COIIIIECTIVE ACTiON:
INCOIII'OllATION OF FUEL DEI'LETION
SWITCH
SHOIIT ClllCUI
MOISTUIIE IN 1-
CONNECTOIIS
FUSING Oil LACK OFWELDING OF
FLIGHT LOCK- SIGNAL
IN IIELAY
AIICING Oil
COIIONA EFFECT
HOLDING IIELA~1-
ENEIIGIZED
MAIN LOX VLV EXCESSIVE
, IGN FUEL CUTOFFVALVE FAIL
TO CLOSE IMI'ULSE
VEH FAILS
.._- TO ACHIEVE
MISSION
OIlJECTIVE
..
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MB3-1 THOR
WTR
VEH. 190
8-14-59
•
E A FUEL
DEI'LETION SWITCH
EIIIIONEOUS
FUEL LOADINGI-
1'0011 I'IIEHATUIIE ENGINE
1'1I0l'ELLANT FUEL FAILUIIE
UTI Ll ZATI ON DEPLETION
,--_ ..
HAJOII FUEL
LEAK (TiC ~TUllE)
CDIIIIECTIVE ACTION: INCOIII'OIlAT
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
228
MB3-1 THOR
WTR
VEH. 180
7-26-62
..
I'NEUHATIC
CONTAMINATION CONTI\OL f--SYSTEH
I\ESTI\I CTI ON ---SLOW DETONATION
1- OI'ENING f-- IN THI\UST to- ENGINE
MAIN LOX CHAHIlEI\ FAILUI\E
VALVE
"---._-
HOISTUI\E DUI\ING
IN HLV
---
COUNTDOWN I--IEAI\ING HOISTUI\E
F'I\fF1F~
COl\I\ECTIVE ACTION:
CHANGES IN I'I\OCEDUI\E 1'1\101\ TO LAUNCH
TO INSI'ECT FOl\ CONTAHINATION AND
HOISTUI\E.
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MB3-3 THOR
WTR
VEH. 537
2-17-71
•
ORONITE
OVEI\FLOW IN t-
SUI'I'LY LINE
OVEI\nOW FI\EEZING OF LACK OF TIl' AND
T""I'I'ED IN OI\ONITE IN LUIll\ICANT ENGINE
SUI'I'LY LINE SUI'I'LV LINE III TIl' FAILUI\E
COl\"ECTIVE ACTION: J. PI\OI'EI\ LOADING OF FAIlU
VEHICLE 2. "EDESIGN OF' LUIE SUI'I'L
IOATTAIL 3. ~EI\IFICATION OF IOATTA
HEATU t-- OPEI\ATlON
FAILUI\E
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
V"LINE
iL HEATEI\
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MA-3 ATLAS
ErR
VEil. llF
4-9-62
SUftGES 1'1I0llAIlLE ftUlllllNG OF EXI'LOSIONDUlliNG IN
STAftT - DISPLACEMENT IHpELlEft SUSTAINEft
I'HASE OF I'UHp SHAF i WEAft ftlNG LDX I'UHI'
COftftECTIVE ACTION: INCOftpOftATION OF
KEL-F LINEft
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
r1A-3 ATLAS
WTR
VEil. 45F
10-3-63
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HYI'EftGOL OISTftUCTION HAIN FUEL ElllilNE FAILEftESmUE IN
MAIN FUEL VL - IN ACTUATIONI-- VALVE FAILEIlr- TO ACHIEVE
ACT. LitlE LINE TO OI'EN HAINSTAGE
COftftECTIVE ACTION:
I. ftEI'LACEHENT OF ACTUATION LINE I'ftlOft TO FLIGHT
2. INCOftl'OftATE I'UftGE OF ACTUATION LINES AFTEft
HOT FlftE.
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-3 ATLAS
WTR
VEH. 3F
4-3-64
IlYPEltGOL I'AltTIALLY MFV SLOW ENGINEItESIDUE IN I-- OHSTltUCHD I--- OPENING I--- FAILED TOACTUATION ACTUATION ACHI EVE
LINE LINE MAINSTAGE
COltltECTIVE ACTION:
I. ItEPLACEMENT OF ACTUATION LINES l'''IOlt.TO FLIGHT
2. INCDltPDltATE PUltGE DF ACTUATION LINES AFTEIt HOT
FIIIE
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-3 ATLAS VEH. lq9F
8-8-fi6
[DESICCANT OIlSTltUCT'ON ElILtSSIVE FUE LDEI'LETI ON VEHICLElAGS LEFT IN 1I00STEIt - HOOSTEIt - SUSTAINEIt r-- FAILED TOIN LOX LOX SYSTEM FUEL I'ltEHATUltE ACHIEVE ItEQ.SYSTEM (MAIN' GG) COU SUMI'T1 ON SHUTDOWN VELOC lTV
COltllECTIVE ACTION:
I'ltOCEDUltES MODIFIED TO VEltlFY ItEMOVAL OF ALL
DESICCANT SAGS F"OM ENGINE 1'''10'' TO LAUNCH.
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
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MA-3 ATLAS
WTR
VEil. 98F
10-10-69
FA ILUliE ~r--- OFI~"
I'INION
OISTIIUCTED
LUBE I'ASSAGEI--(CAKED
I'IIESEIIVATlVE)
IEAIIING
'--- FAILUIIE I-
UNCOUI'LING ENGI NE ENGINE FAILS
OF I'EIIFOIlHANCE TO ACHIEVE
TUIIBOI'UHP DECAY IIEQUIIIED
I VELOC lTV
COIlIlECTIVE ACTION:
I. IIEI'IIESEIIVED ALL ENGINES WITH 1'1I0l'ElI TYI'E
PIIESEIIVATIVE OIL
2. INSPECTION AND FLOW CHECKS OF LUBE
DISTIIIIUTION SYSTEH
•
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-3 ATLAS
WTR
VEH. 19F
5-29-80
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FAILUIIE OF IIEQUIIIED
TUIIIOI'UHI' TUIIIOI'UHI' TUIIBOI'UHI' ENGINE LOSS VELOC ITY
I'll IHAllY FUEL I--- GEAft CASE I--- LOSS OF - OF THftUST r- NOT
SEAL (I.EAKAGE FLOODED EFFICIENCY ACHIEVED
COIlIlECTIVE ACTION:
I. INCOftl'OftATlON OF TIP GEM lOX I'UftGE·
2. INSI'ECTION OF TIl' DIIAIN LINE FOft ftESTftlCTIONS
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
VEH 68EMA-3 ATLAS I
OIL SU~~LY WTR 12-8-80LINE f--
SEVE~ED
FUEL
~IlESSUMNT I--
SU~nY LINE
FAILUIlE LACK OF "A" ~INION TUIlIO~UM~
LUIE TO FA ILU"E , SUISEQUENT
TUIlIO~UH~ ENGINE
FAILUIlE
LUIE TANK
~IlESSUIlIZING to-VALVE
FAILUIlE COIlIlECTIVE ACTION:
J. ALL i-NUTS AND ~LUGS AilE SAFETY WillED
2. QUICK DISCONNECT VALVES IlE~LACED WITH ~LUGS
3. IlE~LACEHENT OF STIlESS COIlIlOSION SUSCE~TIILE'
LUIE TANK FITTING WITH FITTINGS HADE OF DIFFEIlENT
IlU~TUIlE I-- HATEIlIAL
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-5 ATLAS
ETR
VEH. 225E
7-20-65
FAILUIlE OF IlESTIlICTION FLAME -OUT WILOX ~O~~ET IN LOX FLOW TO LOXSTEM IN STAIlVAT I ON OF
~1l0~. VALVE TO ENGINE VEIlNIE" ENG •
•
COIlIlECTIVE ACTION:
INC"EASE ~O~~ET STIlENGTH AND COIl"0510N IlESI5TANCE
CHANGE OF HATEIlIAL (2024-T6 TO 2024-T4)
~1l0HIIIT "E~ETITIVE MOLDING OF KEL-F SEAT
VEIlIFY EXiSTENCE OF GAP BETWEEN PNEUMATIC ~ISTON ,
~O~~ET
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
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MA-5 ATLAS
WTR
VEU, 304D
3-19-66
LOX LEAK HYDftAULIC H.S. VALVE I'AYLOAD STIIUCI
IHI'INGING FLUID IN FAILS TO EXCESSIVE IY 100STEIIr--- ~ - CUTOFF ..--- STAGE AFTEIION CONTIIOL CONTIIOL LINE CLOSE AT
LINE FIIOZEN CUTOFF IHI'U.LSES SEI'AIIATION
COIIIIECTIVE ACTION:
1'1I0l'ELLANT UTILIZATION AND HEAD SUI'I'IIESSION
VALVE CONTIIOL LINES WEllE INSULATED.
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-5 ATLAS
ETR
VEH. 5503
12-4-71
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EAIILY HIGH GAS TUIIIlINE LOW TUlIlIlNE ENGINEGENEIIATOII HOT GAS100TSTIIAI'
- TEHHftATUIIE I-- MANIFOLD - LEAKAGE r- EFFICIENCY - I'EIIFOIIHANCE(SEVEIIE) TftANSIENTS EIIOSION 30:t DECAY
COIIIIECTIVE ACTION:
IIEDESIGN OF SUSTAINEII GAS GENEftATOII DXIDIZEII SUI'I'LY
SYSTEM:
I. ADAI'TEII IIEDESIGNEO
2. INCORI'OIlATION OF NEW CHECK VALVE
3. LARGE II 1l00TSTIIAP LINE
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
MA-5 ATLAS
ETR
VEH. 5701 AC-43
9-29-77
OHEGA JOINT ENGINE
(GG HGH) Ol"EkATIONAL HOT GAS ENGINE
SENS 11' IZED IN - MANIFOLD I-- I"EIIFOIlMANCE -
ENGINE
VIIlIIATION FAILUIIE
IIIAZING CYCLE CAUSED FATIGU FAILS DECAY
COIIIIECTIVE ACTION:
IIEVIEW OF I"1I0CESS CONTIIOLS OF ITEHS
HANUFACTUIIED FIIOH 300 SEIIIES STAINLESS STEEL.
HODIFICATION OF I"1I0CEDUIIES TO I"IIEVENT CAIIION
CONTAHINATION OF DUCT DUlliNG IIIAZING Ol"EIIATION.
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
J-2
ETR
AS-502
4-4-68
ASI LINE FATIGUE FIIIE- 1"11 EHATUIIE
EXCESSIVE CAUSES 10-- ENGINE ENGINE
VIIIIATION LINE IIUI"TUIIE !'A ILUliE SHUTDOWN
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
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H-l
ETR
VEH. SA-6
5-28-64
236
STftUCTUftAL
FAILUftE OF
"A" ~INION
TUftIlO~UH~ ~ftEHATUftE
FAILUftE ENGINE
SHUTDOWN
SEIZUftE OF QUILL SHAFTHIGH SPEED TDftSI ONAL
-~INION FAILUftE
IEAftlNG 15
Failure Propagation Block Diagram
APPENDIX E. IN-FLIGHT CONDITION
MONITORING LITERATURE SEARCH
APPENDIX E
IN-FLIGHT CONDITION MONITORING LITERATURE SEARCH
A computerized search and review of periodicals was employed to survey the
literature for identification of novel and state-of-the-art in-flight condition-
monitoring technologies. The in-house on-line capability included Orbit IV and
Dialog systems, and Compendex, NTIS, and ISMEC data bases, totaling some six
million citations.
The search addressed all those citations which were related to sensors, instru-
ments and detectors, both diagnostic and prognostic. It was limited to industrial,
aerospace and automotive fields and the result was 289 relevant citations. Upon
reviewing these citations, 89 complete articles were requested. They are
summarized in Table 22 according to article title, author, source, in-flight/
between-flight novel, SOTA and rocket-engine categories. The table also shows
the number of SOTA and novel,in-flight and between-flight condition-monitoring
systems discussed in each article.
This search combined with a few other minor on-line searches and review of periodi-
cals resulted in the 20 novel and 14 SOTA technologies.
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ATUIIE, 'IlESSURE, VIIIlATION AND
ELECTRICAL IGNITION SYSTEM
SENSORS AilE DISCUSSED
'1I01E MEASUIIEMENTS IN FLAMES 10WN, C. T. STANFOIID
· - - - - -
TEM'EIlATURE, S'ECIES CONCEN-
(EX'EIIIMENTAL DIAGNOSTICS IN UNIVEIISITY TIlATION AND VELOCITY '1I01ES
GAS 'HASE COMIUSTION SYSTEMS) USED FOil MEASUIIEMENT IN LAI-
OIlATORY ANO INDUSTIIIAL FlAMES
HYDIlAULIC DIAGNOSTIC MONITOR- DUZICH, J. J. GIIUfotlAN AEIIOS,ACE 10 1 DIAGNOSTIC MONITOIIING SYSTEM
ING SYSTEM COR'OIlATION FOil A HYDIlAULIC FLIGHT SIMU-
lAT~. SYSTEM WAIINS OF
IM'ENDING FAILURE OF HYDIlAULIC
SYSTEM COMPONENTS IV ON-BOAIID
SENSOIIS. ONE NOVEL SENSOR WAS
A F1IEII-O'TIC APPIIOACH USED
FOil DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF
LIQUID IN A HIGH-PRESSUIIE
PNEUMATIC 10TTLE.
STUDY OF ADVANCED AUTQMATIC CIIESWICK, F. A. IATTELLE, - . - . - - IIEVIEW OF CUIIIlENT TECHNOLOGY
OIAGNOSTIC/'RDGNOSTIC TEST WYLER, E. N. COLUMIUS FOil AUTOMATIC DIAGNOSTIC/PIIOG-
EQUIPMENT FOil MAINTENANCE OF LAIOIIATOIIIES NOSTIC TEST EQUIPMENT FOil USE
MILITAIIY AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES IN MILITARY VEHICLE
(IIEPOIIT NO. A-4712, TASK 53) MAINTENANCE
SOME '1I0ILEMS OF EX'LOITATION SLOOOWNIK, A. TECHNIKA - - - . - - MENTIONS THE USE OF A RADIO-
OF JET TUIIIINE AIIICRAFT LOTNICZA ACTIVE ISOTOPE FOil DETERMINING
ENGI NES OF LOT 'OLISH AlII THE WEAII OF ENGINE 1I0TOII BEAR-
LINES INGS AND TURIiNE TI'S ON COM-
MEIIICAl JET AIIlCIlAFT
s'ACE SENSOII LOCATION AND MAYEII, 1. C. 'AIIKS COLLEGE OF
· - -
- -
. THIS IIEPOIIT DISCUSSES THE
ATTACHMENT SUTPHIN, H. W. ST. LOUIS SHOCK PULSE VIlIlATION TECH-
HAIIIIINGTON, J. 1. UNIVEIISITY NIQUE FOil DETECTING IEARING
WEAII IN HELICOPTEII GEAR 10XES.
'LACEMENT AND MOUNTING METHODS
FOil THE ACCELEROMETEIlS AilE
DESCIIIIED
A STATUS IIEPOIIT ON SENSOIIS WHITTIEII, II. M. ENDEVCO
· - -
- - -
DISCUSSION OF ACOUSTIC EMIS-
AND THEIII AP'LICATION TO SION, VIIRATION SENSORS AND
IEARING CONDITION MONITOIIING 'IEZOELECTRIC TRANSDUCERS FOil
(MECHANICAL FAlLUIIES '11 EVEN- lEARING CONOlTlON MONITORING
TION GROUP MEETING NO. I',
NOVEMBER' TO 10, 1972)
·SDTA • UP TO DATE, IN USE, PROVEN TECHNOLOGY ··NOVEL • NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
tv
~
tv
TABLE 22. (CONTINUED)
IN-FLIGHT aElWEEN-FLIGHT
.. .... ..
" "... oCu .. oCu
oC" ..0 oC" "0 ...
.." oc .. " i~ ...i8 .. z i8 >nTLE AUTHOIl SOUIlCE 0 0 0 IlEMAIlQc z c z z
~ESONANT ST~UCTURE TECHNIQUES IU~CHILL, ~. F. MECHANICAL TECH- 1 1 SENSING SYSTEM TO OETECT IALL
FO~ IEA~ING FAULT ANALYSIS NOLOGY, INC. IEA~ING FAILURE FO~ A SPACE
GY~O APPLICATION USING A
I~OAD lAND, MIIHATU~E ACCEL-
E~OMETE~ (INCLUDED A FAULT
DETECTION CI~CUIT WITH 2aK Hz
FILTE~ AND ENVELOPE DETECTION
DEVICE)
INST~UMENTATION II I MEDICAL SHACKIL, A. F. I EEE S~ECT~UM
- - - - - - TWO NEW DEVICES DEVELOPED IY
EQUIPMENT JANUA~Y 19a1 THE MEDICAL FIELD CALLEO
COM~UTE~IZED AXIAL TOMOG~APHY
(CAT) ANO POSIT~ON EMISSION
TOMOGM~HY PROVIDE IIOCHEMICAL
AND ST~UCTURAL INFO~TION.
THESE SCANNE~S A~E NONINVA-
SIVE IMAGING SYSTEMS. A THI~D
DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM DESCRI8ED IS
A NUCLEAR MAGNETIC ~ESONANCE
IMAGING SYSTEM.
DIAGNOSTICS OF WEAR IN WEDEVEN, L. D. NASA LEWIS 5 SOTA DETECTION TECHNIQUES FO~
AE~ONAUTI CAL SYS rEMS RESEARCH CENTER OIL ANALYSIS:
1. SOAP (SPECTROMET~IC OIL
ANALYSIS ~ROG~)
2. CHIP DETECTO~S
3. FERROGRAPHY
4. IN-LINE OIL MONITO~
5. MDIOACTIVE ISOTOPE TAGGING
AN EX~UIMENTAL INVESTIGATION SUZUKI, A. UNIVERSITY OF
- - - - - - RAOIOACTI'IE TIl.ACING OF iALl
OF CYLINDRICAL ~OllE~ IEAR- SEI~EG, A. WISCONSIN TRANS IEA~INGS WITH GAMMA MDIATION
INGS HAV ING ANNULAR ~OLlERS OF ASME AND USE OF A SCINTILLATION
OCTOIE~ 1976 DETECTO~ AND COUNTE~ TO
MEASU~E CHANGE IN RADIOACTIV-
ITY OF BEARINGS AND THUS ~~O-
DUCE A MEASU~E OF 8EA~ING WEAR
Fl5/F100 ENGINE DIAGNOSTIC SPETH, ~. H. McDONNEl 20 ENGINE MONITO~ING AND DIAG-
SYSTEM scon, a. c. AIRCRAFT CO., NOSTIC SYSTEM TO DETECT AND
ROMOSER, a. K. ~AAn & WHITNEY DIAGNOSE ENGINE MALFUNCTIONS
AI~CRAFT AND IDENTIFY FAULTY COMPONENTS
AIDS - AI~CMFT INTEGRATED HUGHES, 1. HAMILTON STANDMD
- - - - - - AIDS FUNCTION IS TO P~OVIDE
DATA SYSTEM DIVISION OF ON-BOMD MONITO~ING OF
UNITED TECHNOL- ENGINES, AIRCAAFi SYSTEMS AND
OGlES COR~. AI RCRAFT PERFORMANCE
'SOTA = U~ TO DATE. IN USE. ~~OVEN TECHNOLOGY *-NOVEL = NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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A TIlANSMITTEft FOft DIAGNOSTIC WANG, k. UN IVEftS ITY OF
- - - - - -
ACOUSTIC IMAGING SYSTEM USING
IMAGING (VOL. 90, PftOCEED- CHANGE, H. HOUSTON AN OPTO-ACOUSTIC TRANSOUCEft
INGS OF THE PHOTO-OPTI CAL SHEN, H. UNIVEftSITY OF (OAT) TO PftOOUCE REAL-TIME
INSTRUMENTATION ENGINEEftS. WADE. G. CALlFOftNIA SANTA OftTHOGftAPHIC DIAGNOSTIC
AUGUST,l!]i) SUo k. IAftlAIIA IMAGING IN THE MEDICAL FIELD
LO. K.
ELLIOT, S.
EX~EftIMENTAL DETEIIMINATlON CALFO. F. D. NASA LEWIS 1 A NONCONTACTING ELECTftO-
OF TIlANSIENT STIlAIN IN A I!lON. P. 1. IlESEAIlCH CENTEIt OPTICAL EXTENSOHETEIt USED TO
THEftMALLY-CYCLED SIMULATED MEASUftE DISPLACEMENT IETWEEN
TUftllNE ILADE UTILIZING A ~AIlALLEL TAftGETS MOUNTED ON
NONCONTACT TECHNIQUE LEADING EDGE OF SIMULATED
TUIlIINE ILADE. THIS METHOD
COULD IE EXTftEMELY USEFUL IN
OEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF
A THEOIlY FOR PREDICTING
THERMAL FATIGUE LIFE OF
STIlUCTUIlAL COMPONENTS
CONCEPT FOftMULATlON STUDY NOftTHIlOP COIlP. NOIlTHItOP COItP. 1 THIS MPER ~RESENTS THE ftESULT
FOft" AUTOMATIC INSPECTION, ELECTftONICS SYSTEM OF A CONCEPT FOftHULATION STUDY
DIAGNOSTIC AND ~ftOGNOSTlC DIVISION FOft AN AUTOMATIC INSPECTION.
SYSTESM (AIDAPS) FINAL DIAGNOSTIC AND ~ROGNOSTIC SYS-
IlEPDftT, VOL. 1 TEM (AIDAPS) FOft ARMY AlftCRAFT
INTEGRATED ENGINE INSTIlUMENT SKOVHOLT. ll. L. GENERAL ELECTlllC 1 INTEGRATED ENGINE INSTftUMENT
SYSTEM COMPANY SYSTEM SYSTEM (lEIS) IS A COl1PUTEIl
DftlVEN DISnAY AND PftOCESSING
SYSTEM FOft MONITORING AlftCIlAFT
ENGINE CONDITION. THIS ftEPOftT
COVEftS THE ESTAILISHHENT OF
IlEQUIIlEHENTS AND SYSTEM DESIGN
OF lEIS
IH~IlOVED CAPA.ILlTIES TO ALCOftTA, J. A. PIIATT , WHITNEY 1 • LOW-LEVEL IIADIATION TECHNIQUE.
DETECT INCIPIENT 8EAftlNG PACKEIl, L. L. AlftCIlAFT GftOUP USING IftON-55 AS THE ftADID-
FAILUftE ACTIVE TAG. FOR DETECTION OF
WEAft IN GAS TUft81NE ENGINE
MAINSHAFT IEAftINGS. A GAS
flOW PftOPOftTIONAL COUNTEft WITH
COSMIC GUARD DETECTOft AND lACK
GIlOUND SHIELDING CONSTITUTES
THE LOW-LEVEL ftADIOACTIVE
MEASURING DEVICE FOft THE IftON-
55 COUNTING
·SOTA • UP TO DATE, IN USE. PftOVEN TECHNOLOGY ··NOVEL • NOT PftOVEN, ~ftOTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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Fl0l ('V) O'EIlATION AND -- ~ENEllAl ElECT~IC 10 2 TWO NOVEL IN-FLIGHT SENSO~S:
SE~VICE MANUAL 1. T4I 'YROMETE~. AN INFM~EDMDIATION SENSING DEVICE
(CONSISTING OF A SILICONE
CHIP PIIOTODIODE SENSOli AND
ElECTIIONICS 'ACKAGE) 'RO-
DUCING AN OUTPUT THAT IS AN
EXPONENTIAL OF TURIINE IlADE
TEMPE~A TUllE
2. FLAME SENSOII WHICH IS AN
UNTIlAVIOlET ~ADIATION SENS-
ING DEVICE USED FOil DETECT-
1NG THE PIIESEKCE OF FLAME
AT THE FlAMEHOlDE~ IN THE
AUGHENTEII
INTEGMTED EKGINE INSTIIUMENT SKOVHOlT, II. ,ENEMl ElECT~IC 1 AIIEAS OF SYSTEM DESIGN. HUMAN
SYSTEM FIKAl TECHNICAL ~E'ORT SYSTEM FACTOIIS AKD DIS'lAY EQUI'MENT
PHASE IV FO~ THE lEIS 'ROGRAM AilEDESC~I8ED IN THIS FINAL ~EPOIlT.
DIGITAL '~OCESSING TECHNIQUES
FOil CONVEIITING ANALOG PY~OMETE~
AND ACCElE~OMETER OUTPUTS TO
DIGITAL WO~DS FO~ FUIITHE~
'1I0CESSIKG.
SETE WOIIKSHO' 'IIOCEEOINGS, GOODMAN. D. M. ~lEET MISSILE - - - - - - OVE~VIEW OF 11'0 ACTIVITIES IN
ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOil YSTEMS AUTOMATION AND IUIlT-IN TEST
AUTOMATIC TESTIKG AKD lUllT- EQUI'MENT SPONSO~ED IY 000,
IN TEST EQUIPMENT (lITE) FOil NASA. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
TEST, MEASUREMENT AND DIAG- AKD INDUST~Y.
NOSTIC EQUIPMENT (THDE)
FEASIIIllTY STUDY FOil A VAMDI. , •. MYTHEON COH'ANY, 1 A VAMDI MASS SPECT~OHETE~ TUIE
HYD~OGEK GAS lEAK DETECTION ADAIII. II. 'ACE AND INF01\MA- DESIGNED FD~ USE IN A FLIGHT
SYSTEM AS IIEQUIIIED FOil USE SHAIECK. J. ION SYSTEMS HYO~OGEN lEAK DETECTO~ SYSTEM.
ON IN-FLIGHT EX'E~IMENTS - ~IVISION THE SYSTEM DETECTED lESS THAN
FINAL IIHO~T a HYDIIOGEN IN A ~ELlUMATMOSPHE~E AT 10- TO~~.
CONCE'T FORMULATIOK STUDY FO~
--
~OIlTHIIU' CO~'D~A- INST~UMENT PAIIAMETE~ LISTS FO~
AUTOMATIC INSPECTION, 10K. ELECTRONICS ARMY AI~CRAFT WHICH DEFINE THE
DIAGNOSTIC AND 'ROGNOSTIC DIVISION INTE~FACING REQUI~EMENTS
SYSTEMS (AIOAPS) APPENDIX 8ETWEEN MAINTENANCE ~EQUI~E·
F-AIOAPS PAIIAMETEII LISTS MENTS AND AIDAPS DATA COllEC-TlOIl FUNCTIOKS.
'SOTA • UP TO DATE. IN USE. '~OVEN TECHNOLOGY "NOVEL' KOT 'ROVEN. '1I0TOTYn TECHNOLOGY
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INSTRUMENTATION AND PROCESS GLASS, R. E. THE1lMAL PROCESSE' - - - - - - SANDIA NATIONAL LAIOMTORIES
CONTROL DEVELOPMENT FOR IN· DIVISION, SANDIA TESTING Df AN INVERTED THERMO-
SITU COAL GASIFICATION NATIONAL COUPLE AND A SUIlFACE ELECTftICAl
TWENTIETH QUAIlTEIlLY REPOftT: LAIDMTOIlIES IlESISTIVITY NETWORK FOil IN-
SEPTEMIEIl THROUGH NOVEMIEIl SITU COAL GASIFICATION
1919 EXPERIMENTS
UH-l H AI DAPS TEST lED PROGMM PIlOVENZANO, J. HAMILTON 1 SOTA HAIlDWARE TO PROVIDE AUTO-
VOlUME I AND II GAMES, J STANDAAD SYSTEM MATIC INSPECTION, DIAGNOSTIC
WYROSTEK, A. AND PROGNOSTIC MAINTENANCE
OSTHEIMER, A. FUNCTIONS ON SLECTED UH-IH
YOUNG, J. HELICOPTEIl SYSTEMS.
NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION 10LIS, E. NATO AGAIlOOGMPH .
-
.
- - -
THE FOLLOWING SOTA TECHNIQUES
PRACTICES, VOLUME I EDITOR NO. 201 FOil NONOESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
OF MATERIALS ARE DISCUSSED:
1. MOIOGIIAPH
2. MAGNETIC PAIITICLE
3. LIQUID PENETMNT
~. EDDY CURIlENT
5. ULTRASONIC
i. ACOUSTIC EMISSION
1. HOLOGIIAPHIC METHODS
USMMIIDL TECHNICAL REPORT WHITE, A. H. COLT INDUSTRIES • AN ADVANCED ELECTIIONIC ENGINE12-59 ADVANCED ENGINE CONTROL WILLS, D. F. CHANDLEIl-EVANS CONTROL SYSTEM FOil SMALL TUIlIO-
PROGMM INC., CONTIlOL SHAFT ENGINES. INSTIlUMENTATION
SYSTEMS DIVISION FEATURES A RADIATION PYROMETEIl
"EASUIlING TUftilNE ILADE TEMPEIl-
ATURE - UTILIZES A FLEXIILE
FlIU OPTIC CAlLE TO LINK HOT
ZONE APERATUIlE ASSEMILY TO
DETECTOIl ASSEMILY
INSTIlUMENTATION FOil NONCON- HADDEN, S. C. IlCA GOVEIlNllENT - . - - . - A SINGLE NONCONTRACTING TIIANS-
TRACT IC ENGINE TEST ANO HULLS, L. II. ANO COMMEIlCIAL DUCER AND SPEC IAL PUllPOSE CIR-
MONITOIlING SUTPHIN, E. M. SYSTEM/AUTOMATED CUITIlY WHICH EXTIIACTS ENGINE
SYSTEMS DIVISION SPEED INFOIlMATION ANO PERFORMS
SPECTftAL ANALYSIS FOil DIAG-
NOSTIC PURPOSES FOR INTERNAL
COMIUSTION ENGINES.
A ftADIATION PYROMETEIl IAIlBEIl, R. LAND PYIlOMETERS, 1 DESCRIIES THE PIlINCIPLE OF
DESIGNED FOR IN-FLIGHT INC. OPERATION AND DESIGN OF A
MEASUREMENT OF TURIINE lLADE RADIATION PYROMETER DEVELOPED
TEMPERATURES (SOCIETY OF TO MEASURE SUIlFACE TEMPEIlATUIlES
AUTOMOTI VE ENG INEUS) OF TUIlIiNE ILADES DURING FLIGHT
THE PYROMETER CAN MEASURE TEMP-
ERATURES AIOVE 1300 F TO AN
~CCURACY OF %10 F.
"SOTA • UP TO OATE, IN USE. PROVEN TECHNOLOGY ""NOVEL' NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ilEAL ~O~GOSHEV. O. NAVAL AIIl I AN OIL MONITOIl KNOWN AS A IlEAL
TIME FEIlROGIlAPH AND DTHEIl VALOIlI. Il. ~1l0~ULSION TIME FERIlOGRA~H USED FOilOIL MONITOIlS AS IlELATED TO CENTEIl DETECTING 1l0LLING CONTACT
OIL FILTIlATION FATIGUE Oil SCOIlING-TY~E FAIL-
UIlES. FEIlIlOGIlA~H IS EFFECTIVE
IN DETECTING FAILUIlES WHEN OIL
FILTIlATlON LEVEL IS AIOVE40
MICIlOMETERS.
FIIEIl O~TlC AND lASEIl MAIlGElllM. G. W. NAVAL ~OST- 2 TWO FIIEIl O~TIC ~IlESSUIlE
DIGITAL PIlESSUIlE TIlANSDUCEIl LEONAIlD. J. W. GRADUATE SCHOOL TIlANSDUCEIlS:
FUllS. A. E. I. FIIEIl OPTICAL DEVICE MEAS~
ING OUTPUT LIGHT FLUX FIlOM
A DIAPHIlAGM WHICH IS A
MEASUIlE OF ~IlESSUIlE.
2. DIGITAL ~IlESSUIlE TIlANSDutEIl
EMPLOYING MODULATION OF
LASEIl ~O\!EI\ IY USE OF A
MIRIlOIl ATIACHED TO THE
SENSING DIAPHRAGM.
STATUS OF THE EVALUATION OF IAUCUM. W. E. UNIVEIlSITY OF I MASS FLOWMETEIl UTILIZING
A COIlIOLIS EFFECT MASS FLO\!- TENNESSEE. SPACE COIlIOLIS FOIlCES GENERATED IV
METEIl FOil DENSE ~HASE COAL INSTITUTE FLOW OF A SUISTANCE TO MEASUIlE
FLOWS THE MASS WHICH GENEIlATES THE
FDIlCE
SUIlFACE ACOUSTIC WAVE UNOEIl- STAPLES. E. J. IlOCKWELL I ACOUSTICAL TY~E OF UNDEIlWATEIl
WATEIl SOUND SENSORS WISE. J INTEIlNATlONAL. SOUND DETECTOIl USING SURFACE
SCHOENWALD. J. S. ELECTIlONICS ACOUSTIC WAVE IlESONATOIl CON-
LIM. T. C. IlESEAIlCH CENTEIl TROLLED OSCILLATOIlS
DIGITAL QUARTZ ~RESSUIlE MilOS. J. M. ~AIlOSCIENTIFIC. I DIGITAL QUAIlTZ ~RESSUIlE TIlANS-
TIlANSDUCERS FOil FLIGHT INC. DUCEIlS USED ON THE F-ll1 AIIl-
APPLICATIONS CRAFT IN THE INTEGIlATED ~1l0-
~ULSION CONTIlOL SYSTEM
WIEGAND EFFECT: A NEW ~ULSE
-
SOC IElY OF AUTO- I A NOVEL TIlANSOUCEIl YIELDING
GENEIlATING OPTION MOTIVE ENGINEERS DIGITAL PULSES IN RESPONSE TO
INC. MOTION. THE WI EGAND MODULE HAS
SUCH ~OTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AS
IGNITION TIlIGGEIlS AND TACHO-
METEIlS AND S~EEDOMETEIlS IN
THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTIlY.
·SOTA • U~ TO DATE. IN USE. ~1l0VEN TECHNOLOGY "·NOVEL • NOT ~1l0VEN. ~1l0TOTY~E TECHNOLOGY
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TASK COM~LETION ItEPOItT SSME SSME ENGINEEItING ItOCKWELL " 2 SUItVEY ANO ANALYSIS OF OIGITAL
FLIGHT INSTItUMENTATION INTEItNATIONAL, ~ItESSUItE TItANSDUCERS AND
12 JUNE 1"0 ROCKETDYNE FliER O~TICAL S'EEO SENSOItS
ItI/ROIO-170 DIVISION FOIt SSME A~~LICATIONS.
NEItVA NUCLEAIt SUISYSTEM SWO~E, R. It. WESTINGHOUSE 1 A NOVEL HIGH TEM~EItATUItE
INSTRUMENTATION ELECTRIC THEItMOCOUPLE UTILIZING TUNG-
COIt~OItATION STEN/TUNGSTEN-26S ItHENIUM
THERMOCOU~L E WlitE IN A MOLY-
10ENUM SHEATH WITH ..0 VITItI-
flED lEADS FOIt INSULATION
(TEM'EItATUItE ItANGE 492 TO
4715 It)
TURlIHE ENG IHE INS~ECTION McCOItD, II. H. ~1tATT , WH lTNEY
-
.
- - - -
FIIItOSCO~E USED FOIt TUIIIINE
WITHOUT DISASSEMILY AIItCItAFT GItOUP ENGINE INS~ECTION.
APPLICATIONS OF ELECTItO- ALWANG, W. Q. ~ItATT , WHITNEY 13 NOVEL GAS TUItIINE ELECTItO-
OPTICAL INSTItUMENTATION AiltCItAFT GItOU, OPTICAL INSTItUMENTATION
INCLUDES:
1. OHICAL 'YItOMETEItS
2. !tAMAN SCATTEItING
VI.ItATION AND STItAIN
1. HOLOGItAPHY
2. S~ECKLE 'HOTOGItA'HY
3. OIFFItACTION GItATINGS
4. 1t0TOR ILADE TI~ OltiENTATION
USING omCAL SENSOIlS
5. REFLECTED LASEIt lEAH FOIt
DETEItMINING ROTOIt ILADE
VIlltATORY MODE SHA~ES
5. O~TICAL HETEItOOYNING
CLEAItANCE AND 0IsnACEMENT
1. oniCAL ~ItOXIMlTY PItOIES-
INTENSITY THE
2. O~TICAL 'ItOIES-
TRIANGULATION TY'E
3. IMAGING TY~ES OF DISPLACE-
MENT SENSOItS
flOW
1. HOLOGItA~HIC FLOW
VISUALI ZATION
2. LASEIt VELOCIMETItY.
*SOTA. U, TO DATE, IN USE, 'ItOVEN TECHNOLOGY **NOVEL • NOT 'ROVEN, 'ItOTOTY'E TECHNOLOGY
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A NOVEL FJlEft-OPTIC TEMpEft- DAftKIN. J. P. PLESSEY AAOAft 1 FJlEft OPTIC TEMpEftATUftE PftOIE
ATUftE plI.OIE KAHN. O. A. IlESEAftCH CENTEft CONSISTING OF A SILICA F1II1.EWAVEGUlOE TEftMINATEO IY AN
OPAQUE SHIELO (FOft USE IN
400 TO 1100 C AANGE)
FF41-A-2/A7E INFLIGHT ENGINE OeMOTI. L. ft. DETftOIT DIESEL 14 INFLIGHT ENGINE CONDITION MaN-
CONDITION MONITOIlING SYSTEM ALLISON GMC 1T0ftiNG SYSTEM FOft THE
(IECMS) TF41-A-2 AIRCAAFT GAS TUftllNE
ENGINE.
AIDS - EXPECTATIONS PAST. ALLISON. J. W. PMTI I WHITNEY - - - - - - THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE AIDS
PRESENT AND FUTUIlE DIECKMAN. T. W. AlftCRAFT GftOUP HAROWAftE INSTALLEO. SIGNIFI-
CANT PARAMETERS MONITOftEO. AND
AIDS PROGftAM HIGHLIGHTS Fall.
COMMEftC IAL AIII.CRAFT •
JT9D-7AlSP) JET ENGINE PEIl- II.ICHTE!'•• G. P. LEWIS II.ESEAII.CH - - - - - - THIS PAPEft PftESENTS A DISCUS-
FDII.MANCE DETEftlOMTION TftEND! CENTEll. S10N OF THE TEST PROGRAM AND
THE RESULTS OF THE DATA ANA-
LYSIS CONDUCTED ON THE plW
JT90 JET ENGINE
NEUTftON AAOIOGAApHIC NON- DANCE. W. E. ADVANCED 1
DESTII.ICTIVE EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY
AEftOSPACE STftUCTURES CENTEft. INC.
IMpftOVED CAPAIILlTIES TO ALCOftTA. J. A. PMTI I WHITNEY 1
DETECT INCIPIENT IEAII.ING PACKEft. L. L.
FAILUftE
APPLICATIONS OF ELECTftO- AL~S. G. A. UNIVEII.SITY OF 1
MAGNETIC ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCEft! NEW MEXICO
METHOO FOft MEASUIlING THE IACHALO. W. D. SpECTftON 1
SIZE AND VELQCITY OF SPHEIlES OEVELOPMENT
IY DUAL-IEAM LIGHT-SCATIEft LAIOMTOftIES.
INTEftFEftOMETIlY INC.
AN INSTftUMENT Fall spAAY IACHALO. W. O. SPECTftON 1
OftOpLET SIZE AND VELOCITY HESS, C. F. DEVELOPMENT
MEASUftEMENT HAftTWELL. C. A. LAIORATOftIES.
INC.
VISJlILlTY OF LAftGE SPHEftES FAftMEft. W. M. UNIVEftSITY OF 1
OISEftVEO WITH A LASEft TENNESSEE. SPACE
VELOCIMETEft: A SIMPLE MODEL INSTITUTE
"SOTA • UP TO DATE. IN USE. PftOVEN TECHNOLOGY ""NOVEL· NOT pftOVEN. PftOTDTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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LASER - IlAMAN DIAGNOSTICS OF WILLIAMS, W. D., ARO, INC., 1
TEMPERATUER AND NUMIER DENS- ET At. ARNOLD All' FORCE
lTV IN THE MIXING REGION OF STATION
A ROCKET ENGINE EXHAUST AND
A COFLDWING AIRSTREAM
TUMAILE DIODE LASER SULFURIC ~EARSON, E. F., LASER ANALYTI CS 1
ACIll STACK MONITORING SYSTEM MANTI, A. W.
COMIUSTION GAS MEASUREMENTS
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APPENDIX F
IN-FLIGHT AND BETWEEN-FLIGHT }lliASURANDS FOR DETECTION OF FAILURE
The di.agrams in this section show the in-flight and between-flight measurands
which can be used for detection of each failure mode from Task I and shown in
Appendix C.
The 16 failure modes covered herein were determined by an analysis of 86,000
actually experienced failures.
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APPENDIX G
IN-FLIGHT CONDITION,MONITORING SENSOR GRADING
In this section, candidate sensors are graded with respect to ideal sensors for
their usefulness in detecting each class of rocket engine failure. The grading
is based on the lumped technical and economic descriptors described in Table 23,
including physical, electronic and functional requirements, detectability, dura-
bility, safety and cost. The development time required for each sensor to be lIsed
for the given application is also listed, and an overall grade is given, again
with respect to an ideal sensor.
TABLE 23. LUMPED DESCRIPTORS
TECHNICAL REOUIREMENTS:
• PHYSICAL
• WEIGHT
• SPACE
• STRENGTH
• MATERIALS
• CHEMICALS
• RESONANCE
• FATIGUE
• ELECTRONIC
• POWER. COMSUMPTION
• VOLTAGE
• CURRENT
• WIRING
• FILTERING
• AMPLIFICATION
• ANALOG/DIGITAL
• MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
• LINEARIZATION
• SHIELDING
• FUNCTIONAL
• INTRUSIVE
• POWER LOSS (PARASITIC)
TECHNICAL FEATURES:
-----..------
• DETECTABILITY
• SPEED
• ACCURACY
• REPEATABILITY
• SENSITIVITIY
• RESOLUTION
• DRIFT
• ARTIFACTS
• SUSCEPTIBILITY
• SAFETY
• FAILSAFE
• FAILURE EFFECTS
• DUftABILlTY
• RECALIBRATION
• INSPECTION
• LIFE
ECONOMICAL:
• EXPENDITURES
• R&D
• INTEGRATION
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00 TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF COOLANT PASSAGE LEAKAGE/RESTRICTION (NO.2)
DESC"II"TORS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOttMENT
REQUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXI"ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
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w
I"ERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 !M) $' $1 $1 10 0 10 110
PRESSURE SENSORS
QUARTZ, DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 8 60 50 250 300 7 1 9 76
FIBEROPTIC 7 2 18 6 18 8 59 200 250 450 5 3 7 71
LASER DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 7 59 300 250 550 4 4 6 69
SAW, DIGITAL 7 3 18 6 18 7 59 200 250 450 5 2 8 72
ULTRASONIC THERMOMETER, 6 5 20 12 20 6 69 100 200 300 7 3 7 83
FLAME
ULTRASONIC FLOWMETER. 10 5 20 6 20 9 70 50 150 200 8 2 8 86
NOZZLE
POLAROGRAPH 2 4 10 14 10 4 44 250 450 700 3 6 4 51
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 12 19 7 60 300 300 600 4 6 4 68
SPECTROMETER
rUXTURE RATIO
1 - IN THOUSANDS
..
•
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..
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0\
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TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF HIGH-TURBOPUMP TORQUE (NO.5)
DESCPlII"TOPlS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOl"MENT
PlEQUIPlEMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXI"ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>-
tJ I- Z-' :;j ~ 0 -'z C iii -' ~ ~Z ~ -'-' 0 0 g :;j C ~ -'C >- iii a: CIIIu c ~ Z III en IIIt I- Cl 0 a: ~ cOiii III III C :J: 0 III Z C C IIIC>- III Z l- ll. a: U I- 0 >c
SENSOPIS :J: -' :;) III C :;) III • Z U
C III a: OCl
L III U. 0 III 0 I- a: - III Cl >- Cl
I"ERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 $1 Sl 'Sl 10 0 10 110
RTD THERMOMETER 6 8 18 4 18 4 58 50 200 250 7 2 8 73
OPTICAL TACHOMETER 6 8 20 12 15 8 69 200 200 400 6 2 8 83
ACCELEROMETER 9 5 20 1 20 9 64 70 150 220 7 3 7 78
ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR 7 5 20 18 18 7 75 500 500 1000 0 6 4 79
HYDROPHONE 7 5 20 6 18 6 62 50 150 200 8 2 8 78
FERROMAGNETIC TORQUE- 5 10 20 15 15 10 76 500 400 900 1 7 3 80
METER
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 16 18 8 74 300 300 600 4 6 4 82
SPECTROMETER
1 - IN THOUSANDS
N
........
o TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF CRACKED TURBINE BLADE (NO.6)
DESCRI..,.ORS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOI"MENT
REQUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXI"ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>
rJ I- Z... :::; > 0 ...
Z C ii I- ... ~ C. ... Z :::; C C.J ...0 0 C C.J :E ...C a:: I- > ii a:: III III CIIIC.J E 0 enI- C.J I- Z Cl 0 a:: 0 eO;;; C.J III III C :z: 0 III Z C < C wCZ l- lL. a:: C.J o·> III
•
l- e III e >cSENSORS :z: ... :l III C :l III Z C.J 00
... III IL. 0 en 0 I- a::
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III 0 > 0
I"ERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 80 $1 $1 $1 10 0 10 110
PRESSURE SENSORS2
QUARTZ DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 8 62 50 250 300 7 1 9 78
FIBEROPTIC 9 2 18 6 18 8 61 200 250 450 5 3 7 73
LASER DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 61 300 250 550 4 4 6 71
SAW DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 61 200 250 450 5 2 8 74
PYROMETER 8 5 20 14 16 9 72 100 300 450 6 2 8 86
VIBRATION3 9 5 20 1 20 9 63 20 250 270 7 1 9 79
HYDROPHONE3 8 5 20 6 18 6 62 50 250 300 7 2 8 77
FIBEROPTIC BEARING 6 7 20 10 18 8 69 200 400 600 4 3 7 80
DETECTOR
EXO-ELECTRON DETECTOR 3 4 10 15 12 7 51 300 300 600 4 7 3 58
EDDY CURRENT DETECTOR 3 4 10 12 12 8 49 50 300 300 6 3 7 62
EMAT DETECTOR4 3 4 10 14 12 8 51 150 300 450 5 4 6 62
1 - IN THOUSANDS
2 - TRANSIENTS
3 - CHIPPED BLADE
4 - EMAT - ELECTROMAGNETIC ACOUSTIC TRANSDUCER
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TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF CRACKED CONVOLUTIONS, BELLOWS, SHIELDS (NO.7)
DESCRI".ORS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT
REOUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXPENDITW'E TOTAL TIME TOTAL
rJ ~ z_ ..J ;:j ~ 0 ..JZ e ii ..J ~ CS..J Z ;:j CS ..Je 0 0 e ~ ..Ja: ~ ~ ~ ii Z a: w lit w ewCJ ~ CJ e CI 0 Q C 0 a:Oiii CJ w w :I: Q w Z C e e we> w Z ~ IA. C CJ ~ 8 a: >cSENSORS :I: ..J :;) W e :;) w • Z w C OCIL W IA. 0 lit Q ~ a:
-
w CI > CI
PERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 $1 $1 '$1 10 0 10 110
PRESSURE SENSORS
QUARTZ. DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 8 62 50 250 300 7 1 9 78
FIBEROPTIC 9 2 18 6 18 8 61 200 250 450 5 3 7 73
LASER. DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 61 300 250 550 4 4 6 71
SAW DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 61 200 250 450 5 2 8 74
RTD THERMOMETER 6 8 18 4 18 4 58 50 200 250 7 2 8 73
ACCELEROMETER 9 5 18 1 18 9 62 70 150 220 7 3 7 76
GYDROPHONE 7 5 18 10 16 6 62 50 150 200 8 2 8 78
1 - IN THOUSANDS
N
'-J
N TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF BALL BEARING FEATURES (NO.9)
DESCRIPTORS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOI"MENT
REOUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXI"ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>l- I Z~ .... :::; ....> 0 eZ e ii I- .... ~
.... Z :::; e (,,) ....
e 0 0 e (,,) e :E ....(,,) E t I- > ii Z II: 0 W CIS w ewI- (,,) l- e 0 0 II: 0 11:0en (,,) w W II: :J: 0 w Z e < e we> w Z I- Y- (,,) I- 0 >ESENSORS :J: .... ~ w e ~ w 01 Z (,,) II: w E 00L W Y- o CIS 0 l- II:
-
W 0 > 0
I"ERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 !to $' $' $' 10 0 10 110
OPTICAL TACHOMETER 6 8 20 12 15 8 69 200 200 400 6 2 8 83
ISOTOPE DETECTOR 7 5 20 18 18 7 75 -500 500 1000 0 6 4 79
FIBEROPTIC DETECTOR 6 7 20 19 18 8 77 200 400 600 4 3 7 88
RTD THERMOMETER 6 8 20 4 18 4 60 50 200 250 7 2 8 75
ACCELEROMETER 9 5 20 1 20 9 64 70 150 220 7 3 7 78
HYDROPHONE 7 8 20 10 18 6 69 50 150 200 8 2 8 85
FERROMAGNETIC 5 10 20 15 15 10 75 500 400 900 1 7 3 79
TORQUEMETER ,
EXO-ELECTRON DETECTOR 3 4 10 15 12 7 51 300 500 800 2 7 3 56
TURNABLE DIODE LASER 8 . 5 19 16 18 8 74 300 300 600 4 6 4 82
SPECTROMETER
EDDY CURRENT DETECTOR 3 4 10 10 12 8 47 50 300 350 6 3 7 60
EMAT2 3 4 10 12 12 8 49 150 300 450 5 4 6 60
1 - IN THOUSANDS
2 - EMAT - ELECTROMAGNETIC ACOUTIC TRANSDUCER
~
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TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF TURBINE SEAL LEAKAGE (NO. 11)
..
!'J
-J
W
TECHNICAL ECONOMICALDESC"lftTO"S DEVELOPMENT
"EQUI"EMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EXPENDITU..E TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>
tJ ~ z ...... ::::i ~ 0 ~i 4( ii ... ~ ...... Z 4( ::::i ~ ~ ...4( 0 0 ~ ~ i i II: 110I en 110I 4(110I0 II: fi 0 CI Q II: ~ ~~iii ~ 110I 110I :I: 110I Z 4( 4(0 II: Q 0> 110I Z ~ I&. 0
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~ II: 110I C >11:SENSO"S :I: ... ::;) 110I 4( ::;) 110I ! 0 el > el OelL 110I II. Q en Q ~ II: 110I
PE"FECT sco"e 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 $1 $1 '$1 10 0 10 110
RTD THERMOMETER 6 8 20 4 18 4 60 50 200 250 7 2 8 75
OPTICAL TAC~OMETER 6 8 20 12 15 8 69 200 200 400 6 2 8 83
ACCELEROMETERS 9 5 20 1 20 8 64 70 150 220 7 3 7 78
ISOTOPE SEAL DETECTOR 7 5 20 18 18 7 75 500 500 1000 0 6 4 79
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 16 18 8 74 300 300 600 4 6 4 82SPECTROMETER
1 - IN THOUSANDS
N
......
~ TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORSFOR DETECTION OF VALVE FAILURES (NO. 13)
DESCR,'TORS TECHNICAL
ECONOMICAL
DEVELO'MENT
REQUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EX'ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>
~ I- Z.... :::; ~ 0
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z c ii .... ~ ~.... Z :::; e ....e 0 0 e u i ....
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'ERFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 90 S1 S1 'S1 10 0 10 110
PRESSURE SENSORS
QUARTS. DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 8 62 50 250 300 7 1 9 78
FIBEROPTICS 9 2 18 6 18 8 61 200 250 450 5 3 7 73
LASER, DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 61 300 250 550 4 4 6 71
S.A.W., DIGITAL 9 3 18 6 18 7 71 200 250 450 5 2 8 74
ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR 7 5 16 18 18 7 71 300 300 600 4 6 4 79
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 16 18 8 74 500 500 1000 0 6 4 78
1 - IN THOUSANDS
" •
•TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF INTERNAL LEAKS (NO. 14)
--
N
"VI
DESCRII'TORS TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL
REQUIREMENTS
DEVELOI'MENT
FEATURES TOTAL EXI'ENDITURE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
>
~ I- Z..J ::::i > 0 ..JZ C ii I- ..J i= C
..J Z C ::::i C U ..JC 0 0 u C ~ ..J
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Q I- a: IU 0 > 0 00
I'EftFECT SCORE 10 10 20 20 20 10 !to $1 $1 $1 10 0 10 110
ULTRASONIC THEm~OMETER 6 5 20 12 20 6 69 100 200 300 7 3 7 83
ACCELEROMETERS 9 5 20 1 20 9 64 70 150 220 7 3 7 78
ISOTOPE DETECTOR 7 5 20 18 18 7 75 500 500 1000 0 6 4 79
HYDROPHONE 7 5 20 6 18 6 62 50 150 200 8 2 8 78
TUNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 16 18 8 74 300 300 600 4 6 4 82
SPECTRO~lETER
I
1 - IN THOUSANDS
N
--.J
0' TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC GRADING OF IN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC SENSORS
FOR DETECTION OF REGULATOR FAILURES (NO. 15)
- - -_. _. ..-
DESCPlI..-rOPlS TECHNICAL
ECONOMICAL
DEVELOPMENT
PlEQUIREMENTS FEATURES TOTAL EX..ENDITUPIE TOTAL TIME TOTAL
rJ ~ z ...... ::::; ~ 0Z 01( ii oJ ~ CSz CS ...oJ 0 0 01( ::::; :i ...01( I- > ~ I: w ~!u a:: E Z 0 en wI- U I- 0 0 I: ~iii u w w :z: 0 w Z 01( 01( wol(> w Z l- I&. a:: U .. I- 0- I: W I: >1:SENSO"S :z: oJ :::l w 01( :::l w ~ U 00L W I&. 0 en C I- a:: w 0 > CI
..EPlFECT SCOPIE 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 $1 $1 -S1 10 0 10 110
TURNABLE DIODE LASER 8 5 19 16 18 8 74 300_ 300 600 4 6 4 82
SPECTROMETER
ISOTOPE WEAR DETECTOR 7 5 20 18 18 7 75 500 500 1000 0 6 4 79
1 - IN THOUSANDS
• -"
" ....ENDIX H. LITERATURE SURVEYED FOR
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APPENDIX H
LITERATURE SURVEYED FOR BETHEEN-FLIGHT INSPECTION
A survey was undertaken to find inspection technology which could be applicable
to reusable rocket engines between flights. This survey included computer liter-
ature searches, periodical reviews, and personal visits. Representative literatlJre
was enumerated and the inspection techniques uncovered were then summarized. This
appendix indicates the 56 documents that were tabulated as a result of this survey.
The sequence shown represents only the order in which the literature was reviewed.
Table 24 is a tabulation indicating the title, author(s), source organization
which actually performed the study or tests, level of development (Novel, Rocket
Engine, or state-of-the-art), and remarks for each document .
Table 25 gives the reference information needed to obtain the literature,
listed to correspond to the tabulation numbering of Table 24 •
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TABLE 24. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE SEARCH FOR BETWEEN-FLIGHT CONDITION MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES
IN·FLlGHT IETWEEN·FLIGHT
I-
'"
• I- ~~ . I- C.C'" .. C"' I- ..1-" Oil: ~ 1-" 51 '"51i .. z 51g >NUMIER TITLE AUTHOR SOURCE 0 0 0 REMARKSz z II: Z
1 MAINTAINA~ILITY OF THE SPACE GOE, ~.1. ~OCKETDYNE 3 1 EARLY SSME MAINTENANCE
SHUTTLE OR8ITE~ MAIN ENGINE CONCEPTS
2 DIVE~SIFICATION OF ACOUSTICAL COLLINS, DR. H. HOLOSONICS, INC. 1 ACOUSTICAL IMAGING TECH-
HOLOGftAPHY AS A NONDESTRUCT NIQUES FOR CftACK
INSPECTION TECHNIQUE TO DETECTION
DETERMINE AGING DAMAGE IN
SOLID ~OCKET MOTORS
3 WELDED ROTO~ INSPECTION SUSHIEL, J. AVCO LYCOMING 2 ULTftASONIC AND ACOUSTIC-
DEVELOPMENT P~OJECT T55-J-027 VICTOR, S. EMISSION INSPECTION OF
. PAUL, J • GAS TURIINE POWER SHAFTS
4. USE OF LASER-POWE~ED OPTICAL HARDY, H. D. PRATT 1 WHITNEY 1 ~OTATING COMPONENT CLEAR-
~~OXIMITY PROlE IN ADVANCED AIRCftAFT ANCE MEASUREMENT
TU~IOFAN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT
5 ENGINE CONDITION MONITOR HEGNER, H. ~. ITT ~ESEARCH 2 DETECTI ON OF ILADE DAMAGE
SYSTEM TO DETECT FOREIGN INSTITUTE AND CftACK DEVELOPMENT IN
08JECT DAMAGE AND CRACK AIRCftAFT ENGINES
DEVELOPMENT
6 A SYSTEMS ENGINEE~ING LEIIY, D. W. GENERAL ELECT~IC 1 INTEGRATED CONDITION
AP~~OACH TO EFFECTIVE ENGINE MONITORING SYSTEM FOR
CONDITION MONITO~ING AIRCftAFT ENGINES
7 FROM CRACKING CRACKS TO lAlLEY, C. D. LOCKHEED -
IREAKING BEAMS, A REV I EW OF LEWIS, W. H. GEORGIA CO. 1 DETECTION OF CRACK INI-
ACOUSTIC EMISSION FOR AI~- TIATION AND G~OWTH IN
CRAFT STRUCTURE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES
8 STATE OF THE ART OF NON- COMASSA~, D.M. GENEftAL ELECTRIC 3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION OF ULTRASONIC, EDDY CU~RENT,
AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND PENET~ANT INSPECTIONS
9 HIGH RESOLUTION RADIOGRAPHY PA~ISH, ~. W. AE~E 1 X-MY, GAMMA RAY. AND
IN THE AERO-ENGINE INDUST~Y PA~TICLE RADIOGftAPHY
JO WEAR DEIRIS ANALYSIS PARR, N. L. ~OYAL AIRCRAFT 1 LUIRICANT PMTICLE DETEC-
RiTCHIE, J. ESTAILISHMENT TION AND ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES
11 HIGH RESOLUTION ULTMSONIC MORAN, 1. J. AI~ FORCE 1 DETECTION AND CHARAC-
NONDEST~UCTIVE TESTING OF MATE~IALS TERIZATION OF FLAWS
COMPLEX GEOMETRY COMPONENTS LAIO~ATORY
..
*SOTA = UP TO DATE, IN USE, P~OVEN TECHNOLOGY **NOVEL = NOT PROVEN, P~OTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
•
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~TABLE 24. (CONTINUED)
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IN·FLlGHT .ElWEEN·FLlGHT
..
W
". .. c .. cuC W 15 C W "0 ...
.. " .. " S~ wsg .. g~ >NUM.EII TITLE AUTHOII SOUIICE 0 0 IIEMAIIKSc z z
12 NONDEST~UCTIVE METHODS FO~ GREEN, R.E., JR. THE JOHN 4 2 SURVEY OF FATIGUE DAMAGE
THE EMLY DETECTION OF HO~KINS DETECT ION METHODS
FATIGUE DAMAGE IN AIRCRAFT UNIVERSITY
COMPONENTS
13 FEASilILITY DEMONST~ATION OF JACOIY, J. L. TRW SYSTEMS 1 INSPECTION OF TU~IINE
USING PULSE LASE~ HOLOGRAPHIC WRIGHT, J. E. GROUP ILADES ON FULLY ASSEM-
TECHNIQUES TO INSPECT NAVAL ILED TUR81NE WHEELS
AI~CMFT ENGINE COMPONENTS
14 ACOUSTIC EMISSION TECHNOLOGY GREEN, A. 1. ACOUSTIC EMIS- 1 STATE OF ACOUSTIC EMIS-
1979 SION TECHNOLOGY SION METHODS IN 1979
CORP.
15 AN OPERATIONAL 150KV MICRO- FONTlJN, L. A. INSTI TUTE OF 1 HIGH-SENSITIVITY X-RAY
FOCUS ~OD ANODE X-MY SYS- PEUGEOT, ~. S. APPLI EO PHYS ICS TECHNIQUE
TEM FO~ NONDEST~UCTIVE NETH. & RIOGE
TESTING INST~UMENT CO.
16 HOLOGRAPHY AS A ROUT INE HOCKLEY, I. S. ~OLLS-~OYCE , 1 HOLOGRA~HIC INSPECTION OF
METHOD OF VilRATION IUTTE~S, J. N. LTD. AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPRES-
ANALYSIS SOR 8LADES AND TURI! NE
WHEELS
17 CO~~ELATIONS IETWEEN ADVANCE TELLER, C.M. SOUTHWEST 2 PULSE-ECHO SURFACE WAVE
NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION ET. AL. ~ESEA~CH ULTRASONIC ANO MAGNETIC
METHODS AND FMCTU~E MECH- INSTITUTE PERTURMTION DETECTION OF
ANICS ~AAAMETERS FATIGUE C~ACKS
11 FATIGUE DAMAGE DETECTION HAWO~TH, W. L. WAYNE STATE 1 FATIGUE MONITORING USING
IN 2024 ALUMINUM ALLOY IY HEilER, A. F. UNIVE~SITY OPTI CAL HOLOGM~HY
OPTICAL CO~~ELATION MUELLER, ~. K.
19 ACOUSTIC HA~ONIC GENERA- MO~~IS, W. L. ~OCKWELL INTER- 1 FATIGUE DAMAGE DETECTION
TION DUE TO FATIGUE OAMAGE lUCK, O. NATIONAL SCIENCE WITH ACOUSTIC SECONO
IN HIGH-ST~ENGTH ALUMINUM INMAN, R. V. CENTE~ HARMONIC GENEAATION
20 STUDY OF A FLIGHT MONITOR IA~RANGE~, J. P. NASA LEWIS 1 1 EDDY CURRENT DETECTION
JET ENGINE DISK CRACKS ~ESEA~CH CENTE~ OF CRACKS AND ~REOIC-
THE CRITICAL LENGTH C~I- TION OF FAILU~E
TE~ION OF FAACTU~E
MECHANICS
21 APPLICATIONS OF ELECTRO- ALWAG, W. G. ~RATT & WHITNEY 5 REV I EW OF SOTA OPTI CAL
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTATION AIRCRAFT INST~UMENTATION
IN lURIINE ENGINE
DEVELOPMENT
'SOTA : U~ TO DATE, IN USE, PROVEN TECHNOLOGY "NOVEL; NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
N
00
o
TABLE 24. (CONTINUED)
IN·FLlGHT IElWEEN·FLlGHT
.. ..w w
'" '"... «u .. «u«w a~ «w .. 0 ..... '" .. '" 51::; w
NUMIEft 518 lil~ >TITLE AUTHOft SOURCE 0 0 0 ftEMARKSIe z Z z
22 NONDESTftUCTI VE TESTING, VARIOUS SOUTHWEST 10 3 A SURVEY OF NDE
A SUftVEY ftESEAftCH TECHNIQUES
INSTITUTE
23 FIIEft-OPTIC CAMEftA RADDING. A. UNKNOWN 1 TI P-MOUNTED FI~Eft-O~TICCAMEAA CONCEPT
24 A STUDY OF PLASTIC DE FORMA- IAXTER, W. J. GENERAL MOTORS 1 EXOELECTftON DETECTION
TION ~Y EXOELECTftON ftESEAftCH OF FATIGUE
EMISSION LA~OftATOftIES
25 MICftO~ROCESSOR MSED AUTO- MOTTIER UNITED TECH- 1 VEftSATILE PROGRAMMED SCAN
MATIC HETEftODYNE NOLDGIES INTERFEROMETEft
INTERFEftOMETER RESEARCH CENTEft
26 CRITICAL INSPECTION OF ~EAft- MftTON, J. R. SOUTH RESEARCH 1 AUTOMATIC QUANTITATIVE
INGS FOR LIFE EXTENSION KUSEN~EftGEft, F. N. INSTITUTE NO I OF ~EAft I NG COMPONENTS
SMITH, R. T.
27 DEVELOPMENT OF LMF~R STEAM MAGEE, P.M. GENERAL 1 ACOUSTIC LEAK DETECTION
GENERATOR LEAK PROTECTION GERRELS, L£. ELECTRIC SYSTEM
SYSTEMS GREENE. D. A.
McKEE, J.
28 A CftYOGENIC LINE LEAK ALLAN, D. S. ARTHUft D. 1 CONTINUOUS LINE LEAK
DETECTOft SCHIFF. D. S. LITTLE. INC. MONITOftING
29 INDUSTftIAL APPLICATIONS OF LYNNWOftTH. L. C. ~AftAMETRICS, 11 IftOAD REVIEW OF APPLICA-
ULTftASOUND - A REVIEW INC. TIONS OF ULTRASOUND
30 MONITOftING OF LNG VAPOR HINCKLEY. E. D. JET PftOPULSION 2 TWO-MND DIFFERENTIAL
LAIORATOftY ftADIOMETER AND LASER LEAK
DETECTOftS
31 NONDESTftUCTIVE EVALUATION KUSENIEftGEft, F.N. SOUTHWEST 5 MAGNETIC PEftTURBATION
OF METAL FATIGUE E1. AL. RESEARCH ULTftASONIC SUftFACE WAVE,
INSTITUTE AND MRKHAUSEN NOISEANALYSIS FLAW DETECTION
32 NONDESTRUCTIVE INS~ECTION KftASKA, 1. ft. GENEftAL 1 EDDY CURftENT INSPECTION
METHOD FOR JET ENGINE ~ERNDT. W. L. AMEftICAN OF TUft~INE ILADES
TUft~INE ~LADES TftANSPORTATION
/
33 DESIGN OF AN ENDOSCOPIC LACHIVER, G. UNIVERSITY OF 1 CONTROLLED AftTICULATION
CAftftIEft WITH COMPLETE SUEFERT, W. D. SHER~ROOKE , FliER OPTIC CARftIEft
DIftECTlONAL CONTftOL QUEIEC
34 FATIGUE DAMAGE DETECTION MRTON. J. R. SOUTHWEST 5 METHODS, USES, LIMITS
KUSENIERGER, F. N ftESEARCH AND FUTURE OF DETECTING
INSTITUTE FATIGUE
*SOTA = UP TO DATE, IN USE, PftOVEN TECHNOLOGY **NOVEL = NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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TABLE 24. (CONTINUED)
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IN·FLlGHT IETWEEN·FLlGHT
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"" . '"... .'" . ..
.'".... .. 0 ... .... .. 0 ...
.. '" a~ ... .. '" lil"' ...
NUMIlEIl s~ > lil~ ~ >TITLE ....UTHOIl IOUIlCE i i i ftEMAftKSZ
35 THE USE OF OPTICAL ~ROCESS- MA~KEVITCH, I.V. AMPEX CO~~. 1 HIGH ~ESOLUTION ENGINE
ING OF ENGINE VIUATION ROOAL, D. ~. S~ECTAAL ANALYSIS USING
DATA AS A MEANS OF ~~E- I~OWN, H. OPTICAL DEFRACTION
DICTING FAILU~ES
36 IMP~OVED COMIUSTION CHAMIER WALKE~. J. LTV AE~OSPACE 1 SPHERICAL VIEWING ~ERI-
OPTICAL P~08E CO~P. SCOPE-TYPE PROlE FOR
THllUST CHAl41ERS
37 llESIDUAL ST~ESSES IN GAS &ARTON, J. R. SOUTHWEST 1 RESIDUAL STRESS MEASURE-
TU~IlINE ENGINE COMPONENTS KUSEN8E~GE~, F. N. ~ESEARCH MENTS USING IlARKHAUSEN
FROM IARKHAUSEN NOISE INSTITUTE NOISE ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
38 AUTOMATED JET ENGINE 8LADE ROTHFUSZ, R. W. IENDIX RESEARCH 1 AUTOMATED DYE·PENETRANT
INSPECTION SYSTEM LA80AATOR I ES FLAW DETECTION
39 TUR81NE ENGINE LU8~ICATIDN ZIEM~TH, H. K. GARRETT 10 TU~IINE ENGINE CDNDl-
AND MOVING PARTS CHECKOUT CHANG. J. D. AI~ RESEARCH TION MONITD~ING TECH-
KUKEL, J. NIQUES STUDY
40 THE DETERMINATION OF HYDRO- lERMAN, D. A. NAVAL AIll 1 IN-S lTU DETECTION OF
GEN IN HIGH STftENGTH STEEL IECK, W. DEVELOPMENT HYDROGEN CONTENT IN
STRUCTURES IY AN ELECTRO- DeLUCCIA, J. J. CENTER METALLIC ST~UCTURES
CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE
41 FLAT -lASED WATER VAPOR WIEOIJK. P. NV ~HILIPS 1 WATE? VAPO~ DETECTOR
SENSOR OF THE PHOSPHORUS GLOEILAMPEN- FO~ 80TH ATMOSPHHIC
PENTOX IDE TYPE FAeRIEKEN AND VACUUM SYSTEM
42 AN ANGULM DISPLACEMENT WELSH, 8. L. ROYAL AIRCRAFT 1 FIlER OPTIC ROTATIONI
TRANSDUCER ESTAILI SHMENT DISPLACEMENT TAANSDUCE~
43 AADlOACTIVE GAS ~ENETRANT EDDY. W. C., JR. INDUSTRIAL 1 DETECTION OF FLAWS USING
SYSTEM: A ~EPORT ON INITIAL NUCLEONICS KRY~TON-85 PENETAANT
P~ODUCT APPLICATION CORP.
44 DIAGNOSTIC SONICS FO~ GAS ZAIRISKIE. C.J. CURTISS-WRIGHT 1 MONITORING OF TUR81NE
TUR81NE ENGINES CORP. ENGINE COMPONENTS WITHSONIC ANALYSIS
45 A TRANSMITTER FO~ DIAGNOSTIC WANG, K. ET. AL. CULLEN COLLEGE 1 SCANNING-FOCUSED ACOUS-
IMAGING OF ENG INEER I NG TIC BEAM USING AN OPTO-
AND UNIVEllSITY ACOUSTI C T~ANSDUCE~
OF CALI FORN IA
AT SANTA
8ARMAA
'SOTA = UP TO DATE, IN USE. PROVEN TECHNOLOGY "NOVEL = NOT PROVEN, PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGY
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TABLE 24. (CONCLUDED)
IN-FLIGHT aElWEEN-FLIGHT
~ :;;...
" ".~ .. ~ ....... ~o ..... ~o ...~" 00: .. " 00: ...
NUMaEIl TITLE lil~ .. z 0" .. ~ >AUTHOIl SOUIlCE 0 .,~ ~ IlEMAIlKSz z
4i MAXIMUM SU~FACE TEM~ERATURE GOODMAN, ~. ~ANAMET~ICS, 1 ~OST FACTO DETERMINATION
IY MEANS OF KftY~TONATES INC. OF MAXIMUM SU~FACE
TEMPEAATU~E
47 MIC~OWAVE TECHNIQUES FO~ IAH~, A. J. S~I INTE~NA- 1 DETECTION OF FLAWS IN
NONDEST~UCTIVE EVALUATION TIONAL CERAMICS USING MICRO-
OF CEAAMICS WAVES
41 TOWA~DS ~MCTICAL NONDES- WEISS, V. SYMCUSE 1 2 X-AAY DIFFAACTION, ULTAA-
T~UCTIVE FATIGUE DAMAGE OSHIDA, Y. UNIVERSITY SONIC A~SO~PTION AND
INDICATO~S WU, A. ~HASE-CHANGE FATIGUE
DAMAGE MONITORING
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API"ENDIX I. 8ETWEEN-FLIGHT
TECHNOLOGY
APPENDIX I
BETWEEN-FLIGHT TECHNOLOGY GRADING
The method for evaluation and ranking of the technologies was developed in coopera-
tion with the Task II effort. The evaluation method selected was, as in Task II,
a hybrid approach: first, two clear-out screens were identified and applied to
the techniques. Lumped descriptors, each made up of many specific descriptors,
were then defined. The technologies applicable to each failure mode were graded
using these lumped descriptors, thus providing a ranking of the techniques. All
techniques were assumed to be equally developed for use on rocket engines. This
appendix shows the technology grading performed for each failure mode. The scores
given for technical lumped descriptors were summed to give an overall technical
score. Economic costs were subtracted from savings, resulting in an overall
savings figure. An economic grade was then assigned based on one point for each
nearest $100,000 in savings. The development grade was determined by subtracting
one point, from a maximum of 10 points, for each year required for development.
Thus, three grades were obtained for each technology in each failure mode.
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK $oaK $oaK 10 0 10 120
ULTRASONIC FLAW 5 4 5 7 5 7 3 36 100 30 200 70 1 2 8 45
ISOTOPE THERMOMETRY 6 5 4 7 4 8 3 37 200 20 100 (120 0 3 7 44
ISOTOPE TRACERS 12 7 5 17 5 16 2 64 200 30 600 370 4 3 7 75
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 13 7 7 12 6 14 2 61 100 20 500 380 4 1 9 74
BORESCOPING 5 6 8 4 8 7 3 41 50 20 0 (70 0 0 10 51
EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION 7 4 4 8 5 7 3 38 200 30 200 (30 0 3 7 45
POSITRON ANNIHILATION 6 1 4 7 5 6 3 32 300 30 200 (130 0 4 6 38
EDDY CURRENT 6 5 5 6 7 6 3 38 100 30 200 70 1 1 9 48
TORQUING 12 7 7 10 8 10 2 56 0 10 0 (10 0 0 10 66
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK $-K $ -K· 10 0 10 120
ULTRASONIC FLAW 14 5 6 14 6 12 8 65 50 10 400 340 3 2 8 76
ACOUSTIC EMISSION 10 5 5 6 7 13 1 48 200 20 600 380 4 3 7 59
X-RAY RADIOGRAPHY 8 5 4 10 5 10 6 48 100 10 200 90 1 1 9 58
PENETRANTS 10 8 3 14 4 7 3 49 20 10 0 (30 0 0 10 59
HOLOGRAPHIC DEFLECTION 16 3 4 14 5 16 8 66 300 20 600 280 3 4 6 75
EXO-ELECTRON EMISSION 14 4 5 18 5 14 8 68 200 10 600 390 4 3 7 79
POSITRON ANNIHILATION 10 1 4 14 4 10 8 51 300 20 200 (120 0 4 6 57
ELECTRIC CURRENT INJECTION 12 5 6 12 5 14 7 61 200 10 600 390 4 3 7 72
EDDY CURRENT 12 5 7 12 6 14 8 64 100 10 500 390 4 1 9 77I
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK $-K $eeK 10 0 10 120
ISOTOPE THERMOMETRY 5 6 3 8 3 8 2 35 200 50 0 (250) 0 3 7 42
ISOTOPE TRACERS 9 5 4 14 7 16 2 57 200 30 600 370 4 3 7 68
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 10 5 5 10 ~ 15 2 51 100 20 500 380 4 1 9 64
FLOW LEAK DETECTION 10 7 6 14 7 7 3 54 0 10 0 (10) 0 n 10 64
OPTICAL PROXIMITY 8 7 5 12 7 14 4 57 100 100 400 200 2 2 8 67
TORQUING 8 8 6 16 7 7 3 55 0 10 0 (10) 0 0 10 65
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK S-K $eeK 10 0 10 120
ULTRASONIC LEAK 12 6 7 10 5 12 3 55 100 20 200 80 1 2 8 64
ACOUSTIC HOLOGRAPHY 8 4 6 8 4 10 5 45 200 10 200 (10) 0 4 6 51
ISOTOPE TRACERS 12 6 4 15 4 14 1 56 200 30 300 70 1 3 7 64
PENTOXIDE POLAROGRAPHY 10 7 5 10 5 10 2 49 200 20 100 1'120) 0 4 6 55
HYGROMETRY 10 7 6 8 5 9 2 47 50 20 100 30 0 1 9 56
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 12 6 4 12 4 12 1 51 100 30 300 170 2 1 9 62
LASER SURFACE SCATTERING 8 5 5 10 5 12 2 47 200 30 200 (30) 0 3 7 54
OPTICAL LEAK 8 5 4 14 5 12 3 51 200 20 200 (20) 0 3 7 58
BORESCOPING 7 7 7 8 8 8 2 47 0 10 0 (10) 0 0 10 57
DIFFERENTIAL RADIOMETRY 8 5 5 14 5 12 3 52 200 20 200 (20) 0 3 7 59
HOLOGRAPHIC SURFACE MAPPING 10 4 4 12 5 12 2 49 200 30 200 (30) 0 3 7 56
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20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 SOK SOK $-K $-~ 10 0 10 120PERFECT SCORE
ULTRASONIC LEAK 12 6 7 12 5 12 3 57 100 20 200 80 1 2 8 66
ISOTOPE TRACERS 12 6 4 15 4 12 1 54 200 30 300 70 1 3 7 62
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 12 6 4 12 4 12 1 51 100 30 300 170 2 1 9 61
LASER SURFACE SCATTERING 8 5 5 10 5 12 2 47 200 30 200 (30) 0 3 7 54
OPTICAL LEAK 8 5 4 14 5 12 3 51 200 20 200 (20) 0 2 8 59
BORESCOPING 7 7 7 8 8 8 2 47 0 10 0 (10) 0 0 10 57
DIFFERENTIAL RADIOMETRY 8 5 5 14 5 12 3 52 200 20 200 (20) 0 ~ e 60
HOLOGRAPHIC SURFACE MAPPING 8 4 4 12 5 12 2, 47 200 30 200 (30) 0 3 7 54
OPTICAL PROXIMITY 7 7 6 8 5 7 2 43 100 20 100 (20) 0 2 8 51IHALOGEN LEAK 10 6 7 12 5 10 3 53 50 10 200 140 1 1 1~ I 63FLOW LEAK 10 5 6 13 5 10 3 52 0 10 100 90 1 0 63
MASS SPECTROMETRY 10 5 6 13 4 10 3 51 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 I 62
THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY LEAK 14 7 7 12 5 12 3 61 50 10 200 140 1 1 9 i 71
TORQUING 6 7 7 6 7 9 1 43 100 20 100 (20) 0 1 9 i 52
PRESSURE DECAY 12 5 6 8 5 10 3 49 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 60
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PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK t'''K~ $.. K 10 0 10 120
ULTRASONIC LEAK 12 6 6 11 5 12 3 55 100 20 200 80 1 2 8 64
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 14 6 5 14 4 12 1 56 100 30 300 170 2 1 9 67
OPTICAL LEAK 9 5 4 12 5 '10 3 48 200 20 200 (20) 0 2 8 56
DIFFERENTIAL RADIOMETRY 9 5 5 12 5 10 3 49 200 20 200 (20) 0 2 8 57
HALOGEN LEAK 10 5 6 12 5 12 2 52 50 10 200 140 1 1 9 62
FLOW LEAK 9 5 6 12 5 10 3 50 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 61
MASS SPECTROMETRY 9 5 6 12 5 9 '3 49 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 60
THERMAL LEAK 12 7 7 12 6 13 3 60 50 10 200 140 1 1 9 70
PRESSURE DECAY 10 5 5 8 5 10 3 46 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 57
I
I
I
I
I
. ,-
- .._--- -- .-
_.. -
-
w
o
o
BETWEEN-FLIGHT DIAGNOSTIC TECHNOLOGY GRADING
FAILURE MODE 16 TECHNICAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT
REQUIREMENTS FEATURES - LLIIII l§CONTAMINATED ~ cIII z: ~
HYDRAULIC CONTROL VI ... ;;: ': ~C' ~ III -0 0 C LLIC ..J
.... >- 0
'"'
VI III
..J~ ~ -D- ....
'"' z: ..J
III <
.... z: .... VI 0 C ... ~ C' C'0:: 0 ..J >- z: > < LLI~ .... >- .... ... ..J III - >~ .... .... 0 c U LLI.... " ..J a:l .... III ~ .... VI .... >- 0c < < .... --' :IE: .....'"' --' '"' .... ... 0 ... 8 ~ LLI ..J... -' ... '"' a:l 0 C' z: ~ ..J 0 0 <X LLI C z: LLIINSPECTION ..J ... III LLI ~ LLI ~ S .... LLI ~ 0 :E ~ ....D- '"' .1 lJ LLI U ,~ ~ 0=:l D- ~ LLI z: D-TECHNOLOGY D- z: 0 ~ ....< < D- o 0 III .... 0:: ...
PERFECT SCORE 20 10 10 20 10 20 10 100 $OK $OK $-K. $-K 10 0 10 120
ULTRASONIC LEAK 12 6 6 9 5 12 4 54 100 20 200 80 1 2 8 63
PARTICLE ANALYSIS 14 6 5 14 4 12 2 57 100 30 300 170 2 1 9 68
OPTICAL LEAK 9 5 4 10 5 10 4 47 200 20 200 (20) a 2 8 55
DIFFERENTIAL RADIOMETRY 9 5 5 10 5 10 4 48 200 20 200 (20) 0 2 8 56
PRESSURE DECAY 10 5 6 10 5 9 4 49 0 10 100 90 1 0 10 60
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